

APPENDIX TO COMMITTEE REPORT
ON COMMUNIST TAKEOVER AND
OCCUPATION OF POLAND

POLISH DOCUMENTS REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE
ON COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

UNDER AUTHORITY OF

H. Res. 346 and H. Res. 438



DECEMBER 31, 1954.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1955

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AND THE FORCED INCORPORATION OF THE BALTIC STATES INTO THE U. S. S. R.

CHARLES J. KERSTEN, Wisconsin, *Chairman*

FRED E. BUSBEY, Illinois

RAY J. MADDEN, Indiana

ALVIN M. BENTLEY, Michigan

THADDEUS M. MACHROWICZ, Michigan

EDWARD J. BONIN, Pennsylvania

THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut

PATRICK J. HILLINGS, California

MICHAEL A. FEIGHAN, Ohio

JAMES J. MCTIGUE, *Committee Counsel*

EDWARD M. O'CONNOR, *Staff Director*

JAN KARSEKI, *Consultant*

CONTENTS

	Page
1. Secret Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Nonaggression Between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, August 23, 1939.....	1
2. Despatch of September 17, 1939, from Mr. Grzybowski, Polish Ambassador in Moscow, to the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs reporting his conversation with M. Potemkin, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.....	1
3. Text of Note of September 17, 1939, read by M. Potemkin, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to M. Grzybowski, Polish Ambassador in Moscow.....	2
4. Communiqué issued on September 17, 1939, by the Polish Embassy in London.....	2
5. Soviet-German Agreement signed in Moscow September 28, 1939.....	3
6. Polish Government's protest of September 30, 1939, against the German-Soviet Agreement of September 28, 1939, presented by the Polish Ambassador in London to the British Foreign Office.....	4
7. Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R. issued in Moscow on November 29, 1939, concerning the acquisition of citizenship of the U. S. S. R. by the inhabitants of the Western districts of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian S. S. R.....	5
8. Polish Government's Protest of February 3, 1940, against the conscription of Polish citizens by the Red Army, sent to Allied and Neutral Governments through Polish diplomatic representatives....	5
9. Polish Government's Protest of July 25, 1940, against the annexation of the district of Wilno, sent to Allied and Neutral Governments through Polish diplomatic representatives.....	6
10. Polish-Soviet Agreement signed in London, July 30, 1941.....	6
11. Communiqué issued by the British Foreign Office in London, July 30, 1941.....	7
12. Decree of August 12, 1941, by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R. granting amnesty to Polish citizens deprived of their freedom on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.....	8
13. Military Agreement Between the Polish High Command and the Soviet High Command.....	8
14. Note of October 13, 1941, from Ambassador Kot to Mr. Vishinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs in Moscow, drawing attention to the incomplete fulfillment of Soviet obligations concerning Polish citizens, under the Agreement of July 30, 1941.....	10
15. Note of November 10, 1941, from the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, concerning conscription by the Red Army of Polish citizens of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Jewish origin.....	13
16. Note of December 1, 1941, from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in reply to the Note of the Polish Embassy of November 10, 1941, concerning the conscription by the Red Army of Polish citizens of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Jewish origin.....	14
17. Conversation of Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski, Pres., Council of Ministers of Republic of Poland, with J. Stalin, Pres., Council of People's Commissars of U. S. S. R., held in Kremlin, Dec. 3, 1941. Present: Prof. Kot, Polish Ambassador; Mr. W. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs; Gen. Anders, C-in-C of Polish Armed Forces in U. S. S. R.; and Mr. Molotov's secretary.....	15
18. Declaration of Friendship and Mutual Assistance signed in Moscow on December 4, 1941, by General Sikorski for the Government of the Republic of Poland and by Premier Stalin for the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.....	27

	Page
19. Note of December 9, 1941, from the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs concerning Polish citizenship-----	27
20. Conversation of General Anders with J. Stalin, Chairman of the People's Commissars, at the Kremlin on March 18, 1942.-----	28
21. Note of July 22, 1942, from Minister Sokolnicki, the Chargé d'Affaires of the Republic of Poland, to the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Achmed Khan, the Ambassador of Afghanistan in Kuybyshev, on the infringement of Diplomatic Immunity of the Members of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland.-----	37
22. Note of January 16, 1943, from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R. to the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev, claiming as Soviet citizens who on November 1-2, 1939, found themselves on Polish territories occupied by the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-----	39
23. Note of January 26, 1943, from Mr. Raczynski, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U. S. S. R., in reply to the Note of January 16, 1943, concerning Polish citizenship in the Soviet Union.-----	40
24. 2. Excerpts from Ambassador Romer's conversation with Premier Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, at the Kremlin during the night of February 26-27, 1943.-----	41
25. Note of March 8, 1943, from Mr. Raczynski, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U. S. S. R., protesting against the execution of W. Adler and H. Ehrlich.-----	47
26. Note of March 31, 1943, from Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U. S. S. R., to Mr. E. Raczynski, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, in reply to the Note of March 8, 1943, protesting against the execution of W. Adler and H. Ehrlich.-----	48
27. Communiqué of the Soviet Information Bureau of April 15, 1943, regarding the information of the German propaganda about the mass murder of Polish officers in the neighborhood of Smolensk.-----	49
28. Statement of the Polish Government of April 17, 1943, published in London, April 18, 1943, concerning the discovery of graves of Polish officers near Smolensk.-----	50
29. Communiqué issued on April 23, 1943, by the Board of Directors of the International Red Cross in Geneva formulating the position concerning the conditions for the participation of the International Red Cross in the carrying out of investigations of graves of Polish officers in the vicinity of Smolensk.-----	51
30. Note of April 25, 1943, from Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Romer, Polish Ambassador in the U. S. S. R., severing relations between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government.-----	51
31. Summary concerning: (a) <i>Polish Army in the U. S. S. R.</i> ; (b) <i>The Missing Polish Officers in the U. S. S. R.</i> ; (c) <i>Relief for Polish Citizens in the U. S. S. R.</i> ; (d) <i>Citizenship of Polish Deportees and Soviet Territorial Claims</i> .-----	52
32. Statement of the Polish Government of April 28, 1943, concerning the decision of the Soviet Government to sever relations with the Polish Government.-----	52
33. Stalin's Interview with the Correspondent of "Times" of May 4th, 1943, Regarding Polish-Soviet Relations.-----	54
34. Press notice on the creation of a Polish division in the name of Tadeusz Kosciuszko.-----	54
35. Gen. W. Sikorski's reply of May 6, 1943, in the "New York Times" to Stalin's interview with the correspondent of the "Times".-----	54
36. Note of May 13, 1943, from the Government of the Republic of Poland to the Foreign Office concerning the organization of a Polish division on the territory of the U. S. S. R.-----	55
37. Telegram of the Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars of the U. S. S. R. to the members of the Presidium of the Convention of the Union of Polish Patriots in the U. S. S. R.-----	56
38. Notation of Mr. T. Romer, Minister of Foreign Affairs, from his conversation with Minister Eden, of August 12, 1943, containing the summary of the Polish point of view concerning the question of restoring Polish-Soviet relations.-----	56

39. Aide memoire of the Department of State of August 12, 1943, submitted by the Ambassador of the United States to the Soviet Government in Moscow concerning the reestablishment of Polish-Soviet relations.....	57
40. Memorandum of United States Ambassador A. J. Drexel Biddle of August 12, 1943, which contains explanations to the Aide-Mémoire of August 12, 1943.....	58
41. Minutes of Minister Romer on the Conference with Mr. Drexel Biddle, Ambassador of the United States, on August 17, 1943, on Anglo-American Intervention, at Moscow, and on the Conference with Sir Owen O'Malley, Ambassador of Great Britain.....	58
42. Report of Ambassador E. Raczynski of September 3, 1943, concerning his conversation with Minister Eden held on September 3, 1943, after Eden's return from the Quebec Conference.....	60
43. Memorandum of October 9, 1943, of Mr. Zaranski, secretary of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in London, concerning the conversation with Mr. Roberts of the Foreign Office held on October 8, 1943, in relation to the Soviet Reply to the Anglo-American demarche in Moscow.....	62
44. Minutes of Counselor Zaranski's Conversation on November 9, 1943, with Mr. Roberts from the Foreign Office concerning the reestablishment of Polish-Soviet relations.....	63
45. Proclamation by the Plenipotentiary in Poland of the Polish Government on November 15, 1943, to the population in the border regions..	64
46. Memorandum of the Polish Government of December 16, 1943, handed by Ambassador E. Raczynski to Minister Eden on the situation in Poland in connection with the Entry of Soviet Troops Onto Polish territory.....	65
47. Declaration of the Polish Government of January 5th, 1944, in connection with the Crossing of the Polish Frontiers by Soviet Troops..	71
48. Note of Ambassador Raczynski to the Foreign Office of January 16, 1944, Regarding the situation created in Poland by the entry of Soviet troops.....	72
49. Excerpt from Hansard of January 26, 1944, containing the question of Mr. Pickthorn, M. P., and the answer of Minister Eden in the matter of the Polish-Soviet Frontier.....	75
50. Remarks from Department of State Bulletin of January 29, 1944, with respect to the rejection by the Soviet Government of the good offices of the United States in the relationship between Poland and the U. S. S. R.....	75
51. Memorandum of the Department of State of February 1, 1944, containing the reply to the memorandum of Ambassador Ciechanowski of 26 January 1944 in the matter of the Polish-Soviet Frontier....	76
52. Excerpt from Prime Minister Churchill's Address in the House of Commons of February 22, 1944, regarding his conversation with Stalin at Teheran on Problems of the Polish-Soviet Frontier.....	76
53. Excerpt from Minister Eden's Statement in the House of Commons of February 23, 1944, in which he denies the division of Europe into spheres of influence.....	78
54. Letter of Ambassador Raczynski to Ambassador Eden of June 1, 1944, containing protest of the Polish Government against the mobilisation ordered by Soviet authorities in the Eastern Provinces of Poland.....	78
55. President Roosevelt's letter to Premier Mikolajczyk of June 14, 1944, and a letter of Premier Mikolajczyk in connection with the conclusion of his visit in Washington.....	79
56. Memorandum of the Polish Ambassador to the United States of July 11, 1944, regarding Premier Mikolajczyk's conversation with representatives of the Soviet Government after his return to Washington.....	80
57. Decree of the National Council in the Homeland of July 21, 1944, on the establishment of the Polish Committee for National Liberation.....	81
58. The Decree of the Polish National Council of July 21, 1944, on taking over the supreme command over the Polish Army in the U. S. S. R. and on the consolidation of the People's Army and the Polish Army in the U. S. S. R. in a unified Polish Army.....	82

	Page
59. Memorandum of Minister T. Romer of July 25, 1944, submitted to Prime Minister Churchill regarding the formation of a "Polish Committee of National Liberation" at Chelm-----	83
60. Aide-Mémoire submitted by Minister Romer to Minister Eden of July 25, 1944, with regard to Bringing Pressure on the Soviet Government to regulate the relationship between the Red Army and the Home Army-----	88
61. Reuter's Telegram published in <i>Evening Standard</i> on July 27, 1944, concerning details of Agreement signed in Moscow between the Government of the U. S. S. R. and the Polish Committee for National Liberation-----	89
62. Prime Minister Churchill's Declaration concerning Poland, made in the House of Commons on August 2, 1944-----	90
63. Announcement of August 2, 1944, of the Radio Service concerning the Outbreak of the Uprising in Warsaw-----	91
64. Telegram of W. Raczkievicz, President of the Republic of Poland, to President Roosevelt of August 12, 1944, concerning aid to Warsaw-----	91
65. A message of the Delegate for the Home-land, appointed by the Government, and of the Chairman of the Council of National Unity, of August 23, 1944, to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill concerning the wrong committed under Russian occupation in Poland-----	91
66. Note of Ambassador E. Raczynski to Minister Eden of August 24, 1944, concerning the persecution of members of the Home Army and administrative authorities by Soviet Occupational Powers-----	92
67. Memorandum delivered by Ambassador Ciechanowski to Mr. Durbrow of the Department of State for Foreign Affairs on August 25, 1944, concerning the conduct of the Soviets towards the uprising in Warsaw-----	97
68. Declaration of the British Government, of August 30, 1944, concerning the recognition of rights of combatants to the Members of the Polish Home Army-----	99
69. Communiqué of the Soviet Radio, of September 14, 1944, concerning the conclusion of an agreement between the Polish Committee for National Liberation and the Governments of the Ukrainian S. S. R. and the Byelo-Russian S. S. R. of September 9, 1944, concerning the transfer of population-----	100
70. Radio Communiqué from the Polish Committee for National Liberation dated Lublin, September 23, 1944, concerning the Agreement signed with the Government of the S. S. R. of Lithuania with respect to the transfer of the population-----	101
71. Telegram sent by Premier Mikolajczyk to Marshal Stalin through the good offices of Prime Minister Churchill, dated September 29, 1944-----	102
72. Note of T. Romer, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, of October 7, 1944, characterizing Soviet policy in reference to Poland-----	102
73. The Conference in Moscow, Enclosures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17-----	106
74. Second note of Ambassador E. Raczynski of October 19, 1944, in the matter of conduct of the Soviet authorities on the territories of the Polish Republic-----	146
75. Minutes of Minister T. Romer, Concerning the Conversation which took place November 2, 1944, between Premier Mikolajczyk, Minister T. Romer, and Ambassador Raczynski, with Prime Minister Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan, regarding the Polish-Soviet frontiers-----	149
76. Minutes of Minister T. Romer dated November 28, 1944, concerning the conversation which took place on that day between Premier Mikolajczyk and Minister Romer and Prime Minister Churchill, Minister Eden and Ambassador O'Malley regarding matters caused by the crisis of Mr. Mikolajczyk's government-----	155
77. Address of Mr. W. Raczkievicz, President of the Republic of Poland, given on November 29, 1944, in connection with the taking of oaths of the members of the new Cabinet of Ministers-----	158
78. Reuter's Communiqué of January 5, 1945, concerning the English reaction to the recognition of P. K. W. N. by the Soviets as the so-called Temporary Government of the Republic of Poland-----	160

79. Two Aides-Mémoire presented on January 18, 1945, by the Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at the Presidium of the Council of Ministers concerning the good offices of the Government of the United States with the aim to restore Polish-Soviet relations-----	160
80. Memorandum of the Government of the Republic of Poland of January 22, 1945, concerning the settlement of the Polish-Russian disputes by arbitration-----	161
81. Full text of resolutions passed by the "Big Three" at the Yalta Conference on February 11, 1945-----	162
82. Declaration of the Government of the Republic of Poland of February 13, 1945, concerning the protest against the resolutions passed by the "Big Three" in matters pertaining to Poland-----	163
83. Telegram from President Roosevelt dated February 16, 1945, to Prime Minister Arciszewski concerning the Yalta resolutions pertaining to Poland, and the telegraphic reply to this telegram sent by Prime Minister Arciszewski dated February 17, 1945-----	164
84. Note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. Tarnowski, to the Ambassador of Great Britain, Sir St. Clair O'Malley, pertaining to the Yalta resolutions-----	165
85. Letter of Mr. C. F. A. Warner of the Foreign Office to Ambassador E. Raczynski of February 19, 1945, stimulating him to reveal names of Polish Underground activities-----	169
86. Letter of Prime Minister Arciszewski to Prime Minister Churchill of March 8, 1945, containing an appendix with informations from the Homeland-----	170
87. Prime Minister Churchill's Reply of March 17, 1945, to letter from Prime Minister Arciszewski, dated March 8, 1945-----	174
88. Message from President W. Raczkiewicz dated April 20, 1945, to President Truman, requesting that the principles of justice be defended-----	175

INTRODUCTION

The documents published in this volume were presented to the committee by Count Edward Raczyński, former Polish Ambassador to England (1934-45). During the course of his testimony at the committee hearings in London on June 14, 1954 the documents were made a part of the committee's records and marked for identification as London Exhibits Nos. 5 and 6.

The originals of these documents are in Polish and may be found in the committee files.

These documents have never before been published. They were known only to the individuals concerned and a limited number of statesmen. The committee feels that their publication will make an invaluable contribution to a better understanding of Soviet war diplomacy and Communist duplicity.

83D CONGRESS <i>2d Session</i>	}	HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES	}	REPT. 2684 Part 4
-----------------------------------	---	--------------------------	---	----------------------

POLISH DOCUMENTS REPORTS

DECEMBER 31, 1954.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. KERSTEN of Wisconsin, from the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, submitted the following

R E P O R T

[Pursuant to H. Res. 346 and H. Res. 438]

POLISH DOCUMENTS REPORT

No. 1

Secret Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Nonaggression Between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

AUGUST 23, 1939.

On the occasion of the signature of the Nonaggression Pact between the German Reich and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics the undersigned plenipotentiaries of each of the two parties discussed in strictly confidential conversations the questions of the boundary of their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. These conversations led to the following conclusions:

1. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the U. S. S. R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognized by each party.

2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the U. S. S. R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San.

The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments.

In any event both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement.

3. With regard to Southeastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterestedness in these areas.

4. This protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret.

Moscow, August 23, 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich:

V. RIBBENTROP

Plenipotentiary of the Government of the U. S. S. R.:

V. MOLOTOV

No. 2

Despatch of September 17, 1939, from Mr. Grzybowski, Polish Ambassador in Moscow, to the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs reporting his conversation with M. Potemkin, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs

Moscow, September 17, 1939.

Mr. Potemkin sent for me today, September 17, at 3 a. m., and read me a Note from his Government, signed by Premier Molotov. The

Note communicates that the Soviet Government have ordered their troops to cross the Polish frontier. The motives given in the Note were of such a nature that I refused to take it into cognizance and categorically protested against its contents. In view of the absence of Soviet diplomatic representatives from Poland, I agreed only to transmit the above information. I await instructions.

No. 3

Text of Note of September 17, 1939, read by M. Potemkin, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to M. Grzybowski, Polish Ambassador in Moscow

The Polish-German War has revealed the internal bankruptcy of the Polish State. During the course of ten days' hostilities Poland has lost all her industrial areas and cultural centres. Warsaw no longer exists as the capital of Poland. The Polish Government has disintegrated, and no longer shows any sign of life. This means that the Polish State and its Government have, in fact, ceased to exist. Therefore the Agreements concluded between the U. S. S. R. and Poland have ceased to operate. Left to her own devices and bereft of leadership, Poland has become a suitable field for all manner of hazards and surprises, which may constitute a threat to the U. S. S. R. For these reasons the Soviet Government, which hitherto has preserved neutrality, cannot any longer observe a neutral attitude towards these facts.

The Soviet Government further cannot view with indifference the fact that the kindred Ukrainian and White Ruthenian people, who live on Polish territory and who are at the mercy of fate, are left defenceless.

In these circumstances, the Soviet Government has directed the High Command of the Red Army to order the troops to cross the frontier and to take under their protection the life and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia.

At the same time the Soviet Government proposes to take all measures to extricate the Polish people from the unfortunate war into which they were dragged by their unwise leaders, and enable them to live a peaceful life.

No. 4

Communiqué issued on September 17, 1939, by the Polish Embassy in London

LONDON, September 17, 1939.

On September 17, at 4 a. m., Soviet troops crossed the frontier of Poland at many points and were met immediately with strong resistance on the part of the Polish national army. A sharp encounter in particular is being fought near the frontier in the region of Molo-deczno.

The pretext which the Soviet Government advance in order to justify this flagrant act of direct aggression is that the Polish Government has ceased to exist, and that it has abandoned the territories outside the zone of war with Germany without protection. The Polish Government cannot enter into any discussion of the pretext which

the Soviet Government has invented in order to justify the violation of the Polish frontier.

The Polish Government, responsible to the President of the Republic and to the duly elected National Parliament, are functioning on Polish territory and are carrying on the war against the German aggressors by all the means in their power.

By the act of direct aggression committed this morning the Soviet Government have flagrantly violated the Polish-Russian Pact of Non-Aggression concluded in Moscow on July 25, 1932, in which both parties mutually undertook to abstain from all aggressive action or from attack against each other. Moreover, on May 5, 1934, by the Protocol signed in Moscow, the Above Pact of Non-Aggression was prolonged until December 31, 1945.

By the Convention concluded in London on July 3, 1933, Soviet Russia and Poland agreed on a definition of aggression, which clearly stamped as an act of aggression any encroachment upon the territory of one Contracting Party by the armed forces of the other and furthermore, that no consideration of a political, military, economic, or any other order could in any circumstances serve as a pretext or excuse for committing an act of aggression.

Therefore, by the act of wanton aggression committed this morning, the Soviet Government stands self-condemned as a violator of its international obligations, thus contradicting all the moral principles upon which Soviet Russia pretended to base her foreign policy since her admittance into the League of Nations.

No. 5

Soviet-German Agreement signed in Moscow September 28, 1939

The Government of the U. S. S. R. and the German Government, following the collapse of the former Polish State, consider it as exclusively their own task to restore peace and order in these territories and to assure to the peoples inhabiting them a peaceful existence which will correspond to their national characteristics. With this object in view, they have concluded the following Agreement:

ARTICLE 1

The Government of the U. S. S. R. and the German Government establish, as the frontier between their respective State interests in the territory of the former Polish State, a line which is marked on the attached map and which will be given in more detail in a supplementary Protocol.

ARTICLE 2

Both countries recognize as final the frontier between their respective State interests, as set out in Article I, and will resist any interference with this decision on the part of other Powers.

ARTICLE 3

The German Government will carry out the necessary State reconstruction on the territory west of the line indicated in Article I, and the Soviet Government on the territory east of this line.

ARTICLE 4

The Government of the U. S. S. R. and the German Government regard the above-mentioned reconstruction as a reliable foundation for the future development of friendly relations between their peoples.

ARTICLE 5

This agreement is subject to ratification. The exchange of instruments of ratification is to take place as soon as possible in Berlin.

The agreement enters into force from the moment of its signature.

MOLOTOV

RIBBENTROP

No. 6

Polish Government's protest of September 30, 1939, against the German-Soviet Agreement of September 28, 1939, presented by the Polish Ambassador in London to the British Foreign Office*

In face of the flagrant violation of the sacred rights of the Polish State and the Polish Nation constituted by the Agreement of September 28 between Germany and the U. S. S. R., disposing of territories of the Polish Republic for the benefit of the two aggressor States, in the name of the Polish Government I make the most formal and solemn protest against this machination woven between Berlin and Moscow in contempt of all international obligations and all human morality.

Poland will never recognize this act of violence, and strong in the justice of her cause she will not cease to struggle for the day when, her territory liberated from the invaders, her legitimate rights will be established in their entirety.

By the heroic resistance of her army, by the patriotic sacrifice of all her population which has been demonstrated in the heroic defence of the capital city of Warsaw, of Lwow, of Gdynia, of Modlin and of so many other towns, the Polish nation has clearly proved to the world its steadfast will to live in freedom and independence.

Basing herself on the unanimous sympathy of all the countries which respect liberty and good faith in relations between peoples, and confident in the steadfast support which is guaranteed her by her treaties of alliance, Poland will continue the struggle by all means in her power, confident in her future and in ultimate victory.

(For the similar protests concerning: the liquidation of local administration as well as political parties and all non-Communist organizations, Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish alike; annexation of Polish territories into Soviet Republics under the cover of falsified elections; imposition of Soviet citizenship on the inhabitants of those territories; recruitment to the Red Army; looting of public and private property; confiscations and economic exploitation; mass deportations—see The Katyn Forest Massacre, Select Committee to Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Existence and Circumstances. Eighty Second Congress, Second Session. H. Res. 390 and H. Res. 539. Part 4. Exhibit 19 pp. 983-1227.)

No. 7

Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R. issued in Moscow on November 29, 1939, concerning the acquisition of citizenship of the U. S. S. R. by the inhabitants of the Western districts of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian S. S. R.

1. In conformity with the Citizenship of the U. S. S. R. Act of August 19th 1938, it is decreed that the following are henceforth citizens of the U. S. S. R.:

a) former Polish citizens who were on the territory of the Western districts¹ of the Ukraine and White Ruthenia when these became part of the U. S. S. R. (November 1 and 2, 1939).

b) persons who arrived in the U. S. S. R. on the basis of the agreement of November 16, 1939, between the Government of the U. S. S. R. and the German Government as well as those who arrived as a result of the cession by the U. S. S. R. to Lithuania of the city of Wilno and the district¹ of Wilno in accordance with the agreement of October 10, 1939.

2. Former Polish citizens resident in the Western districts¹ of the Ukraine and White Ruthenia who were not present in the territory of these districts¹ on November 1 and 2, 1939, and do not possess Soviet citizenship can acquire the citizenship of the U. S. S. R. by the procedure provided in Article 3 of the Citizenship of the U. S. S. R. Act.

3. Such persons enumerated in Paragraph 1 of the present Decree as were deprived of Soviet citizenship under the Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the R. S. F. S. R. of December 15th, 1921 may acquire citizenship of the U. S. S. R. by the procedure provided in Article 3 of the Citizenship of the U. S. S. R. Act.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R.

M. KALININ.

Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R.

A. GORKIN.

No. 8

Polish Government's Protest of February 3, 1940, against the conscription of Polish citizens by the Red Army, sent to allied and Neutral Governments through Polish diplomatic representatives

By order of my Government I have the honor to submit the following for Your Excellency's information:

The Soviet authorities have proceeded on the territories of the Republic of Poland occupied by the armies of the U. S. S. R. to carry out a military census of all men aged from 18 to 50 and of all women who have attended nursing courses, and this as a preliminary step to their military service.

Further to its protest against the decision to incorporate the above mentioned territories in the U. S. S. R. and having regard to the

¹ Oblast.

stipulations of international law in force, the Polish Government protests against this new violation of international law and custom.

In drawing attention to the fact that the use of force to compel Polish nationals to serve in the army of a State which occupied by violence part of the territory of Poland, will entail a large number of victims, the Polish Government here and now hold responsible therefore the Government of the U. S. S. R.

No. 9

Polish Government's Protest of July 25, 1940, against the annexation of the district of Wilno, sent to Allied and Neutral Governments through Polish diplomatic representatives

By order of my Government I have the honor to submit the following for Your Excellency's information:

The Government of the U. S. S. R. has proceeded to annex the territories of the three Baltic Republics. This annexation also includes the territory of Wilno which was already illegally occupied by Soviet troops in September 1939 and retroceded to the Lithuanian Government in October 1939, and is now reoccupied by Soviet troops simultaneously with the Lithuanian territory.

The Polish Government solemnly protests against this new violation of international law by the U. S. S. R. and formally reserves all its rights to the territories of the Republic of Poland occupied by Soviet troops whether in September 1939 or recently. This act of violence committed by the U. S. S. R. confers upon it no rights whatsoever to the territories thus occupied, and the Polish Government reserve the right to claim at the appropriate time reparation from the Soviet Government for damages which the Soviet occupation has caused or may cause to Poland and Polish nationals.

No. 10

Polish-Soviet Agreement signed in London, July 30, 1941

The Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have concluded the present Agreement and decided as follows:

1. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognizes that the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 relative to territorial changes in Poland have lost their validity. The Government of the Republic of Poland declares that Poland is not bound by any Agreement with any third State directed against the U. S. S. R.

2. Diplomatic relations will be restored between the two Governments upon the signature of this Agreement and an exchange of ambassadors will follow immediately.

3. The two Governments mutually undertake to render one another aid and support of all kinds in the present war against Hitlerite Germany.

4. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expresses its consent to the formation on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of a Polish Army under a commander appointed by the Government of the Republic of Poland, in agree-

ment with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Polish Army on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be subordinated in operational matters to the Supreme Command of the U. S. S. R. on which there will be a representative of the Polish Army. All details as to command, organization and employment of this force will be settled in a subsequent Agreement.

5. This Agreement will come into force immediately upon its signature and without ratification. The present Agreement is drawn up in two copies, each of them in the Russian and Polish languages. Both texts have equal force.

PROTOCOL

1. As soon as diplomatic relations are re-established the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will grant amnesty to all Polish citizens who are at present deprived of their freedom on the territory of the U. S. S. R., either as prisoners of war or on other adequate grounds.

2. The present Protocol comes into force simultaneously with the Agreement of July 30, 1941.

WŁADYSŁAW SIKORSKI

I. MAISKI

No. 11

Communiqué issued by the British Foreign Office in London, July 30, 1941

1. An agreement between the Republic of Poland and the Soviet Union was signed in the Secretary of State's room at the Foreign Office on July 30. General Sikorski, Polish Prime Minister, signed for Poland: Mr. Maiski, Soviet Ambassador, signed for the Soviet Union. Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden were present.

2. The agreement is being published.

3. After the signature of the agreement, Mr. Eden handed to General Sikorski an official Note in the following terms:

“On the occasion of the signature of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of today, I desire to take this opportunity of informing you that in conformity with the provision of the agreement of mutual assistance between the United Kingdom and Poland of the 25th of August 1939, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have entered into no undertakings towards the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics which affect the relations between that country and Poland. I also desire to assure you that His Majesty's Government do not recognize any territorial changes which have been effected in Poland since August 1939.”

General Sikorski handed to Mr. Eden the following reply:

“The Polish Government take note of your letter dated July 30 and desire to express sincere satisfaction at the statement that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom do not recognize any territorial changes which have been effected in Poland since August 1939. This corresponds with the view of the Polish Government which, as they have previously informed His Majesty's Government, have never recognized any territorial changes effected in Poland since the outbreak of the war.”

No. 12

Decree of August 12, 1941, by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R. granting amnesty to Polish citizens deprived of their freedom on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

An amnesty is granted to all Polish citizens on Soviet territory at present deprived of their freedom as prisoners of war or on other adequate grounds.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council
of the U. S. S. R.

M. KALININ.

Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Council
of the U. S. S. R.

A. GORKIN.

No. 13

Military Agreement Between the Polish High Command and the Soviet High Command

1. The military August 14, 1941 agreement derives naturally from the political agreement of July 30, 1941.

2. A Polish army will be organized in the shortest possible time on the territory of the U. S. S. R., wherefore:

a) it will form part of the armed forces of sovereign Republic of Poland,

b) the soldiers of this army will take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of Poland,

c) it will be destined with the Armed Forces of the U. S. S. R. and other Allied States for the common fight against Germany,

d) after the end of the war, it will return to Poland,

e) during the entire period of common operations, it will be subordinated operationally to the High Command of the U. S. S. R. In respect of organization and personnel it will remain under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces, who will coordinate the orders and regulations concerning organization and personnel with the High Command of the U. S. S. R. through the Commander of Polish Army on the territory of the U. S. S. R.

3. The Commander of the Polish Army on the territory of the U. S. S. R. will be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces; the candidate for this appointment to be approved by the Government of the U. S. S. R.

4. The Polish Army on the territory of the U. S. S. R. will consist of units of land forces only. Their strength and number will depend on manpower, equipment and supplies available.

5. Conscripts and volunteers, having previously served in the Polish Air Force and Navy, will be sent to Great Britain to complement the establishments of the respective Polish services already existing there.

6. The formation of Polish units will be carried out in localities indicated by the High Command of the U. S. S. R. Officers and other ranks will be called from among Polish citizens on the territory of the U. S. S. R. by conscription and voluntary enlistment. Draft

boards will be established with the participation of U. S. S. R. authorities in localities indicated by them.

7. Polish units will be moved to the front only after they are fully ready for action. In principle they will operate in groups not smaller than divisions and will be used in accordance with the operational plans of the High Command of the U. S. S. R.

8. All soldiers of the Polish Army on the territory of the U. S. S. R. will be subject to Polish military laws and decrees.

Polish military courts will be established in the units for dealing with military offences and crimes against the establishment, the safety, the routine or the discipline of the Polish Army.

For crimes against the State, soldiers of the Polish Army on the territory of the U. S. S. R. will be answerable to the military courts of the U. S. S. R.

9. The organization and war equipment of the Polish units will as far as possible correspond to the standards established for the Polish Army in Great Britain.

The colors and insignia of the various services and military rank will correspond exactly to those established for the Polish Army in Great Britain.

10. The pay, rations, maintenance and other materiel problems will be in accordance with regulations of the U. S. S. R.

11. The sick and wounded soldiers of the Polish Army will receive treatment in hospitals and sanatoria on an equal basis with the soldiers of the U. S. S. R. and be entitled to pensions and allowances.

12. Armament, equipment, uniforms, motor transport etc. will be provided as far as possible by

- a) the Government of the U. S. S. R. from their own resources,
- b) the Polish Government from supplies granted on the basis of the Lend-Lease Act (an Act to promote the defense of the United States, approved March 11, 1941).

In this case, the Government of the U. S. S. R. will extend all possible transportation facilities.

13. Expenditures connected with the organization, equipment and maintenance of the Polish Army on the territory of the U. S. S. R. will be met from credits provided by the government of the U. S. S. R., to be refunded by the Polish Government after the end of the war.

This problem will be dealt with in a separate financial agreement.

14. Liaison will be established by

- 1) a Polish Military Mission attached to the High Command of the U. S. S. R.
- 2) a Soviet Military Mission attached to the Polish High Command in London.

Liaison officers attached to other commands will be appointed by mutual agreement.

15. All matters and details not covered by this agreement will be settled directly between the High Command of the Polish Army on the Territory of the U. S. S. R. and the corresponding authorities of the U. S. S. R.

16. This agreement is made in two copies, in the Polish and Russian languages, both texts are equally valid.

Plenipotentiary of the Polish High Command.

SZYSZKO BOHUSZ, *Brigadier-General*.

Plenipotentiary of the High Command of the U. S. S. R.

A. WASILEWSKIJ, *Major General.*

MOSCOW, August 14, 1941.

No. 14

Note of October 13th, 1941, from Ambassador Kot to Mr. Vishinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs in Moscow, drawing attention to the incomplete fulfillment of Soviet obligations concerning Polish citizens, under the Agreement of July 30, 1941

Moscow, October 13, 1941.

Mr. COMMISSAR: Referring to the Note of the Charge d'Affaires ad interim of the Republic of Poland addressed to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, No. 30/41 of August 22, 1941, and the Note Verbale of the Polish Embassy, No. D. 467/41 of September 27, 1941, I have the honor Mr. Commissar to inform you of the following:

In both the aforesaid Notes, as in my conversation with you, Mr. Commissar, I emphasized particularly the need for the fulfillment by the Soviet Government of the provisions of the Agreement concluded between the Polish Government and the Soviet Government on July 30, 1941, and of the provisions of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R. of August 12, 1941, concerning the release of Polish citizens from prisons, labour camps and localities of compulsory residence at the earliest possible date, at least before the coming winter, during which the departure from many of the camps would be most difficult if not altogether impossible. The question of release was also brought up by the Polish delegation at the two meetings of the Mixed Polish-Soviet Commission, when emphasis was laid on the special urgency of this problem.

During my conversation with you, Mr. Commissar, on September 20, I received your assurance that the Soviet authorities would take care that Polish citizens detained in distant Northern regions, where the climate is unsuitable for Poles, were transported to more suitable districts before the winter season set in. During my conversation on October 7, I quoted figures relating to Polish citizens who were still detained in large numbers in camps and mentioned the fact that certain categories among them had been transferred to very remote Northern regions. In spite of repeated Polish requests and the assurances given on behalf of the Soviets, this Embassy has not as yet received the list of localities nor the exact number of Polish citizens released.

Contrary to the assurances that except for a small number of individuals suspected, indicted or convicted of espionage on behalf of Germany, whose names and dossiers up to now have not been communicated to the Embassy, all Polish citizens had been set free and that in a small number of cases only was delay caused by purely technical considerations, the Embassy is in possession of information that there are still in a number of prisons and camps thousands of Polish citizens who were not informed of the Agreement concluded on July 30, 1941, or were informed that the provisions of this Agreement and of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R. of August 12 did not apply to them.

By way of example, may I state that Polish citizens are still being detained in prison at Saratov, Gorki, Balashov, Tschelabinsk, Kizel and in compulsory labour camps in the Primorski Kray in the North-Eastern extremity of the Yakut district (near the mouth of the Kolyma on the Arctic Ocean), near Aldan, in the region of Tomsk, Karaganda, in the mines of Karabash (Tschelabinsk district), in the Ivgiel camp (Svierdlovsk district), in the Archangle district and in the Republic of Komi, along the railway line under construction between Kotlas and Pechora and at other points.

More detailed information concerning the numbers and condition of these Polish citizens is given in the Annex to the present Note. As will be seen therefrom the local authorities either did not receive detailed orders concerning the treatment of Polish citizens after the conclusion of the Agreement of July 30, or, in some cases, the local authorities were content to deal with the matter in a purely pro forma way (the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs withdrew police supervision of the 2,000 Polish citizens employed in the mines of Karabash-Voloshynowski-Rudnik, but left the persons concerned where they were which actually made their position worse than before) or with a partial execution of the orders issued. It is to be assumed that various considerations have dictated this treatment and in some instances local authorities may have desired to secure for themselves virtually unpaid manpower, whence the tendency to release sometimes elderly, invalid or ailing persons, while the stronger and healthier are retained for compulsory labour.

I have the honor to draw your attention, Mr. Commissar, to another characteristic feature of the conduct of local government authorities towards Polish citizens who are released, or who approach them with the request for employment or for the assignment of a residence. This conduct, without doubt unknown to the Central authorities, which should cease in the interests of good relations between the Polish and Soviet Governments, consists in informing those concerned that the blame for their difficult situation rests with the Polish Government and their representatives in the U. S. S. R. Naturally Polish nationals are not misled by this, but it arouses unnecessary mistrust among the Polish population.

Information issued abroad by the Polish Government, entirely in line with good Polish-Soviet collaboration, is to the effect that Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have been liberated from prisons and camps. I presented to you, on the 7th of this month, copies of communiques issued by the Polish Telegraph Agency in London and New York. The Polish Government is of the opinion that such official information should correspond to the real situation of the Polish population in the U. S. S. R. In the common interest of both Governments the Polish-Soviet Agreement should be fully carried out so that in foreign countries no elements unfriendly to this collaboration and hostile to the U. S. S. R., should find in the difficult of the deported Polish population a theme for their propaganda.

The Polish Government could in no case agree that, as a result of the agreement of July 30, 1941, the lot of Polish citizens residing in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should become worse or that local authorities should carry out its provisions in a manner contrary to the declarations and statements of the representatives of the Soviet Government.

Consequently, in its Note, No. 30/41 of August 22, 1941, the Embassy presented a number of proposals forming a logical whole with a view to the practical solution of the problem of the Polish population in the U. S. S. R., in accordance with the interests of this population and of both Governments. The fact that the suggestions contained in point 2 were only carried out in part, and that points 3 and 4 were left completely unfulfilled, has meant that such Polish citizens as have been released have not been able to improve their living conditions and a large number of them have been forced to wander aimlessly and compelled to camp at railway stations or in the open air in the localities newly chosen for their residence. In view of the approaching winter which in some parts of the Soviet Union has already set in, many of them are threatened with death by starvation. Their position is rendered still worse by the fact that the local authorities not only refuse to carry out the suggestions of the Embassy, but do not even comply with the assurances given by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs contained in the Aide-Memoire of August 28, 1941, with regard to free railway fares, travelling subsidies, subsistence allowances and, most important of all, employment for the persons released.

I also venture to draw your attention, Mr. Commissar, to the fact that the organization of the Polish Army in the U. S. S. R. is not progressing in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Agreement of July 30, 1941, or with the intentions of the two Governments.

The Supreme Command of the Polish armed forces in the U. S. S. R. has vainly waited four weeks for a decision on the formation of further Polish divisions and the designation of the localities in which this formation is to take place. In consequence, numerous Polish citizens reporting for military service and rallying en masse to the Polish Army stream into the two already overcrowded camps, which lack the necessary number of tents, adequate food supplies and medicines. Thus a situation, harmful alike to the troops and to the common cause is being created. The local administrative authorities very often do not carry out the instructions issued by the central authorities with regard to questions concerning the Polish Army and create new additional difficulties, as for instance by declining to release from prisons and camps all Polish citizens, military and reservists, and in many instances by detaining the more physically fit elements, which reduces the military value of the units already formed. Moreover, considerable numbers of Polish citizens enrolled in the Red Army and subsequently transferred to the so-called labor battalions, have not up till now been directed to the Polish Army.

Thus the Polish contribution to the common struggle against Germany, contrary to the intentions of the Polish and Soviet Governments and to the unanimous will of the Polish citizens, is being weakened to the detriment of the cause of all the Allies.

In the profound belief that the Soviet Government attaches no less importance than the Polish Government to the development of friendly relations between the two States, I have the honor to request you, Mr. Commissar, to take measures to put into full effect all the proposals contained in the Note of the Embassy of August 22, and in particular the immediate release from prisons, camps and localities of compulsory domicile of all Polish citizens, the friendly treatment of those who are unfit for military service and the acceleration of the

decision concerning the formation of further large units of the Polish Army, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Agreement of July 30, 1941.

I have the honor to be, etc.

9

No. 15

1

Kot.

Note of November 10, 1941, from the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, concerning conscription by the Red Army, of Polish citizens of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Jewish origin

The Polish Embassy has the honor to submit the following for the information of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs:

According to information received, the War Commissar for Kazakhstan at Alma-Ata, General Schcherbakov issued orders that all Polish citizens deported by the Soviet Authorities from occupied Polish territory and possessing documents issued to them by these authorities, endorsed to the effect that they are of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian or Jewish origin are to be enrolled in the Red Army if they meet the age and fitness requirements.

After an intervention by the interested parties and by representative of this Embassy, General Schcherbakov declared that he was acting on instructions from the Central Authorities, who are alleged to have directed him to treat as citizens of the U. S. S. R. all citizens of the Republic of Poland of other than Polish origin possessing Soviet passports. Among others the following Polish citizens, despite protests on their part, were among those conscripted and sent it would seem to the Far East: Aleksander Rotstein, Silberspitz and Kotok.

This same discrimination between Polish citizens according to origin or race, devoid of any impartial basis and contrary to the provisions of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, is being practiced by the military authorities in Alma-Ata, who also explain to the Polish citizens reporting to them to settle various formalities connected with their enlistment in the Polish Army in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that they are acting on instructions from the Central Authorities. Only Polish citizens of Polish origin are given permits to travel to centers where the Polish Army is being organized, while Polish citizens of Ukrainian and Jewish origin are, it seems, categorically refused permits by the aforementioned authorities.

The Polish Embassy has the honor to request the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to cause instructions to be given to the War Commissar in Kazakhstan to apply impartially to all Polish citizens residing in the area under his authority, the principles resulting from the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, and the Polish-Soviet Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, which guarantee the right to serve in the Polish Army in the U. S. S. R. to every Polish citizen who is capable of bearing arms.

KUYBYSHEV, November 10, 1941.

No. 16

Note of December 1, 1941, from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in reply to the Note of the Polish Embassy of November 10, 1941, concerning the conscription by the Red Army of Polish citizens of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Jewish origin

In reply to the Note of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland No. D. 740/41 of November 10, 1941, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has the honor to state the following:

Referring to the fact of the conscription by the Red Army in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, as Soviet citizens, of citizens of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Jewish origin who left the territories of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia, the Embassy of the Polish Republic calls in question the existence of a legal basis for this order, considering that it is contrary to the principles of the Soviet-Polish Agreement of July 30, 1941 and the Soviet-Polish Military Agreement of August 14, 1941.

The People's Commissariat cannot agree with this point of view of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland. No foundation to support the point of view expressed in the Note of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland, referred to above, can be found in the Agreement of July 30, or in the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941. In accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R. of November 29, 1939, all citizens of Western districts of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian S. S. R. who found themselves on the territory of the said districts on November 1 and 2, 1939, respectively, acquired the citizenship of the U. S. S. R. in accordance with the Citizenship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Act of August 19, 1938. The Soviet Government's readiness to recognize as Polish citizens persons of Polish origin, who resided until November 1 and 2, 1939, on the aforementioned territory, gives evidence of good will and compliance on the part of the Soviet Government but can in no case serve as a basis for an analogous recognition of the Polish citizenship of persons of other origin, in particular those of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian or Jewish origin, since the question of the frontiers between the U. S. S. R. and Poland has not been settled and is subject to settlement in the future.

With regard to the Polish Embassy's reference to an order issued in Alma-Ata by General Shcherbakov, according to the information of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs no order was issued calling the aforementioned citizens to the ranks of the Red Army, but orders were given to call them up for work behind the lines, as is also done in the case of other citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

KUBYSHEV, *December 1, 1941.*

No. 17

Conversation of General Wladyslaw Sikorski, President of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland, with J. Stalin, President of the Council of People's Commissars of the U. S. S. R., held in the Kremlin on December 3, 1941. Present: Prof. Kot, Polish Ambassador; Mr. W. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs; General Anders, Commander-in-Chief of Polish Armed Forces in the U. S. S. R.; and Mr. Molotov's secretary

Gen. S. I am extremely glad that I can greet one of the real makers of modern history, and congratulate you, Mr. President, on the heroism of the Russian Army in the fight with the Germans. As a soldier I would like to express my admiration for the valiant defense of Moscow led so successfully by you, Mr. President, who himself remains in the capital. Simultaneously I thank you, Mr. President, for the great hospitality which has been extended to me from the very moment I stepped upon Soviet soil.

STALIN. I thank you, Mr. Prime Minister, for what you said and I am very glad to see you in Moscow.

Gen. S. I will begin by stating that I never have conducted, and never have agreed with the policy directed against Soviet Russia for twenty years. Therefore, I was morally entitled to sign the pact, since it may bring about the final fulfillment of the principles which I have upheld for so long. Furthermore, I have, in this problem so vital for the future, the backing of the Polish nation in our country as well as in all Polish communities, either larger ones like in America where four and a half million Poles live, in Canada and in France where there are six hundred thousand Poles, or in other smaller communities. Those who did not conduct such a policy as mine, I have against me. I would not want that a slow realization of the agreement weaken the policy of approach and of friendly coexistence between our nations. Whether we have really reached a turning point in history depends on a complete and loyal realization of the agreement. This depends on you since your decisions are authoritative in this country. Therefore, it is necessary that our agreement be realized, the chicaneries, annoying our population, disappear. I know perfectly the difficulties in which Russia has found herself. Four-fifths of all the armed forces of the German Reich have been thrown against you. Understanding this I have been the advocate of your cause in London as well as in the United States. A few months ago I already submitted materials proving the necessity of establishing a second front in the West.

STALIN. I thank you, Mr. Prime Minister. It is right and good.

Gen S. But this is not an easy task. There exist great difficulties, especially in shipping. The crossing of the English Channel by a larger number of armed forces, and the seizure and development of proper positions on the continent, is not a simple task. Operations of this nature have to be prepared very carefully, exactly and concretely; one can't be too insistent on this point, so that another Dakar will not repeat itself.

Molotov. That's right; if such an operation should fail, then morally it would have very negative results.

Gen. S. I return, however, to our problem. I confirm in your presence, Mr. President, that your declaration about the amnesty is not being fulfilled. Many of our people, a great number of very prominent men, are still kept in labor camps and in prisons.

STALIN [taking notes]. This is impossible, as the amnesty has referred to all, and all Poles have been released. [the last words are directed toward Molotov. Molotov nods.]

Gen. A. [gives details upon request of Gen. S.]. This is not in accordance with the real facts, since we possess the most concrete data, that from the camps were released firstly, Jews, then Ukrainians, and finally physically weaker Polish laboring groups. Stronger ones were retained, releasing but a small number of them. I have in my armed forces people, who have been released but a few weeks ago from such camps, and they confirm that in individual camps there are still retained in each hundreds and even thousands of our countrymen. Governmental orders are not carried out there, because the commanders of the individual camps, who are responsible of fulfilling the plan of production, do not want to lose their best laboring groups, without which the fulfillment of the plan of production might be at times impossible.

MOLOTOV. [smiles and nods his head].

Gen. A. These people do not understand the real weight of our common problem, and this is extremely detrimental to our common problem.

STALIN. These people should be taken before the courts.

Gen. A. That's correct.

Gen. S. It is not up to us to supply the Soviet Government with accurate lists of names of our people; however, complete lists are in the possession of the commanders of the camps. I have with me a list containing the names of approximately 4,000 officers who were deported by force and who presently still remain in the prisons and labor camps. Even this list is not complete, since it contains only names which we were able to take from memory. I ordered that checks be made whether they are in Poland, with whom we have steady contact. It has been proven that not one of them is there, likewise as in our prisoner of war camps in Germany. These people are here. Not one of them has returned.

STALIN. That is impossible, they have escaped.

Gen. A. Where then could they escape?

STALIN. Well, to Manchuria.

Gen. A. It is impossible that all could escape, the more impossible considering the fact that since they have been deported from prisoner of war camps to labor camps and prisons, their correspondence with their families has stopped completely. I know perfectly well, being informed by officers who have already returned even from Kolyma, that there is still a large number of officers remaining there, many of them mentioned by name. I know that groups of Poles were already prepared for release and departure, but they were retained at the last moment. I am informed that our people are found even in Novaya Zemlya. The greater number of these officers mentioned in this list, I know personally. Among them are commanders and officers of my staff. These people perish and starve there under the terrible conditions.

STALIN. Surely they have been released, but as yet have not arrived.

Gen. S. Russia is immense and the difficulties are great. Maybe the local authorities did not carry out the orders. Those who arrive after being released confirm that others who remain there just merely exist and labor. If anyone would succeed to get beyond the boundaries of Russia, he surely would report to me.

STALIN. I want you to know that the Soviet Government has not the slightest reason to retain even one Pole; I released even Sosnkowski's agents who attacked us and murdered our people.

Gen. A. However, we receive evidence about people, whom we know very well, evidence containing names of prisons and numbers of cells in which they are confined. I know the names of many camps in which an extremely large number of Poles have been retained and must continue to labor.

MOLOTOV. We have retained only those, who, after the war, had committed felony, stimulated diversion, set up radio stations, and the like. You will surely not concern yourself about those.

Amb. K. Certainly not; however, I have asked many times that lists of these people be given us, because people whom I know as ardent patriots and who are absolutely innocent, are very often charged with this.

MOLOTOV [nods].

Gen. S. Let's not touch the questions which arose during the war. It would be useful now if you, Mr. President, would make a public statement pertaining to this matter, in order to bring about in Soviet Russia a basic reversal of the situation of the Poles. Certainly they are not tourists here, but people taken by force from their homes. They did not come here by their own will but were deported and have survived tremendous sufferings.

STALIN. The attitude of the population in the Soviet Union toward the Poles is favorable. Only officials can make mistakes.

Gen. A. It is not only our concern that the officials badly carry out their orders, but it is also our concern that the population should understand that the Poles are gathered in certain places not by their own will. We are particularly interested in good relations with the population.

Gen. S. In Kuybyshev I saw a transport of our people which impressed me terribly. It is necessary to give them speedy relief. I classify our people into two groups—those who are able to work and they should be given work under best conditions possible.

STALIN. On the same conditions as Soviet citizens.

Gen. S. It does not matter that they be the same, however, simply tolerable ones. The proper use of our people lies in the interest of our joint war efforts. You understand of course, Mr. President, that an expert in building tanks who is now felling trees in a forest, or a distinguished chemist who does physical work on farms is not properly utilized. The second category of our citizens consists of people unfit for work, old men, women and children, who should all be gathered into places with favorable conditions and climate, so that our Embassy could look after them. From labor camps everyone should be released at once, while those who were deported and who are living in settlements under tolerable conditions may remain there for the time being. An uncoordinated moving of people back and forth causes only ill

feelings, as they find themselves under very severe conditions, and in the result it may come out that I, by making this pact with you, did them only wrong. People even die because of the terrible conditions. These corpses will heavily influence our future relations. These people must be helped instantly, and it is not worth while to bargain over a few million rubles which during the war do not play a part whatsoever. A loan to the Polish Government should be given on a large scale.

It is also necessary that delegates of the Embassy be given permission to enter Polish communities and be granted true and not fictitious right. As for example, our delegate in Archangel is not able to give any help to our population, and his work is limited only to the sending out of transports. He cannot even distribute warm clothing to the Polish population. I am also concerned that a mission of the Embassy be set up in Vladivostok. The Polish community in America has collected many things for Poles in Russia, however, they make the shipment dependent upon the condition that it be delivered into Polish hands, to delegates of the Embassy.

STALIN. I agree as to the delegates and also as to Vladivostok.

MOLOTOV. I believe it impossible that your people are still in the camps.

Gen. A. Nevertheless, I definitely confirm that they are; I repeat that the strongest are retained because they need workers. The retention of our people badly serves our joint cause.

STALIN. This will be settled. Special orders will be given to the authorities, however it should be understood that we are conducting a war.

Gen. S. And you conduct it well.

STALIN. Oh no, just fairly. Our system of transport was terribly overloaded. We shipped out the wounded, evacuated the population, transferred seventy large factories. We were forced to transfer armed forces back and forth. Your Poles should understand the tremendous difficulties that we had. But it will be better.

Gen. S. The Polish population should be located in a province with a better climate.

STALIN. We have to think over what regions can be assigned to the Poles. To Fergana and Uzbekistan, we regularly deliver grain, because there we produce cotton and we have even issued special orders prohibiting the raising of grain. From this point of view these territories are not convenient. However, the southern regions of the Semipalatynsk Province would be more adaptable. We can even see how it looks on the map [all rise and approach the map, Stalin points to the map]. Thus, Tashkent, Alma-Ata and the entire southern Kazakhstan.

Amb. K. The territories around Barnaul and Novosibirsk would be better for those from the Far East.

STALIN. It is cold there but bread is abundant.

Amb. K. But where can those be sent who are in the Archangel Province and in Komi?

STALIN. Also to southern Kazakhstan. [They sit down at the table.]

Gen. S. Regarding the loan, I think that one hundred million rubles would settle the case for a longer time, if only for the reason that

it not cause a bad impression, and so that you would avoid the charge that you make difficulties over such insignificant matters.

MOLOTOV. Of course, we have already given sixty-five million.

Amb. K. But that was for the armed forces.

Gen. S. Hitler taught everyone how, without gold and only through labor, great things can be created. Do not follow, Mr. Commissar, the example of the western ministers of treasury who in the beginning bargained for every million.

STALIN [nodding]. Good.

Gen. S. That is all what I wanted to say about the Polish civilian population. Now I must bring up military matters. Should I immediately speak about the whole problem or shall we discuss its elements successively?

STALIN. As you wish, General.

Gen. S. We Poles do not consider warfare as a symbol but as a true fight.

STALIN. [Makes a nodding gesture.]

Gen. A. We want to fight for Poland's independence here on the continent.

Gen. S. In our homeland we have a strong military organization, which I had ordered to remain quiet, because there people are shot for every word. [Stalin nods.] [General Sikorski gives several details pertaining to the methods of fighting of the Polish nation against the Germans.] Our army fights everywhere. In Great Britain we have a corps which needs reinforcements. We possess a navy which performs excellently. We have in action 17 air force units which are equipped with the most modern English planes, and they fight superbly. Twenty percent of the German Air Force losses in England were caused by Polish pilots.

STALIN. I know that Poles are valiant.

Gen. S. If they are well led. Thanks to Providence, and thanks to you, Mr. President, we have here with us General Anders, my best soldier, whose eight stars received for wounds prove his valor. You put him into prison because he wanted to join me. This is a loyal leader, not a politician, who will not allow any of his subordinates to conduct any political activity.

STALIN. The best policy is to fight well. [Turning to Anders.] How long did you stay in prison?

Gen. A. Twenty months.

STALIN. How were you treated?

Gen. A. In Lwow exceptionally bad, in Moscow slightly better. But you, Mr. President, know yourself what "better" means in a prison if one is confined for twenty months.

STALIN. Well, such were the conditions.

Gen. S. I have one brigade in Tobruk which will be transferred to Syria and reorganized into a motorized division with two tank battalions. If the need arises I can transfer it here to the East. We have a few navy vessels. When I had decorated the sailors from one submarine which was stationed in Malta and which had sunk an Italian cruiser and a transport ship, the crew of this submarine became so enthusiastic that after that the submarine entered a Greek port and, even with a damaged periscope, sunk another cruiser and one Greek transport ship. They returned without any losses. The Polish

soldier will fight in this manner everywhere, if he is led well. Our homeland is occupied, and we have here the only reserve of our youths. I wish to send to Scotland and Egypt approximately 25,000 as reinforcements. We should form about seven divisions with the rest. This is extremely important for the homeland, which is looking at the Polish army as a symbol of its resistance and independence. We want to fight and that is why our armed forces in Scotland will be used as a vanguard for the establishment of a second front, or will be transferred here to the East. In this case I would personally take the command. The present difficulties of feeding, equipping and training make me anxiously concerned that the formations created under such conditions will be completely useless. Instead of sacrificing health and life for the common cause, people merely exist here or perish in vain. The war will be long. Great Britain and the United States disarmed themselves too much, and their war industry, particularly the American, needs much time to achieve full capacity of production. With time the avalanche of war materials will grow. However, I already have Roosevelt's and Churchill's assurance that they will equip our divisions parallel with yours, without straining the shipment for you, but under the condition that the formation of our armed forces will take place in regions to which supplies can be sent without much trouble. The present state of equipping our divisions is completely inadequate. The divisions under such conditions are incapable of fighting, since they did not receive all of the necessary equipment. General Anders will explain this to you in detail.

Gen. A. [Explains in detail the state of the equipment received and the entire matter of equipping the Polish armed forces, stressing the insurmountable difficulties, which appear every day.]

STALIN. [Inquires about certain details of artillery equipment.] Russia entered the war with divisions each having 15,000 men, which however in practice proved too large. Therefore, we changed over to a type of light divisions having a strength of approximately 11,000 men in each.

Gen. S. The conditions under which the Polish forces are now formed are completely inadequate. The soldiers freeze in summer tents, feel the want of food, and are simply doomed for slow extinction. Therefore, I propose that the entire army and all the people eligible for military service be moved, for instance, to Persia where the climate as well as the promised American and British help would allow these people to recover within a short time and form a strong army which would return here to the front and take over the section assigned to them. This has been settled with Churchill. On my part I am ready to declare that these forces will return to the Russian front, and that they might even be strengthened by several British divisions.

Gen. A. [Continues to present the situation of the armed forces which are formed at present and confirms that under such conditions of food supplies, housing, sanitation, and of unfavorable climate, the organization of units capable of warfare is completely unfeasible.] This is simply a miserable existence toward which all the efforts of the people are directed, to live and to live very badly! It is, of course, our concern that the Polish army be prepared for war as soon as possible and fight for Poland with our Allies, which under these conditions is absolutely impossible. Therefore, it is essential to transfer the forces into an area with such conditions of climate, food and supply,

which would allow the whole problem to be solved. Faced with the difficulties in which Russia finds herself, we must take into consideration the facility of Anglo-American shipping. The most adequate area is Persia. All the soldiers and all men capable of military service should find themselves there. When we take part in fighting, the striking force of our army should not only be a symbol but it should serve towards the aim, the struggle for Poland, for which we are fighting in the entire world.

Gen. S. I wish the Soviet Government would turn with confidence toward my proposition. I am a person who, when I say yes, then it means yes, when I say no, it means no, and when I say nothing, I either cannot or do not want to tell the truth.

STALIN. [Expression of excitement and evident displeasure.] I am a person of experience and of age. I know that if you go to Persia you will never return here. I see that England has much to do and needs Polish soldiers.

Gen. S. We are united with Great Britain by an alliance which she fulfills loyally. We have full sovereignty in Great Britain. I can even bring a corps from Scotland here, and I am sure that no one in England would trouble me about it. Likewise, I can attach the units stationed at Tobruk to our forces here.

Amb. K. A Pole fights especially well when he is near his fatherland.

STALIN. Iran is not far from here, but the English may force you to fight against the Germans on Turkish territory, and tomorrow Japan may enter the war.

Gen. A. We want to fight for Poland. We believe that even the strongest air force and navy will not end the war. The battles on the continent will end the war. We all, without exception, love our country and want to enter it first, we want to be ready for fighting as soon as possible, but under the conditions which we now face, it is impossible to prepare ourselves for it.

Gen. S. England of today and of the past is heaven and earth. The English now have enough armed forces to defend their Isles, therefore, they have no reason not to allow our corps to leave them.

MOLOTOV. [Proposes that General Panfilov be called and gives orders to the secretary who is leaving.]

Gen. A. [Explains the difficulties of forming forces, the living conditions in Koltubianka, Tatiszczew and Tock, and the lack of punctuality in the delivery of food, fodder, equipment, tools, and so on.] This is only a miserable existence and months are wasted. Under such conditions it is impossible to form armed forces.

STALIN [excited]. If the Poles do not want to fight then let them go. We cannot hold back the Poles. If they want to they may go away.

Gen. S. If we had been allowed to organize ourselves, we would be fighting already. But, so much time was wasted here for which we are not to blame. In the areas where our soldiers are now quartered, we still do not have facilities for their training [an interval of silence]. I, therefore, must ask for another solution.

STALIN. If the Poles do not want to fight here then let them say so, one way or the other. I am sixty-two years old and I know that where an army is formed, there it remains.

Gen. S. [in a sharper tone]. Then please show me another solution because the proper conditions for organizing of our armed forces are

not available here, and I do not want people to perish in vain. I am not presenting an ultimatum, but when there is a severe winter, winds and frost, from which people perish, I cannot look at it and remain silent.

Gen. A. Where I am the freezing temperatures have already fallen to 33° C. below zero. The people live in simple tents, the majority without heating stoves, which are not supplied to us in a sufficient number. They awaken in the morning with frozen noses and ears. This is not an organization of armed forces but simply sheer existence.

Gen. S. One cannot throw an untrained soldier against the Germans. One cannot be exposed to disgrace. The Polish Army must be well armed and fight as a body.

Gen. A. Even so, I have full admiration for our soldiers as they have never complained, in spite of their extreme sufferings during the past two years and in spite of the horrible conditions under which they now live. Only two weeks ago they had received shoes, until then 60% of them were barefoot. They never received their due share of food, and for a long time were not even paid.

Gen. S. [emphatically]. You hurt me, Mr. President, by saying that our soldier does not want to fight.

STALIN. I am rough [Russian "grubyj"] and I want to know clearly whether you want to fight or not.

Gen. S. [emphatically]. That we want to is proven not by words but by facts.

Gen. A. That is why we are organizing, in order to fight here and we understand that we will fight on the continent. According to my calculations I can have 150,000 soldiers; this is equivalent to eight divisions. But we do not have quite two divisions, and the formation is limited to that. We do not receive our due share of food and all promises to complete it are not fulfilled.

STALIN [turning to Gen. S.]. As you want, Sir.

Gen. S. I do not want the matter to be presented in that way. I am still waiting for a new formula and I am ready to accept every just solution.

STALIN [with a shade of irony]. I see that the English are in need of good armed forces.

Gen. S. This estimate is not exact. In England they value us, but they do not exploit us. I know Churchill very well, and I know that he wants to do all he can to help Russia.

Gen. A. Sixty percent of my people are from the reserves, but they must recover from two years of hardship and must be retrained. Volunteers likewise are in very bad shape and must undergo proper training, for which time and proper conditions are necessary.

STALIN. [upset]. That means that we are savages, and that we can not improve anything. It amounts to this, that a Russian can only oppress a Pole, but is unable to do anything good for him. However, we can do without you. We can give back all of them. We will manage ourselves. We will conquer Poland and then we will give her back to you. But what will people say to this? They will ridicule us all over the world that we are not able to achieve anything here.

Gen. S. I did not receive a reply as to where I am to establish an army, so that it could participate in the war but not perish from the horrible climatic conditions. I ask for concrete counterpropositions.

I categorically confirm once again that we want to fight for Poland and at your side.

STALIN. When you go to Iran then perhaps you will have to fight in Turkey against the Germans. Tomorrow Japan will enter the war, then against Japan. So as the English will order. Perhaps in Singapore.

Gen. A. It is on the continent that we want to fight the Germans for Poland. Our people have not seen their country for a long time, and no one loves his country as much as the Poles do. From here it is closest to Poland.

Gen. S. The patriotism of the Poles does not have to be proven. I confirm that I still have no clear counterproposition.

STALIN. If you insist—one corps, 2 to 3 divisions may leave. However, if you so desire, I shall assign place and means necessary for the forming of seven divisions. I see, however, that the English need Polish soldiers. I, of course, have received Harriman's and Churchill's request to evacuate the Polish Army.

Gen. S. The English are not so badly off, that the Polish Army formed here should decide their fate. They are slow. However, today they represent a great power. It was I who demanded that Churchill requests the evacuation of our armed forces. I will, however, prove my good will; I am ready to leave the army in Russia, if you assign an adequate region for its concentration and if you assure to it equipment and supplies and proper quarters, and so establish adequate conditions for its training.

MOLOTOV. Panfilov is ready. Gentlemen, do you have any objections against Panfilov entering the room? [All nod, shortly Panfilov, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Red Army, enters the room.] [A conversation, concerning the conditions for the organization of Polish forces, follows with Stalin, General Anders and General Panfilov; each side brings up various details.]

Gen. A. I confirm categorically that I do not receive the due share of food nor fodder for horses. The divisions have not received their due rations of food, nor articles of equipment so necessary, like stoves for the tents. Several months have passed since I was promised delivery of tractors, but up to this time they have not arrived. All our requests remain without results, and promises from Soviet military authorities remain unfulfilled. I have typhoid fever in my units, and all my begging for a hospital train has been futile. For several months the soldiers have not received any soap, tools for construction, lumber or nails. The soldiers never receive any vegetables. Many additional food products are never delivered. The means of transportation are absolutely inadequate and in very bad shape. A few weeks ago the food rations were suddenly cut from 44,000 to 30,000. In spite of President Stalin's promise to our Ambassador, that the rations be restored to 44,000, up to now it has not been carried out. On the 1st of December the entire camp in Tock did not receive any food at all. [He enumerates a series of other shortages and lacks of food and supplies.] It does not comply with facts that we did not remind them about it. I myself continuously turned to the Liaison Officer, Colonel Wolkovsky, and I myself sent out dispatches and letters. [Panfilov remains silent.] I went after these matters a great deal personally.

STALIN [very sharply to Panfilov]. Who is responsible for this?

Gen. PANF. Proper instructions were issued, the orders were given by General Khrulov.

STALIN. When did I give the orders for increasing the number of food rations?

Gen. PANF. Two and a half weeks ago.

STALIN. Why then has the order not been carried out up to now? Shall they eat your directives?

[This entire part of the conversation is conducted in a very harsh tone by Stalin. Panfilov is standing at attention—turning colors.]

Gen. S. Only the extreme difficulties which we are encountering here, and the bad conditions, have compelled me to present the matter in this way.

STALIN. We can give the Polish Army the same conditions as we give the Red Army.

Gen. S. Under the conditions existing up to now, not even a corps will be established.

STALIN. I understand that they are bad. Our units are organized under better conditions. I say this sincerely, that if they can give you better conditions in Iran, then as far as we are concerned, we are able to offer only such conditions as we give our Army. Food for our soldiers is better than what the Germans have.

Gen. A. If they will receive all the food which is due a soldier, then I consider it sufficient, but it should be delivered without those continuous shortages which we encounter. I myself must have the opportunity to manage and establish my own stocks and not live from one day to the next; when a transport does not arrive then people often go hungry.

Gen. S. I confirm once again our desire for fighting jointly with you against the Germans, our common foe.

STALIN. It seemed to me that the English need your army.

Gen. S. No, it was I, seeing what difficulties we have to face here, that requested the English and Americans to move our soldiers to better conditions.

Gen. A. [Gives detailed explanations about the number of Polish soldiers in the area of the southern territories of Russia, enumerating particular localities. A discussion follows about the places where they are being formed. The names of Uzbekistan, Turkistan, and Transcaucasia are mentioned.] I am counting on 150,000 people, that is eight divisions together with the army's maintenance forces. Perhaps there are even more of our people, but among them there is also a great number of Jews who do not want to serve in the army.

STALIN. Jews are poor warriors.

Gen. S. Many from among the Jews who reported are speculators or those who have been punished for contraband, they never will make good soldiers. Those I don't need in the Polish Army.

Gen. A. Two hundred Jews deserted from Buzuluk, upon hearing the false report on the bombing of Kuybyshev. More than sixty deserted from the 5th Division a day before the distribution of arms to the soldiers was made public.

STALIN. Yes, Jews are bad warriors.

[A discussion follows among Stalin, Anders and Panfilov concerning armament and its shortages. Verification and calculations are made from lists.]

Gen. S. When will a new area be assigned to us and when will we learn about the other details pertaining to the organizing of forces?

STALIN. [Deliberates audibly with Panfilov and gives as suggestions names like Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Transcaucasia.]

Gen. S. After organizing and training, all should be gathered together as one unit, in order to strike as an army, because only such a force will inspire the imagination of the Polish nation.

STALIN. This will require much time.

Gen. A. No, if everything will be carried out properly then the organization, after the arms are received, will not take much time.

STALIN. [Touches upon the question of the army, without the organization of corps.]

Gen. S. Maybe this is better. We will agree with this, only the divisions must then be equipped and armed still stronger.

STALIN. The organization without corps is better because the commander of the army delegates all the responsibility to the commanders of the corps, when such exist, and the result is such that no one is responsible for anyone. It would be better that your army have simply seven divisions, as it is in ours.

Gen. S. I will see to it, that equipment comes to you from abroad in a greater volume. With good will this can be done.

STALIN. We will give a part, the English should give the rest. However, the ocean transports do not always arrive on time. They can be late, and this should be kept in mind.

Gen. S. I must evacuate 25,000 people from here, because I need them for the air force, navy, and panzer units. Besides that we can set up seven divisions. Here, of course, exist our only human reserves. Do you have sufficient airplanes?

STALIN. There is never a sufficient number of airplanes. As to the quantity we are no worse off than the Germans, regarding the quality we are superior. However, in reference to tanks the situation is much worse.

Gen. S. Lybia has destroyed a great part of the German Air Force.

STALIN. For the past 2 months we have not felt the superiority of the German Air Force. They now have very inexperienced pilots, young ones. Their airplanes are relatively slow. And how many airplanes does your air force division have?

Gen. S. Twenty-seven, eighteen of which are in the first, and nine in the second line.

STALIN. That is equivalent to our air force regiment.

Gen. S. From England we will be able to send several air force divisions for our army. There the people are anxious for that.

STALIN. [Praises the English airmen who are in Russia.]

Gen. S. Our airmen have excellent vision and quick orientation.

STALIN. The best and most valiant airmen are Slavs. They act very quickly, because it is a young race which as yet has not been worn out.

Gen. S. The present war will make the Anglo-Saxons younger. The British are not the French, who really are already finished.

STALIN. I don't agree with this opinion.

Gen. S. Perhaps the lower class is still good, but the upper class does not represent a greater value [a longer discussion on Pétain, Weygand and others].

STALIN. The Germans are strong, but the Slavs will crush them.

Gen. S. I now would like to travel in order to inspect the army and visit the centers of the civilian population, and later return once again to Moscow in order to see you again, Mr. President.

STALIN. By all means, I am at your service.

Gen. S. Tomorrow I shall speak over the radio on behalf of the nations occupied by the Germans. Commissar Vyshinsky was to have sent you the text of my speech.

STALIN. Yes, I read it, it will be good for the broadcast to take place.

Gen. S. I imagine that it will be useful to the world. The broadcast will be received and transmitted also by the B. B. C. and America.

STALIN. I ordered that here your speech be translated into forty languages.

Gen. S. I would like you to announce my speech.

[I make the suggestion that we sign a joint political declaration. I don't insist upon it of course, but I am leaving its draft with you, Mr. President, hands over a draft of the declaration.]

STALIN. Basically I agree. I will read it and tomorrow we will settle it jointly.

Gen. S. And so, of course, I consider the problem of the armed forces as settled in principle. I will be substituted by General Anders in a mixed committee which should be assembled as soon as possible, in order to bring about a final conclusion of these questions. Please appoint your trusted persons for the inspection of the camps.

STALIN. I agree. [He mentions Vyshinsky and Panfilov, asking whether they suit General S.]

Gen. S. [Replies with approval and bids farewell together with the Ambassador and General A. As they are leaving Stalin asks that General Anders remains.]

[The conversation between Stalin and General Anders lasts for a few minutes. Stalin inquiries about his collaboration with Panfilov, to what General Anders stated that this collaboration was proceeding favorably, but that General Panfilov could not accomplish much.]

Gen. A. Now since you, Mr. President, have promised to do away with the difficulties I believe that the forming of the army will be settled properly.

STALIN. I am very sorry that I did not meet you before.

Gen. A. It is not my fault that I was not called to you, Mr. President.

STALIN. I will want to meet you from time to time.

Gen. A. Mr. President, I am always at your disposal to call upon your demand.²

[This memo was written under the dictation of General Anders from notes taken by Ambassador Kot.]

KUYBYSHEV, *December 6, 1941.*

² The conversation lasted for two and a half hours.

No. 18

Declaration of Friendship and Mutual Assistance signed in Moscow on December 4, 1941, by General Sikorski for the Government of the Republic of Poland and by Premier Stalin for the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The Government of the Polish Republic and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, animated by the spirit of friendly understanding and fighting collaboration, declare:

1. German Hitlerite imperialism is the worst enemy of mankind—no compromise with it is possible.

Both States together with Great Britain and other Allies, supported by the United States of America, will wage war until complete victory and final destruction of the German invaders.

2. Implementing the Treaty concluded on July 30, 1941, both Governments will render each other during the war full military assistance, and troops of the Republic of Poland located on the territory of the Soviet Union will wage war against the German brigands shoulder to shoulder with Soviet troops.

In peace-time their mutual relations will be based on good neighborly collaboration, friendship and reciprocal honest fulfillment of the obligations they have taken upon themselves.

3. After a victorious war and the appropriate punishment of the Hitlerite criminals, it will be the aim of the Allied States to ensure a durable and just peace. This can be achieved only through a new organization of international relations on the basis of unification of the democratic countries in a durable alliance. Respect for international law backed by the collective armed force of the Allied States must form the decisive factor in the creation of such an organization. Only under this condition can a Europe destroyed by German Barbarism be restored and a guarantee be created that the disaster caused by the Hitlerites will never be repeated.

For the Government of the Republic of Poland:

SIKORSKI.

By authority of the Government of the Soviet Union:

STALIN.

No. 19

Note of December 9, 1941, from the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs concerning Polish citizenship

The Polish Embassy acknowledges receipt of the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of December 1, 1941, and has the honor to bring the following to the notice of the People's Commissariat:

1) Polish legislation is founded on the principle of equality before the law of all citizens, regardless of their origin or race. The Polish Embassy is also not aware of any Soviet laws which would introduce or sanction any discrimination or differentiation of this kind.

The Agreement of July 30, 1941, and the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, do not introduce in any of their provisions relative

to Polish citizens (amnesty, military service) the notion of origin or race, and thus they concern all Polish citizens without exception.

In this state of affairs, this Embassy sees no possibility of changing its attitude as expressed in its Note of November 10, 1941, which stated that it was contrary both to the Agreement of July 30, 1941, and the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, that only Polish citizens of Polish origin should be able to enlist in the Polish Army, while Polish citizens of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Jewish origin were enlisted in the Red Army by the War Commissariat in Kazakhstan.

2) The fact of the possession of Polish citizenship by a given person is regulated by Polish law, in particular by the Polish State Citizenship Act of January 20, 1920. For this reason and for the reasons stated above under Paragraph I, this Embassy has the honor to declare that it finds itself unable to take into cognizance the statement included in the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of December 1, 1941, to the effect that the Soviet Government is prepared to recognize as Polish citizens only persons of Polish origin from among the persons who found themselves on November 1 and 2, 1939 on the territory of the Republic of Poland temporarily occupied by the military forces of the Soviet Union.

3) The Citizenship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Act of August 19, 1938 cannot be applied to Polish citizens, for its introduction on the territory of the Polish Republic occupied by the Soviet Union from the latter half of September, 1939, until June or July, 1941, would be contrary to the provisions of the IVth Hague Convention of 1907.

4) The Polish Embassy does not connect the matter referred to in Note D. 740/41 of November 10, 1941, with the problem of Polish-Soviet frontiers. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs points out in the Note in question that it does not recognize as Polish citizens persons of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Jewish origin who possessed Polish citizenship before November 1-2, 1939, "because the problem of the frontiers between the U. S. S. R. and Poland has not been settled, and is subject to settlement in the future." The Polish Embassy is bound to state that such a thesis is self-contradictory. Maintaining fully the fundamental attitude expressed above in Paragraphs 1-3, this Embassy has the honor to point out that such a view would be tantamount to a unilateral settlement by the Soviet Union at the present time of a problem which, in accordance with this same statement of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, is subject to settlement in the future.

KUYBYSHEV, *December 9, 1941.*

No. 20

Conversation of General Anders with J. Stalin, Chairman of the People's Commissars, at the Kremlin on March 18, 1942

Summary of the conversation held at the Kremlin on March 18, 1942:

Punctually at the appointed hour 17:30 the Commander of the Armed Forces in the U. S. S. R. Divisional General Wladyslaw Anders, accompanied by Staff Colonel Okulicki, were received by Presi-

dent Stalin in the presence of Minister Molotov and a stenographer. Immediately after salutation, President Stalin asked:

"You came to me to find out why the number of rations for the Polish Army had been decreased. I shall answer you with absolute frankness. You see, in October when Harriman and Beaverbrook were here, we made an agreement with America that she will deliver to us monthly 2,200,000 tons of grain. Up to now we should have received from this source 1,000,000 tons of wheat, and to the end of July 1942—1,800,000 tons. Upon that understanding was based the plan of supplying our army with food. The grain should be delivered by American ships, because our own tonnage is limited. How much we received of it—so much as the tears of a cat. I do not blame anybody but till now we have received scarcely 60,000 tons. The Japanese let our ships pass, but they sink American ships, which sail without convoy. They have already sunk four. The war with Japan has shuffled the cards. The American tonnage is not able to deliver us bread. For this reason we were compelled to revise ("pieres-matret") the plan of supplying the army. We were forced to dissolve territorial units stationed behind the army—what you may check at the spot—in order to secure food for the front units, which fight well. We reduced also considerably the cavalry. For these reasons, General Chrulov issued the order that until March 20 you will receive food for the entire force, but after that time only 40,000 rations. I would not like that they say that the Soviet people do not keep promises, but as long as conditions do not change, your army must be limited to three divisions and one reserve regiment.

"Gen. ANDERS. I understand all this and I came for that reason because I am convinced there must be found a way out of this situation. After the receipt of the telegram from General Chrulov and before I had received your telegram, Mr. President, I did not say anything to anyone. After the receipt of the telegram from you, Mr. President, I informed General Sikorski, from whom I have heard of directing to me 2,000,000 rations, of the contents of the messages. The present size of the army is 75,000 to 78,000 men. I cannot let the rest die for starvation. I see such a solution: Give us food for the entire force up to the time we receive food from England. On this matter I would like to fly to London. General Sikorski agrees to it and wants me to appear there as soon as possible. At present he is flying to Washington and will probably discuss there the matter of supplying our army in the U. S. S. R. I would like to do something good for Poland and therefore I search for the best solution. I consider that a scattering of our armed effort is bad and consequently I intend to create a Polish army as strong as possible on the territory of the U. S. S. R.

"STALIN. Are the men you are getting in the army good? Are you satisfied with them?

"Gen. ANDERS. Yes—the average men are quite good so far as morale is concerned; they are physically very exhausted, but they recover very quickly. At present we suffer from an epidemic of typhoid fever. I rely upon getting our men from the construction battalions and from the Russian Army. They are men of young age groups.

"STALIN. Do you know how typhoid fever rages in Poland? We should not have it here. We have enough soap and we should do away with it quickly. How many organized divisions have you?

"Gen. ANDERS. Six but not all of them are in full strength, but the others will be ready soon. It is only a question of getting the men, as the command staff is ready.

"STALIN. Is this possible? A pity. In this situation you may have only three divisions—a corps. If you could obtain food supplies from America, then the army may be enlarged.

"Gen. ANDERS. General Sikorski has just gone by plane to America. I am sure he will do everything possible to secure some assistance.

"STALIN. The transportation of food may be conducted only by England. The Americans send out ships without convoy. The Japanese sink them, but English ships are escorted and all arrive punctually. In this matter I approached Roosevelt, who has not responded to my proposal. If the Englishmen do not deliver food by their own means, the American transportation may be delusive.

"Gen. ANDERS. The food I have mentioned—2,000,000 rations—promised by General Sikorski will certainly arrive via Iran. I do not know only the exact date. I am sure also that further supplies will arrive.

"STALIN. In this case I shall give you food for 40,000 people.

"Gen. ANDERS. What about the rest of the people?

"STALIN. Perhaps the rest would go to work on the collective farms.

"Gen. ANDERS. This is impossible. All Polish citizens able to serve with the army should be with it. They know of the agreement of Mr. President with General Sikorski and of your stipulation. With respect to the morale of the army, it can not be agreed to. Besides, on the collective farms there is no food and those who are there are also hungry.

"STALIN. Up to now the Polish Army has fed the civilian population from its supplied food. I do not consider it as wrong, and I understand one should help the people.

"Gen. ANDERS. I admit it was so; the Polish civilian population is in such a condition that we had to help it even at the cost of the military rations. The initiative of doing so came from the soldiers themselves.

"STALIN. It is not allowable to decrease a soldier's ration more as you get physically exhausted men.

"Gen. ANDERS. I have already prohibited it by order.

"STALIN. I can not do it otherwise. You will get 44,000 rations. This will be sufficient for three divisions and the reserve regiment. You will have adequate time to organize and train those. We should not press you to go to the front. I understand it will be better for you to go to the front when we come closer to the Polish frontiers. You should have the honor to enter first into Polish lands.

"Gen. ANDERS. In such a case, if nothing can be changed, the rest should be sent to Iran.

"STALIN. I agree. With us will remain your 44,000 soldiers and the rest will be evacuated. There is no other solution. They will say and say that we have deceived you. I know not you soldiers, but for instance your Kot speaks so of it occasionally and also others say a lot of unfavorable things regarding us. If there were no war with Japan, there would be no need for this discussion. We Soviet people habitually keep our promises.

"Col. OKULICKI. Is it possible for you to give us food for the entire force till the time we receive food from the Englishmen. This may not take too long.

"STALIN. Impossible—we do not have food. Front rations can not be decreased. The Germans have caused hunger in our land. Now we entered into a region which was under occupation for a long time and we can not absolutely count upon local reserves. Each 1,000 tons of food is of great importance to us and therefore we can not give you more. My decision is herewith 44,000 rations.

"Gen. ANDERS. This hurts me much.

"STALIN. It can not be otherwise. In Byelorussia, where the war is raging at present, the Germans have devoured everything. To the army must be given all. The army which fights can not go hungry. We can not give more than 44,000 rations.

"Gen. ANDERS. How to do it—to send the people for whom there is no food to Iran as quickly as possible? It can not be done within a few days—they have to be fed of course until they are evacuated.

"MOLOTOV. How many people do you have at present?

"Gen. ANDERS. According to the last report of March 8—about 66,000; every day arrive 1,000 to 1,500 men, so that today there may be already 80,000 men. This number is increasing steadily and will continue to increase. At the moment the basic problem is the matter of a speedy evacuation to Iran. A base has to be established in Krasnovock; up to now I have not received the required consent; it may be established also in Ashabad.

"STALIN. How much food are the Englishmen able to give you for the evacuees?

"Gen. ANDERS. At the beginning 27,000 rations for 7 days but the food has to be brought from Pahlevi to Krasnovock.

"STALIN (orders to connect him with Gen. Chrulov). Where are your quarters? Is there not malaria?

"Gen. ANDERS. At present there is the epidemic of typhoid fever. Malaria, dysentery and typhus appear within later periods. Preventive measures are undertaken.

"STALIN. How stands the matter in relation to armament?"

(Gen. Anders hands over a specification to Stalin, who examines it carefully. General Chrulov calls. Stalin asks how many rations does the Polish Army receive. After receiving an answer from Chrulov returns.)

"STALIN. We extend the time during which we shall issue food for the entire force till the end of March.

"STALIN (takes a seat behind the table). Which division was armed first?

"Gen. ANDERS. The 5th Infantry Division was armed. Now its armament is scattered among all units for training purposes."

(Molotov asks General Anders for information how the divisions are numbered.)

"STALIN. We have changed the size of our divisions. We increased them and reinforced their fire power. Instead of 16 guns we give 20 and 12 howitzers. We increased the number of men in companies. The entire force of a division is 12,700 men. Which guns have you received?"

(Col. Okulicki hands over a specification of armament of a 1939 model.)

"STALIN. This armament is very good. Its range is 14 Km and it may be used for anti-armor purposes. [He looks at the specification of the armament.] Has the second division got any armament?

"Gen. ANDERS. No. In spite of several interventions since the visit of General Sikorski and your promises we have not received anything.

"STALIN. It is right, we have made promises to you. Armament for the second division must be given immediately. We produce very much—330,000 carbines monthly and this is not sufficient. [He once again examines the specification of armament.] Is your third division already organized?

"Gen. ANDERS. Yes; four newly created divisions are almost ready. The organization of the command and staffs is accomplished. These divisions do not have the full strength yet, but they are making up quickly.

"STALIN. Are the divisions numbered?

"Gen. ANDERS. Yes; from 5 to 10.

"MOLOTOV. How many divisions may be formed out of these 44,000 men?

"Gen. ANDERS. This I do not know, for it depends upon the strength of a division; if we take into account divisions which you, Mr. President, described, then there would be three divisions and not much will be left for the reserve regiment and additional units out of a division.

"STALIN. It should be sufficient for three divisions and the reserve regiment. Do you have some air force units?

"Gen. ANDERS. Yes. They are concentrated in one place and have been ready for evacuation since a long time.

"STALIN. Do you want to evacuate them?

"Gen. ANDERS. According to an agreement with Sikorski, the airmen as well as sailors and 25,000 men should have been evacuated.

"STALIN. Where are the airmen going to?

"Gen. ANDERS. To England, where they will have good conditions for training.

"STALIN. Are they going to use the southern or northern route?

"Gen. ANDERS. They will take the southern route through Iran. For a long time they have been ready for evacuation, which in spite of my continued efforts does not move forward.

"STALIN. Do we prevent the evacuation of those airmen to England?

"Gen. ANDERS. I do not know the reasons why up to now the consent of evacuating them has been withheld, but the matter depends only on your decision. They could be sent away a long time ago.

"STALIN. Why, have you approached Panfilov in this matter?

"Gen. ANDERS. Yes, many times. I received even a promise, but nothing has been done thus far. Recently my request for establishing a base for them in Krasnovock was turned down.

"STALIN. The airmen will be evacuated. Narkomindiel has to do it immediately. (Writes in his notebook.)

"MOLOTOV. It will be done.

"Gen. ANDERS. To settle quickly all formalities, an authorized representative should be appointed here at the spot, because otherwise the matter will again drag along and we shall not reach any result.

"STALIN. Right—such one will be sent. I think General Zukov may be the best. Where is Zukov?

"MOLOTOV. He is here in Moscow.

"STALIN. I wonder why he is not in the south.

"Gen. ANDERS. He was with me all the time and came to Moscow only a few days ago. From the beginning he cooperated with us and will do certainly everything to help us.

"STALIN. Do you have any other needs?

"Gen. ANDERS. The first and most urgent need is to organize the evacuation, and first of all the base in Krasnovock to be able to send away immediately those for whom there are no rations.

"STALIN. All right—this will be done. Anything else?

"Gen. ANDERS. The second very urgent matter is to direct the drivers and the necessary personnel to receive the motor vehicles and utensils which are there.

"STALIN (makes notes). What else?

"Gen. ANDERS. The technical conditions of the evacuation shall be arranged with General Zukov. In connection with the present situation I should go as soon as possible to London and therefore I ask for a plane to Cairo and possibly for an assignment of a representative—maybe someone authorized to make authoritative arrangements.

"STALIN (makes notes). Why do you need there a Russian? In London they will say we have sent with you a guardian from the 'Czeka'; there they will look at this in that way and you may have because of it more unpleasant experience than advantage.

"Gen. ANDERS. I am not afraid of it. The entire matter of the evacuation, supplies and so forth must be discussed with the English General Staff.

"STALIN (interrupting). This is all right, but in what respect may a Russian help you over there?

"Gen. ANDERS. Not there, but on my return trip he may render me a great assistance in Teheran, if he has the required authority.

"STALIN (making notes). Yes, the evacuation from Krasnovock may not be sufficient and another base may be established in Ashabad, from where the evacuation could be made by land route through Meshed. (Goes to the map, looks for an Atlas and demands some maps.) Our troops may help you in that, for they are familiar with the conditions there. (Quite unexpectedly:) I doubt whether the Englishmen will give some armament to you.

"Gen. ANDERS. They are giving it already." (Hands over a specification of the first transport of English arms.)

(Stalin takes the specification, studies it and makes some notes.)

"MOLOTOV. It goes through Iran.

"Gen. ANDERS. Yes, the transport is already on its way and should arrive within a short time. On the territory of Iran there is already for me some sanitary material to set up a hospital. Besides, on the territory of Iran there is a considerable amount of arms of the Iranian Army, which may be easily and quickly shifted to us, if you consent to it.

"STALIN (makes notes). I do not object to it, but there were mostly only carbines and a part of them was already taken by us. (Puts some questions to Molotov.)

"MOLOTOV. Yes—100,000 carbines.

"Gen. ANDERS. According to my information, there were from 250,000 to 300,000 carbines, furthermore machine guns, guns and anti-aircraft and anti-armor guns. (Takes out a notebook and wants to tell the amount.)

"STALIN. We have not taken all this, and it may be given to you.

"Gen. ANDERS. All the arms are made for German ammunition. In addition, you have certainly a lot of captured German arms. Our soldiers are very well familiar with this armament and therefore it could be used temporarily for training until we receive the English arms.

"STALIN (makes notes). This is quite possible. (A moment of interruption and quite unexpectedly.) How many Poles serve as interpreters with the staffs of the Germans?

"Gen. ANDERS. In each grouping and in each nation there is a certain amount of less valuable men. You too have this kind of people (Stalin assents to), but you can not draw from this fact any general conclusions. We take care of such people. (Stalin assents to. A map is brought in, Stalin studies it and all others gather around the map.)

"STALIN. Along the Caspian Sea is a route too (indicates on the map) which also may be used.

"Gen. ANDERS. I have not heard of this route, but know only the route leading through Meshed. (All return to their seats.) In the first days of April as soon as General Sikorski returns, I would like to be in London. The matter is very urgent.

"STALIN. Do you want me to give you a plane to Cairo? (Makes notes.) All right. Is this finally all you wish?

"Gen. ANDERS. I would like to ask that the Poles who serve with the construction battalions and with the Russian Army be returned to the Polish Army in accordance with your promise, Mr. President.

"STALIN. We may return them, however, you will have to feed them and you do not have the food.

"Gen. ANDERS. Among them there are excellent young men fit for soldiers. The strongest I shall retain with me and include them in the group of 44,000 men and the rest will be evacuated.

STALIN (makes notes). We shall return them to you.

"Gen. ANDERS. Apart from those, there are still a lot of our people in prisons and labor camps. Men released recently are steadily returning. We still lack our officers who were taken away from Starobielsk, Kozielsk and Ostashkov. They must still be in your hands. We have collected additional data about them. (He hands over two lists, which were taken by Molotov.) They may have gone astray somewhere. We have traces of their stay on the Kolyma.

"STALIN. I have already given all orders that they should be released. It is said they are even in Francis Joseph land but there is not one of them there. I do not know where they are. Why should I want to detain them? It may be that they are in camps in territories taken over by the Germans and have dispersed there.

"Col. OKULICKI. This is impossible—we should know of it.

"STALIN. We have only detained those Poles who acted as spies in the employment of Germany. We have released such men, who afterwards went over to the Germans, as for instance Kozlowski.

"Gen. ANDERS. Upon Kozlowski has been imposed the death penalty by the Court Martial. I confirmed the sentence and the sentence will certainly be executed, maybe even by our people in the homeland.

"STALIN. Where is Beck?

"Gen. ANDERS. He is interned in Rumania.

"STALIN. The Germans will, of course, not do him any harm, as he is their friend. And where is Smigly?

"Gen. ANDERS. According to information received from the homeland, he is in Warsaw, apparently gravely ill, suffering from angina pectoris.

"STALIN. He is presumably hiding.

"Gen. ANDERS. Naturally.

"STALIN. Certainly Rydz Smigly proved in 1920 not to be a bad commander. He commanded well in the Ukraine.

"Gen. ANDERS. Yes, but in this war as Commander in Chief he completely gave up his command after a few days.

"STALIN. The cause of your defeat was the lack of a good intelligence service.

"Gen. ANDERS. This is not true, we had rather a good intelligence service. The informations were very precise, only there was no understanding for utilizing them. I stayed before the outbreak of the war at the frontier of East Prussia and know exactly what was going on the other side opposite me. Likewise I knew exactly about the German concentrations in Slovakia.

"STALIN. Yes, of course, spying in the territory of Germany should not be difficult for you. There you have indeed a lot of Poles.

"Gen. ANDERS. This is right—I received information from the Mazurs who live in East Prussia.

"STALIN. So the Mazurs are still holding out. That is very good.

"Gen. ANDERS. Yes, they hold out very well and certainly will hold out to the end. There is still one matter about which I would like to inform you, Mr. President. According to the order received from General Sikorski, namely that the burning of the huge warehouses in Poznan containing warm clothing assembled in the entire German Republic just before the winter, certainly rendered a considerable service to the cause of victory.

"STALIN. Not a bad one.

"Gen. ANDERS. General Sikorski intended to fly to Washington on March 15; he demands from Churchill and Roosevelt a more serious action on the western front. In his opinion, the evacuation of our pancer division in 1942 has more importance than the creation of three divisions in 1943. Everything we do proves our friendly attitude towards the U. S. S. R.

"STALIN. Hitler is a furious enemy of all the Slav people. He is afraid of the Slavs. (Quite unexpectedly and abstractly:) Our airman Lewoniewski, hero of the U. S. S. R., a brilliant character, who in spite of persuasions and discouragements attempted to reach his goal. When he lost his life, we sent money to his mother. We wanted to erect a monument on the site of his birthplace.

"Col. OKULICKI. His brother, our excellent airman, likewise lost his life.

"STALIN. Yes, I know about that.

"Gen. ANDERS. Formerly the cavalry was the most important means of defense, in particular our hussars, who today gave the airmen their wings and their pancers their tanks; however, the old cavalry spirit remained. The Slavs are particularly well qualified for flying. Your airmen are indeed famous and our airmen hold first place in England.

"STALIN. Yes, you are correct. The cavalry has a wonderful spirit everywhere. Do you have anything more?

"Col. OKULICKI. Not much time remains for completing the evacuation. It is best to make the evacuation from the base of Krasnovock, however, the order must be issued immediately, otherwise the evacuation may be postponed and the food supply will be cut off on March 31.

"STALIN. You are right. We must hurry this along. I shall issue proper orders.

"Gen. ANDERS. If you, Mr. President, authorize General Panfilov to settle the technical problems, I shall discuss them with him and therefore I will not take up your time.

"STALIN. Very well, these matters will be taken care of by Panfilov.

"Gen. ANDERS. If you, Mr. President, allow, I will summarize our conversation. (Stalin consents.) We, therefore, can reckon that the remainder of the people, for whom there is no allotted food, will be speedily evacuated to Iran.

"STALIN. All right.

"Gen. ANDERS. In connection with the evacuation and the limiting of the army to 44,000 men, the recruiting will not cease and the Poles from the construction battalions and from the Russian Army will be released and directed to the Polish Army.

"STALIN. All right.

"Gen. ANDERS. We can depend upon the arms which are in Iran. You do not have any objections to this? May I reveal that to General Sikorski and the Englishmen?

"STALIN. All right; no objections.

"Gen. ANDERS. In reference to my flight to London, may I count on having a Russian plane to Cairo and back?

"STALIN. Yes; I will see to it that you get the plane, but I shall not send anyone along with you; you have people who do not trust us and they would say that the Czeka sends along its observer.

"Gen. ANDERS. I am not responsible for what the foolish people, who are present everywhere, say. Important is only concrete work. I thought that your representative would be of great assistance to me in Teheran.

"STALIN. It is not only the average foolish people who think in that way; recently Grabski, the Chairman of the National Council, wrote a very unpleasant article against us.

"Col. OKULICKI. Our dreams for creating here an army as powerful as possible and for the return to the liberated homeland through battle—collapsed today.

"STALIN. Too bad, it can not be any other way. If it were not for Japan, you could do it. We keep our word to whatever we say. We are not responsible for the change.

"Gen. ANDERS. We want that our attack be powerful. Only then will it have full effect not only among our soldiers, but particularly in the homeland. Maybe, it will be possible to organize a part of our army in Iran, which later together with the units that remain in the U. S. S. R., would go to the front.

"STALIN (consents). Then you will receive such rations as all our front divisions.

"Gen. ANDERS. We want to enter first into Polish territory. We know that this is our duty towards our fatherland and that our brothers are waiting there for us impatiently. At the present time,

after the decision is made by you, Mr. President, the chief problem is the evacuation, which should begin as quickly as possible.

"STALIN. So it is. I shall order them to check the conditions of railway transportation, sea transportation and army conditions. I shall immediately issue pertinent orders. When are you flying?"

"Gen. ANDERS. Tomorrow, it will be impossible and I shall converse with General Panfilov. On the following day I want to leave. This is probably all."

(He gets up, bids farewell with handshaking; Stalin several times shakes hands with the Commander of the Polish Armed Forces; Molotov bids sincere farewell to all.)

"STALIN. I wish you luck."

(Stalin responds to a military salutation with a raised hand.)

Termination of the conversation at 19:00 hours.

The tempo of the conversation was lively—the atmosphere friendly.

OKULICKI, Col.

Recorder.

No. 21

Note of July 22, 1942, From Minister Sokolnicki, the Charge d'Affaires of the Republic of Poland, to the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Achmed Khan, the Ambassador of Afghanistan in Kuybyshev, on the infringement of Diplomatic Immunity of the Members of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland

KUYBYSHEV, July 22, 1942.

DEAR DEAN: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency of the following facts:

In accordance with a special agreement concluded with the Soviet Government, the Polish Embassy in the U. S. S. R. has received the authority to establish in country places local offices of Embassy delegates to render moral support, legal assistance and material help to Polish citizens, who are present in very great numbers on the territory of the Soviet Union in consequence of the events of the war. These local offices of Embassy delegates have been managed by delegates of the Embassy, of whom eight had been selected among the secretaries and attaches of the Embassy. The delegates were supplied with passports and diplomatic visas as well as with "Dip-cartotchki" and were always considered by the Narkomindiel as members of the diplomatic corps. Their names did not appear in the last edition of the list containing the diplomatic corps, because according to an understanding with the NKTD, the Embassy confined the number of names inserted in the list to those diplomats who are residing in Kuybyshev, so that all the other diplomatic colleagues could evade invitations and the interchange of useless visiting cards.

During their temporary mission in country places they have always maintained their residence in Kuybyshev opposite the Narkomindiel and after their return they belonged again to the diplomatic personnel of the Embassy.

The Soviet authorities have taken steps completely inexplicable and contrary to the law of nations. M. Gruja, the Second Secretary of the Embassy, and M. Zalenski, the First Secretary of the Embassy, have been arrested in Archangel and Vladivostok respectively on June

29 and 30 of the current year. They had to undergo questioning, a personal revision with the requisition of all documents they had with them and were submitted to strict rules of the prison regime (haircut, duty to clean the cell and so forth—this was in the case of M. Gruja, as to the other information is not yet available.)

After a strong protest of the Embassy, both the Polish diplomats were released from prison with the command to leave the country. M. Gruja is actually present in Kuybyshev and M. Zalenski is still on his way—he left Vladivostok on July 16.

In a note of July 10, the Narkomindiel explained that the arrests were due to ignorance on the part of the local authorities as to the diplomatic qualifications of Messrs. Gruja and Zalenski and due to the special circumstances in wartime. This ignorance is contradicted by the depositions of M. Gruja, who declares the contrary. He carried with him his "Dip-cartotchka". In the same note the Narkomindiel accused both the above named diplomats of a hostile action towards the U. S. S. R. The examining judge, however, accused M. Gruja, at the time of his questioning, of violating art. 58, sec. 10, part 2, by an anti-revolutionary action (propaganda or agitation against the U. S. S. R.) which article provides the death penalty.

Since July 15 mass arrests have taken place among the delegates and their staff employees. At the present time one may consider as certain that all delegates, as well as the greater part of their assistants, are imprisoned—among them six members of the diplomatic corps: M. Glogowski, the Second Secretary of the Embassy (Ashabad), and the attaches of the Embassy—M. Heitzman (Samarkand), M. Koscialkowski (Cziment), M. Ploski (Pietropavlovsk), and M. Slowikowski (called back from Tchelabinsk, returned to Kuybyshev on July 16 to work at the Embassy, about which the Narkomindiel was informed on the same day, arrested on July 20 before the door of the Embassy).

I have not failed to inform the Narkomindiel immediately of all the occurring facts and protested thereby against all the arrests and demanded the release of the detained persons. I have protested in particular against the violation of the diplomatic immunity of the assistants of the Embassy who belong to the diplomatic corps, underlining that the immunity which constitutes one of the very fundamental principles of international law has been violated.

I have also personally repeated these demarches to M. Wychynski on July 20. He stated to me that the arrests were made on account of the hostile activity of the arrested officials towards the U. S. S. R. and their action of inquiries. For all these reasons the Soviet authorities decided to suspend the operation of the offices of the delegates.

I have rejected these accusations as unjust and without any foundation. I have demanded the immediate release of the detained persons. With regard to the attaches and secretaries of the Embassy, I have underlined their diplomatic character. I have strongly refuted M. Wychynski's assertion that diplomats accused of an action hostile towards the country can not enjoy diplomatic immunity.

Till now I have not received any answer from the Narkomindiel. It must be underscored that the diplomatic qualifications of the attaches and secretaries of the Embassy sent temporarily to country places have never been put in doubt by any Soviet agency. This attitude has been confirmed by the note of the Narkomindiel of July 6, in which it has informed the Embassy that it could not allow in the

future that delegates of the Embassy could be at the same time attaches or secretaries of the Embassy, retaining their diplomatic rights, and that the Embassy must either recall the diplomats from their posts or annul their diplomatic qualifications and let them carry on their functions of delegates.

Messages of recall sent by the Embassy in consequence of this note to the delegates-diplomats have not been delivered to the addressees, which constitutes a new infringement of the freedom of diplomatic correspondence. The fact would probably not have any influence on the arrests of the six members of the diplomatic corps, if one looks upon the case of M. Slowikowski, the attache of the Embassy. He was recalled by telephone, returned to Kuybyshev and was arrested here before the door of the Embassy four days later.

I inform Your Excellency in your capacity of the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps in the U. S. S. R. of all the incidents stated above, which affect the whole diplomatic corps. Please allow me to request you to take any proper steps which you will consider necessary to obtain the immediate release of the six members of the diplomatic corps in the U. S. S. R.

Dear Dean, please accept in advance all my greatest thanks and the assurances of my very high respect.

H. SOKOLNICKI,
Minister, Charge d'Affaires, a. i.

Your Excellency

Mr. ACHMED KHAN

Ambassador of Afghanistan in Kuybyshev.

No. 22

Note of January 16, 1943, from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R. to the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev, claiming as Soviet citizens who on November 1-2, 1939, found themselves on Polish territories occupied by the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has the honor to inform the Embassy of the Polish Republic of the following:

In connection with the exchange of Notes in the years 1941-1942 between the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the Embassy, concerning the citizenship of persons who previously lived in the Western districts of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republics, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs informed the Embassy on December 1, 1941, that all inhabitants of the above-mentioned districts on November 1-2, 1939. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs is bound to state despite the goodwill of the Soviet Government thus manifested, the Polish Government has adopted a negative attitude to the above statement of the Soviet Government and has refused to take the appropriate steps, putting forward demands contrary to the sovereign rights of the Soviet Union in respect to these territories.

In connection with the above, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, on instructions from the Soviet Government, gives notice that the statement included in the Note of December 1, 1941, regarding the readiness to treat some categories of persons of Polish origin on an

exceptional basis must be considered as without validity and that the question of the possible non-application to such persons of the laws governing citizenship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has ceased to exist.

KUYBYSHEV, *January 16, 1943.*

No. 23

Note of January 26, 1943, from Mr. Raczynski, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U. S. S. R., in reply to the Note of January 16, 1943, concerning Polish citizenship in the Soviet Union

LONDON, *January 26, 1943.*

MR. AMBASSADOR: In the Note of the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev of December 9, 1941, the Polish Government notified its refusal to take into cognizance the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign affairs of December 1, 1941, in which the Soviet Government Declared its readiness to exonerate, by way of exception and favor, certain categories of persons of Polish origin from the application of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of November 29, 1939, as well as from the laws which confer upon them the status of citizens of the Union. The aforementioned Note of the Polish Embassy pointed out that the conferment or withdrawal of Polish citizenship was an exclusive and inalienable attribute of the sovereignty of the Polish State, whose laws, moreover, make no distinction between the origin, race or faith of its citizens.

Since then a year has passed during which the aforementioned categories of Poles residing in the Union have been treated in accordance with their status as Polish citizens. However, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has informed the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev by its Note No. 12 of January 16, 1943, that the Soviet Government considers it necessary to cancel the declaration contained in the Note of December 1, 1941, and that in consequence the possibility of exonerating from laws governing Soviet citizenship the said persons of Polish Nationality has now ceased to exist.

Maintaining its point of view in principle on the question of citizenship, the Polish Government records with deep regret that the Soviet communication of January 16, 1943, is incompatible with the spirit of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, and the joint Declaration made by both Governments on December 4, 1941.

These Documents were based on the mutual conviction of the two Contracting Parties, that the re-establishment between them of normal and confident relations in the interest of their cooperation in the present struggle against the common enemy and of their good neighborliness after the war, calls for the nullification of a recent pact that was contrary to these arrangements. Thus these documents leave no room for doubt as to the annulment of the Soviet-German Agreements of 1939 and their political and legal consequences.

I must recall that according to Paragraph I of the Supplementary Protocol to the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, there were on Soviet territory no other categories of Polish citizens than those to whom this status is now denied by the Soviet Government. So it was

precisely to these persons in their status of Polish citizens, that the amnesty applied. It must be emphasized that the point mentioned above which was the subject of laborious negotiations, constitutes one of the essential clauses of the Agreement of July 30, 1941.

The Polish Government has always refused to recognize the validity of the unilateral decisions of the authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, taken when there were no Polish-Soviet relations; among them was the decision concerning the forcing of citizenship of the Soviet Union upon Polish citizens. It may be added that decisions of this kind are incompatible with international law as defined by the IVth Hague Convention of 1907, and with the provisions of the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, to which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics adhered in the Declaration of the United Nations, dated January 1, 1942.

Always desirous for its part to maintain with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the best of relations, based on the observance of all treaties and arrangements existing between the two countries, the Polish Government see themselves obliged to insist that the Soviet Government grant to all Polish citizens residing in the Soviet Union, a treatment in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Agreement of July 30, 1941, and the principles of equity and liberty on which rest the collaboration of all Powers united in the struggle against the common enemy and oppressor.

I have the honor to be etc.

RACZYNSKI.

No. 24

2. Excerpts from Ambassador Romer's conversation with Premier Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, at the Kremlin during the night of February 26-27, 1943

ROMER. I should still like to discuss the problem of Polish-Soviet relations which unfortunately are passing through a crisis, causing anxiety. We have just ended a friendly discussion on a number of important subjects dealing with military collaboration between our countries. But such collaboration can actually bear fruit only as and when accompanied by mutual friendly feeling. First of all in this connection, the fate of Polish citizens in the Soviet Union is of special interest to the Polish Government and public opinion. The Soviet Note of January 16, 1943, introduced new and unexpected elements and implications which have filled us with deep concern and which it is my duty to elucidate in this conversation with you, Mr. President.

STALIN. I am listening, please.

ROMER. As a result of the Agreement of July 30, 1941, the amnesty proclaimed by the Soviet Government affected a vast number of Polish citizens, not excluding national minorities, whose Polish citizenship was only called into question on December 1, 1941, in a note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Set free from camps and prisons our citizens began to rally en masse to the Polish Army then in formation. With the assistance of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, and of a number of social welfare organizations and institutions, the Polish Government organ-

ized relief work on a large scale for their families and for those who remained at work in their places of exile. The need for this relief did not in the least imply a desire to assure to the Polish population an existence in any way privileged as compared with their surroundings, nor even an allegation, never put forward by us, that Polish deportees received worst treatment at the hands of the Soviet authorities than the local population. Their position was worse for other reasons. They had been deported at an hour's notice and as a rule with no money, clothing or food, torn away by force from the surroundings in which they had grown up. Frequently they were separated from their families and were taken under most difficult circumstances to distant, foreign countries, often with extremely severe climates differing greatly from that to which they were accustomed. They were settled among an alien people whose language and customs were foreign to them, and where they lacked the adequate living quarters and vegetable gardens at the disposal of the local population. They were made to do work of which they had no previous experience, for instance intellectuals were given heavy manual work which they had never done before. They were also suffering from disease. For these reasons relief in the form of food, clothing and medical supplies was and remains an absolute necessity.

STALIN. Whom do you refer to as the Polish population, Mr. Ambassador? The whole Polish population which found itself in Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia?

ROMER. According to Polish legislation, I consider as Polish citizens all those persons who possessed Polish citizenship in 1939. There is a difference of opinion between our two Governments on this subject, the more so since, as was made clear by the Soviet Note of January 16, 1943, and its interpretation which I heard from Commissar Molotov several days ago—the Soviets extended their citizenship to all persons who were in the disputed territories on November 1 and 2, 1939, even if they found themselves there quite temporarily and by accident and had no connection whatever with the place where they were staying.

MOLOTOV. That is not exact. There is reference in the Note to the Citizenship Act which differentiates between permanent and temporary residents: the former have become citizens of the Soviet Union by virtue of the law, while the citizenship of the latter is a matter for individual examination.

ROMER. The note of January 16, 1943, states explicitly that all persons present in the disputed territories acquired Soviet citizenship.

STALIN. But at the same time there is reference to the Soviet Citizenship Act.

ROMER. May I remark that we have received a number of Notes from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs stating that all residents in these districts have become Soviet citizens. The Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev has even received a written warning that intervention on behalf of individual persons will not be considered until evidence is produced showing the whereabouts of such persons on November 1 and 2, 1939.

STALIN. Distinction is made between those who happened to be in those territories and those who lived there permanently.

MOLOTOV. Citizens of a number of States could have been there at the time, as for example Rumanians, Hungarians, Frenchmen and others, but obviously they did not acquire Soviet citizenship on this

account. Our Constitution provided distinctly for such eventualities, which, however, have to be examined individually.

ROMER. This is an entirely new situation to me. I find this interpretation, which I hear for the first time, extremely interesting. Hitherto, ever since its note of December 1, 1941, the Soviet Government has adhered consistently to the attitude that especially that category of Polish citizens who found themselves in the territories in question at the time specified acquired Soviet citizenship.

STALIN. Excuse me, Mr. Ambassador, but persons whose presence in these territories was merely transitory did not automatically acquire Soviet citizenship.

ROMER. I can quote a whole series of concrete cases of the attitude hitherto held by the Soviet Government. I do not remember them all, but a classical example is that of the two Warsaw city councillors, Alter and Ehrlich, who despite our objections and representations were classified as Soviet citizens.

MOLOTOV. There may have been individual cases.

ROMER. What is then the official Soviet interpretation in this matter, Mr. President? All Soviet Notes and statements have indicated hitherto, that in practice all Polish citizens in the U. S. S. R. have lost their citizenship. We cannot agree to that.

STALIN. The Polish Government persists in considering as Polish citizens all Poles now in the U. S. S. R. That is wrong. Truly, a number of Soviet offices have overstepped their authority in certain individual cases, but we must put a stop to extremes. I must moreover point out that it also depends on the person concerned what citizenship he wished to choose. Thus everybody must be asked. Take, Mr. Ambassador, the example of Wanda Wasilewska, a Pole from Warsaw who considers herself a Soviet citizen. The people's wishes must be given consideration, one cannot force citizenship upon them. There is in our Note a reference to the Citizenship Act. I must admit that not all Soviet bureaus have always acted along uniform lines and correctly. But not all the Poles who lived and were domiciled in Polish territory will be Polish citizens. That has to be stopped. There are some who are coming over to us. * * *

* * * * *

ROMER. Many Poles, Soviet citizens, have lived in the territories of the U. S. S. R. for many years. We do not claim them, nor have we ever raised this question.

STALIN. I was thinking of Poles domiciled in the western parts of the Ukraine and White Ruthenia.

ROMER. I therefore note, Mr. President, that you recognize the will of each person concerned as an important element in determining his or her citizenship. On our part we shall gladly agree to such a criterion for we have no desire to have citizens who do not wish to be Polish citizens. I must, however, emphasize that a large number of practical issues are bound up with the citizenship problem. Of these I will mention the continuation of relief to our people and permission for individuals to go abroad without, of course, burdening Soviet railways engaged in war transport. I have in mind particularly Polish children and the families still left in the U. S. S. R. of soldiers serving in the Polish Army in Great Britain and in the Near East, and also families of Polish State officials and welfare workers. The fact that

they are separated from their bread winners can neither be explained nor understood by anyone. * * *

* * * * *

ROMER. Reverting to the subject to citizenship, in view of the practical consequences involved for hundreds of thousands of our people and thus also for Polish-Soviet relations, I must insist that this be settled not unilaterally but by mutual agreement between our two governments. It is unthinkable that a large and valuable portion of our Nation be thus abruptly cut off against its will from the rest.

STALIN. If we consider the Ukrainians and White Ruthenians as nations, we must recognize that a reunion (vossoyedinenie) has taken place between the lands they inhabit and Soviet White Ruthenia and Soviet Ukraine. Surely the Ukrainians are not Poles! Surely the White Ruthenians are not Poles! We have not joined a single Polish province to the Soviet Union. All Polish territories have been occupied by the Germans.

ROMER. Since you refer to the plebiscites in our Eastern provinces, Mr. President, I must recall that they were carried out within the boundaries set up by the German-Soviet agreement which was subsequently solemnly repudiated in the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941.

STALIN. It was the German attack on the U. S. S. R. which rendered the German-Soviet agreement invalid, and especially the non-aggression pact.

ROMER. At the time the Soviet Union took our territory we were in opposite camps, and we have not recognized any acts of violence committed at our expense. Since July 30, 1941, we are in the same anti-German camp, which entitles us to expect that no changes will be made in the lands that are ours or in our fundamental rights without our agreement. In default of this we must maintain the attitude that the former Polish-Soviet frontiers, established by the Treaty of Riga, remain always in force. * * *

* * * * *

ROMER. We must have a friendly discussion on all subjects of friction between our two Governments, a friction that is of no benefit to either party but only serves Germany. It is in such a spirit that the problems connected with relief for Polish citizens in the U. S. S. R. and with their departure should be discussed.

STALIN. What problems?

ROMER. This is a historical moment which will decide the course of Polish-Soviet relations for many years to come. We must approach the decisions it calls for with mutual and full understanding and good will, excluding for the time being from our discussions such matters as cannot now be decided and which, if raised, merely lead to friction in Polish-Soviet relations and provoke public controversies.

STALIN. The Soviet Government keeps consistently silent on the subject and so should the Polish Government.

ROMER. It is easier to remain silent when one is acquiring something than when one is losing it. As a result of the Soviet Note of January 16, 1943, we are threatened with a loss of several hundred thousands of our citizens who are all the more important to us as we have lost so many at the hands of the Germans. Furthermore we are threatened with the loss on Soviet initiative of the whole eastern

part of our territory. No wonder, then, that Polish public opinion is embittered.

STALIN. The territory we have lost is larger than the whole of Poland.

ROMER. But the Red Army has already reconquered vast regions and will undoubtedly regain everything. And, moreover, these territories are only a small part of the Soviet Union.

STALIN. Mr. Ambassador, after the Red Army has beaten the Germans on Russian soil it will enter Polish territory and help to chase the Germans out of Poland and then it will immediately return these lands to the Polish Government, and then, Mr. Ambassador, will you say that this will be a unilateral action adversely affecting good mutual relations?

ROMER. It will not be as bad as that.

STALIN. Mr. Ambassador, we want a strong Poland; we shall give you the whole of German-occupied Poland regardless of the fact that we are being insulted (*niesmotria na to tshto nas rugayut*). But we can take these insults on our shoulders!

ROMER. Thank you, Mr. President, for these words. I shall remember them. And do you agree with me as to the need for coming to a mutual agreement regarding the problem of the citizenship of Poles at present in the U. S. S. R. and of further relief and assistance for them from our own resources?

STALIN. There will be Poles who wish to acquire Soviet citizenship.

MOLOTOV. We are, of course, referring to citizens other than those from Western Ukrainian or Western White Ruthenian territories. This problem should furthermore be examined for the purpose of determining the citizenship of persons whose presence in those territories was only temporary.

ROMER. According to what Mr. President has said, the will of the persons concerned must be given consideration. Since on the strength of an understanding between the two governments it will be made possible for such persons to express their wishes quite freely, I have no doubt that the atmosphere will be easily and smoothly cleared, since all those in whom we are interested will never reconcile themselves to the thought of parting with their Polish citizenship.

STALIN. It must nevertheless be carried out in accordance with our legislation relating to citizenship. The problem of persons serving in the Red Army presents another difficulty. Out of a desire to evade further service, they may express their wish to go, say to Australia in the capacity of Polish citizens. Desertion might thus be facilitated. Apart from the will of the persons concerned, other considerations will therefore have to be taken into account. The nationality of such people and their origin will have to be looked into.

ROMER. A problem of vital interest to me in this connection is that of our children. There are several tens of thousands in the Soviet Union and they will be of great value to the future of resurrected Poland. From the point of view of bringing to agreement our conflicting views on citizenship, we attach great importance to the fate of the orphans. We should like to make it possible for these orphans to go to other countries where they would find favourable conditions of existence and education and be a minimum financial burden to the Polish Government.

STALIN. In accordance with our legislation this depends on a variety of factors. It is difficult to generalize.

ROMER. I think that the problem of citizenship can only be resolved by means of a formal, bilateral agreement.

STALIN. We cannot infringe our laws.

MOLOTOV. Obviously not.

ROMER. We have seen that in the past Soviet legislation did not preclude a large measure of elasticity in its application. I think that on such a premise a way would be found to an understanding on the basis of mutual good will.

STALIN. If conversations take place then all these problems will be cleared up.

ROMER. Do you see any possibility, Mr. President, of such negotiations being begun?

STALIN. If you, Mr Ambassador, see such a possibility, I make no objection.

ROMER. Well, we shall go into this matter further.

STALIN. Thus according to you we have as subject for our negotiations, the question of propaganda, the question of citizenship and the problem of frontiers (vopros o granitzach).

ROMER. No, I understood differently and emphasized that in order to improved our relations it would be better to avoid discussing frontiers for the time being; on the other hand I suggested that we should begin negotiations on the subject of preventing unfriendly propaganda on both sides, on the problem of citizenship and its practical consequences.

STALIN. Very well, Mr. Ambassador.

MOLOTOV. A declaration of the Polish Government was published in London yesterday. Its contents are unfriendly to the Soviet Union.

STALIN. The declaration is more than a newspaper reply. It is in fact an official statement (eto zayavlenye). Where Soviet territory is concerned there is no Soviet Government prepared to waive (otkazalsia by) any provisions of our Constitution. And the adherence of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia to the Soviet Union has been included in the Constitution.

ROMER. On the other hand you will not find a single Pole who would deny that Wilno and Lwow are Polish. I myself so declare it in your presence, Mr. President, with the fullest conviction.

STALIN. I understand your viewpoint. We also have ours. We are quits. Perhaps we should act similarly to the Polish Government as regards frontiers and also publish a statement. * * *

* * * * *

ROMER. In the interest of our common front in the fight against Germany which occupies first place in your thoughts and in ours, I insist on agreement, by means of Polish-Soviet negotiation, on the standpoint and behavior of both parties in the difficult sphere of citizenship and the problems arising from it; also for mutual cessation of public statements and propaganda unfriendly to one another. Would you authorize me, Mr. President, to suggest this to my Government?

STALIN. You are right, Mr. Ambassador. I congratulate you on your good idea. The matter must be examined, we must find out whose citizens these people are, each case must be considered.

ROMER. May I count on our being enabled to continue our relief work until our negotiations concerning citizenship are concluded?

STALIN. I do not know, Mr. Ambassador, that depends on the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

ROMER. It is a vital problem for us. We could thus avoid in the event of the suspension of our relief work all consequences which might arise in other countries interested in it, such as England and America. It would be much better if we could reach an understanding without intermediaries.

STALIN. You are right. I cannot promise you anything definite in advance, but negotiations can be started.

ROMER. Am I to conduct these negotiations in Moscow with Mr. Molotov, the People's Commissar?

STALIN. Yes, do.

MOLOTOV. If it is convenient for you, Mr. Ambassador, I am at your disposal.

ROMER. I shall report the above to my Government and ask for instructions whereupon I shall take the liberty of communicating with Mr. Molotov. In any case, I consider the attitude of the President as an assurance that the problems under consideration will be examined with good will and I hope that the negotiations will lead to an understanding which will remove all existing difficulties.

No. 25

Note of March 8, 1943, from Mr. Raczynski, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U. S. S. R., protesting against the execution of W. Alter and H. Ehrlich

LONDON, March 8, 1943.

MR. AMBASSADOR: Excerpts have been published in the American and British press of a letter from the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Washington addressed to Mr. William Green, President of the American Federation of Labor, containing information on the execution of Wiktor Alter and Henryk Ehrlich, who were sentenced to death by the Soviet authorities on the charge of complicity in subversive action against the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, giving assistance to Polish Intelligence and appealing to the Soviet army to cease bloodshed and conclude an immediate peace with Germany.

In connection with the above information the Polish Government refer to Notes regarding Wiktor Alter and Henryk Ehrlich addressed by the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kuybyshev to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and beg to state as follows:

1. The councillor of the capital city of Warsaw, Henryk Ehrlich (born in Lublin in 1882), and ex-Councillor and Sheriff of the city of Warsaw, Wiktor Alter (born in Mlawa, province of Warsaw, in 1890), were released from prison on September 13, 1941, by the competent authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the provisions of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, and a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of August 12, 1941, granting amnesty to all Polish citizens domiciled and detained in the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The fact of their

release was communicated to the Embassy of the Republic of Poland at Moscow in a Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on September 23, 1941, which clearly proves that Messrs. Alter and Ehrlich had been recognized by the Soviet Authorities as Polish citizens.

2. Henryk Ehrlich and Wiktor Alter were widely known and distinguished leaders of the Jewish Socialist movement in Poland: furthermore Mr. Ehrlich was a member of the Executive Committee of the Socialist Labor International, and Mr. Alter a member of the Executive Committee of the International of Trade Unions.

In consideration of his services with the Jewish labor movement in Poland, the Polish Government had intended to appoint Mr. Ehrlich a member of the National Council, and with this aim in view had taken steps to facilitate his journey from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Great Britain. Mr. Alter was to be appointed assistant at the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev in relief work for Polish citizens on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The political and social activities of Messrs. Alter and Ehrlich for many years well-known throughout Poland and in international labor circles, their patriotism and loyalty as Polish citizens during the German invasion of Poland and also in the light of the desolation caused throughout the Polish nation and the Jewish population by that invasion, are absolute guarantees that they could not even indirectly have been sympathizers with or tools of any action whatsoever in favor of Germany, and even less so in favor of Hitlerism. At the same time the charge that Messrs. Ehrlich and Alter worked against the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics at any period whatever in conjunction with the alleged Polish Intelligence must be firmly rejected as being entirely imaginary and contrary to fact.

On the contrary, it was well known to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that during the period between their release from prison and their re-arrest in December 1941, Henryk Ehrlich and Wiktor proceeded, with the knowledge and consent of the Soviet authorities, to organize in Moscow an International Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, the object of which was to unite all Jewish masses throughout the world in the war effort against Germany and Hitlerism.

On the strength of the above statement, the Polish Government firmly repudiate the motives put forward in the letter of the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Washington to Mr. Green and protest against the execution by shooting of the Polish citizens Henryk Ehrlich and Wiktor Alter.

I have the honor to be, etc.

RACZYNSKI.

No. 26

Note of March 31, 1943, from Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U. S. S. R., to Mr. E. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, in reply to the Note of March 8, 1943, protesting against the execution of W. Alter and H. Ehrlich

LONDON, March 31, 1943.

MR. MINISTER: In reply to your Note of March 8, 1943, I have the honor to inform you that the Soviet Government reject the entirely

unfounded protest of the Polish Government concerning the execution of Ehrlich and Alter, sentenced on account of their activities directed against the U. S. S. R. at the end of the year 1941, which went so far as to appeal to the Soviet armies to cease this bloodshed and to conclude an immediate peace with Germany; this at the time of the hardest struggle of the Soviet armies against the advancing armies of Hitler.

I have the honor to be, etc.,

BOGOMOLOV.

No. 27

Communique of the Soviet Information Bureau of April 15, 1943, regarding the information of the German propaganda about the mass murder of Polish officers in the neighborhood of Smolensk

In the past two or three days Goebbels' slanderers have been spreading vile fabrications alleging that Soviet authorities effected a mass shooting of Polish officers in the spring of 1940, in the Smolensk area. In launching this monstrous invention the German-Fascist scoundrels do not hesitate at the most unscrupulous and base lies, in their attempt to cover up crimes which, as has now become evident, were perpetrated by themselves.

The German-Fascist reports on this subject leave no doubt as to the tragic fate of the former Polish prisoners of war who in 1941 were engaged in construction work in areas west of Smolensk, and who, along with many Soviet people, residents of the Smolensk region, fell into the hands of the German-Fascist hangmen in the summer of 1941, after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the Smolensk area.

Beyond doubt Goebbels' slanderers are not trying by lies and calumnies to cover up the bloody crimes of the Hitlerite gangsters. In their clumsily concocted fabrication about the numerous graves which the Germans allegedly discovered near Smolensk, the Hitlerite liars mention the village of Gnexdovaya. But, like the swindlers they are, they are silent about the fact that it was near the village Gnezdovaya that the archaeological excavations of the historic "Gnexdovaya burial place" were made.

Past-masters in such affairs, the Hitlerites stoop to the clumsiest forgeries and misrepresentation of facts in spreading slanderous fabrications about some sort of Soviet atrocities allegedly perpetrated in the spring of 1940, and in this way try to shake off their own responsibility for the brutal crimes they have committed.

These errant German-Fascist murderers, whose hands are stained with the blood of hundreds of thousands of innocent victims, who methodically exterminate the populations of countries they have occupied without sparing children, women or old people, who exterminated many hundreds of thousands of Polish citizens in Poland itself, will deceive no one by their base lies and slander.

The Hitlerite murderers will not escape a just and inevitable retribution for their bloody crimes.

No. 28

Statement of the Polish Government of April 17, 1943, published in London, April 18, 1943, concerning the discovery of graves of Polish officers near Smolensk

No Pole can help but be deeply shocked by the news, now given the widest publicity by the Germans, of the discovery of the bodies of the Polish officers missing in the U. S. S. R. in a common grave near Smolensk, and of the mass execution of which they were victims.

The Polish Government has instructed their representative in Switzerland to request the International Red Cross in Geneva to send a delegation to investigate the true state of affairs on the spot. It is to be desired that the findings of this protective institution, which is to be entrusted with the task of clarifying the matter and of establishing responsibility, should be issued without delay.

At the same time, however, the Polish Government, on behalf of the Polish nation, denies to the Germans any right to base on a crime they ascribe to others, arguments in their own defence. The profoundly hypocritical indignation of German propaganda will not succeed in concealing from the world the many cruel and reiterated crimes still being perpetrated against the Polish people.

The Polish Government recalls such facts as the removal of Polish officers from prisoner-of-war camps in the Reich and the subsequent shooting of them for political offences alleged to have been committed before the war, mass arrests of reserve officers subsequently deported to concentration camps, to die a slow death,—from Cracow and the neighboring district alone 6,000 were deported in June 1942; the compulsory enlistment in the German army of Polish prisoners of war from territories illegally incorporated in the Reich; the forcible conscription of about 200,000 Poles from the same territories, and the execution of the families of those who managed to escape; the massacre of one-and-a-half-million people by executions or in concentration camps; the recent imprisonment of 80,000 people of military age, officers and men, and their torture and murder in the camps of Majdanek and Tremblinka.

It is not to enable the Germans to make impudent claims and pose as the defenders of Christianity and European civilization, that Poland is making immense sacrifices, fighting and enduring suffering. The blood of Polish soldiers and Polish citizens, wherever it is shed, cries for atonement before the conscience of the free peoples of the world. The Polish Government condemn all the crimes committed against Polish citizens and refuse the right to make political capital of such sacrifices, to all who are themselves guilty of such crimes.

No. 29

***Communique issued on April 23, 1943, by the Board of Directors of the International Red Cross in Geneva formulating the position concerning the conditions for the participation of the International Red Cross in the carrying out of investigations of graves of Polish officers in the vicinity of Smolensk*³**

"The German Red Cross and the Polish Government in London appealed to the International Red Cross for its cooperation in the identification of bodies found, according to German information, in the immediate vicinity of Smolensk.

"In both cases the International Red Cross responded that it is basically ready to give support in choosing neutral experts, however, under the condition that proper requests be directed to them by all parties interested in this matter, as stipulated in the memorandum submitted by the committee of the International Red Cross in December 1939 to all nations participating in the war, in which were formulated the principles to become the bases for participation of the International Red Cross in investigations of this nature."

No. 30

Note of April 25, 1943, from Mr. Molotov, People's commissar for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Romer, Polish Ambassador in the U. S. S. R., severing relations between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government

Moscow, April 26, 1943.

MR. AMBASSADOR: On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to notify the Polish Government with regard to the U. S. S. R. as entirely abnormal, and violating all regulations and standards of relations between two Allied States. The slanderous campaign hostile to the Soviet Union launched by the German Fascists in connection with the murder of the Polish officers, which they themselves committed in the Smolensk area on territory occupied by German troops, was at once taken up by the Polish Government and is being fanned in every way by the Polish official press.

Far from offering a rebuff to the vile Fascist slander of the U. S. S. R., the Polish Government did not even find it necessary to address to the Soviet Government any inquiry or request for an explanation on this subject.

Having committed a monstrous crime against the Polish officers, the Hitlerite authorities are now staging a farcical investigation, and for this they have made use of certain Polish pro-Fascist elements whom they themselves selected in occupied Poland where everything is under Hitler's heel, and where no honest Pole can openly have his say.

For the "investigation," both the Polish Government and the Hitlerite Government invited the International Red Cross, which is compelled, in conditions of a terroristic regime, with its gallows and mass extermination of the peaceful population, to take part in this investi-

³ Published in "Dziennik Polski" No. 856, April 24 and 26, 1943, as translated from "Exchange Telegraph."

gation farce staged by Hitler. Clearly such an "investigation," conducted behind the back of the Soviet Government, cannot evoke the confidence of people possessing any degree of honesty.

The fact that the hostile campaign against the Soviet Union commenced simultaneously in the German and Polish press, and was conducted along the same lines, leaves no doubt as to the existence of contact and accord in carrying out this hostile campaign between the enemy of the Allies—Hitler—and the Polish Government.

While the peoples of the Soviet Union bleeding profusely in a hard struggle against Hitlerite Germany, are straining every effort for the defeat of the common enemy of the Russian and Polish peoples, and of all freedom-loving democratic countries, the Polish Government, to please Hitler's tyranny, has dealt a treacherous blow to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government is aware that this hostile campaign against the Soviet Union is being undertaken by the Polish Government in order to exert pressure upon the Soviet Government by making use of the slanderous Hitlerite fake for the purpose of wresting from it territorial concessions at the expense of the interests of the Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Byelorussia and Soviet Lithuania.

All these circumstances compel the Soviet Government to recognize that the present Government of Poland, having slid on the path of accord with Hitler's Government, has actually discontinued allied relations with the U. S. S. R., and has adopted a hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union.

On the strength of the above, the Soviet Government has decided to sever relations with the Polish Government.

MOLOTOV.

No. 31

For summary concerning: (a) *Polish Army in the U. S. S. R.*; (b) *The Missing Polish Officers in the U. S. S. R.*; (c) *Relief for Polish Citizens in the U. S. S. R.*; (d) *Citizenship of Polish Deportees and Soviet Territorial Claims*; see: *Polish-Soviet Relations 1918-1943*, Official Documents, Chapters III, IV, V, VI, pp. 26-67. The Katyn Forest Massacre, Select Committee To Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre. Eighty-second Congress, second session, H. Res. 390 and H. Res. 539. Part 4. Exhibit 19, pp. 969-1227.

No. 32

Statement of the Polish Government of April 28, 1943, concerning the decision of the Soviet Government to sever relations with the Polish Government

The following statement was issued on April 28, 1943, by the Polish Government in London:

The Polish Government emphatically declare that their policy aiming at a mutual friendly understanding between Poland and Soviet Russia on the basis of the integrity and full sovereignty of the Republic of Poland was and continues to be fully supported by the Polish nation.

Conscious of their responsibility towards their own nation and towards the Allies, whose unity and solidarity the Polish Government consider to be the cornerstone of future victory, they were the first to approach the Soviet Government with a proposal for an understanding, in spite of the many tragic events that had taken place from the moment of the entry of the Soviet Armies on the territory of the Republic, that is from the day of September 17, 1939.

Having settled their relations with Soviet Russia by the Agreement of July 30, 1941, and by the Declaration of December 4, 1941, the Polish Government have strictly discharged their obligations.

Acting in close union with their Government, the Polish nation, making unheard of sacrifices, fights unswervingly in Poland and abroad against the German invader. It produced no traitor Quisling and accepted no collaboration with Germany. In the light of facts known throughout the world, the Polish nation and the Polish Government have no need to defend themselves from any charge of contact or understanding with Hitler.

In a public statement of April 17, 1943, the Polish Government categorically denied to Germany the right to abuse the tragedy of Polish officers for her own perfidious aims. They unhesitatingly denounced the effort of Nazi propaganda to create mistrust between the Allies. About the same time a Note was sent to the Soviet Ambassador accredited to the Polish Government asking once again for information which would help to elucidate the fate of the missing officers.

The Polish nation and the Polish Government look to the future. They appeal in the name of the unity of the Allies and of elementary human principles for the release from the U. S. S. R. of the thousands of families of soldiers of the Polish Armed Forces, engaged in the fight or preparing in Great Britain and the Middle East to take their part in the fight, tens of thousands of Polish orphans and children for the education of whom they would take full responsibility and who now, in view of the German mass slaughter, are particularly precious to the Polish people. The Polish Army, in waging the war against Germany needs as reinforcements all Polish men able to fight who now find themselves on Soviet soil. The Polish Government appeal for their release. They reserve their right to plead the cause of all these persons before the world. Finally, the Polish Government appeal for the continuation of relief for the mass of Polish citizens who remain in Russia.

In defending the integrity of the Republic of Poland, which accepted the war with the Third Reich, the Polish Government never claimed and do not claim, in accordance with their statement of February 25, 1943, any Soviet territories.

It is and will be the duty of every Polish Government to defend the rights of Poland and of Polish citizens. The principles for which the United Nations fight, and the strengthening by all means of their solidarity in this struggle against the common enemy, remain the unchanging bases of the policy of the Polish Government.

No. 33

Stalin's Interview with the Correspondent of "Times" of May 4th, 1943, Regarding Polish Soviet Relations

On May 5th, when the Polish Ambassador was leaving Russia, Premier Stalin made a written statement to the Moscow correspondent of the "Times", from which it was to be deducted that the Soviet Government stood by the spirit of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of 1941, and in particular by the Sikorski-Stalin Declaration of December 4th, 1941.

"DEAR MR. PARKER, On May 3rd I received your two questions concerning Polish-Soviet relations. Here are my answers:

Question 1: Does the Government of the U. S. S. R. desire to see a strong and independent Poland after the defeat of Hitlerite Germany?

Answer: Unquestionably, it does.

Question 2: On what fundamentals is it your opinion that relations between Poland and the U. S. S. R. should be based after the war?

Answer: Upon the fundamentals of solid good neighbourly relations and mutual respect, or, should the Polish people desire—upon the fundamentals of alliance providing for mutual assistance against the Germans as the chief enemies of the Soviet Union and Poland.

With respect,

(Signed) STALIN."

No. 34

Press notice on the creation of a Polish Division in the name of Tadeusz Kosciuszko⁴

The Soviet Government decided to fulfill the request of the Union of Polish Patriots in the U. S. S. R. concerning the creation, in the territory of the U. S. S. R., of a Polish Division in the name of Tadeusz Kosciuszko in order to fight jointly with the Red Army against the German invaders.

The formation of this division has already begun.

No. 35

General W. Sikorski's reply of May 6, 1943, in the "New York Times" to Stalin's interview with the correspondent of the "Times"⁵

"Premier Stalin's words correspond to the opinion he expressed to me during my stay in Moscow in December, 1941. Indeed, the Germans have been for ages the common and implacable enemy of both the Poles and the Russians. The Polish nation wants, of course, to continue its friendly relations with Soviet Russia and base them on an alliance directed against Germany. It is, however, difficult for me not to be restrained, even in the face of such a favourable declaration by Premier Stalin, at the very moment when the Polish Ambassador is leaving Russia and the masses of Polish population in the U. S. S. R. are left without the care and assistance of their Government. Yet, in spite of this, and in spite of many other facts, the Pol-

⁴ "Wolna Polska" No. 10, May 8, 1943 [Moscow].

⁵ "New York Times", May 6th, 1943.

ish Government is ready to give a positive answer to any Soviet initiative which will coincide with the interests of the Polish Republic, as defined in our common declaration of December 4th, 1941, and in my speech of May 4th, 1943."

No. 36

Note of May 13, 1943, from the Government of the Republic of Poland to the Foreign Office concerning the organization of a Polish Division on the Territory of the U. S. S. R.

DEAR MINISTER: The Information Bulletin of Reuter's Telegraphic Agency of May ninth brings the news that the Soviet Government has undertaken the formation of a division recruited with Poles who had been deported to the U. S. S. R., and that this division will constitute a part of the Red Army under the name "Division of Tadeusz Kosciuszko". By making the pertinent decision, the Soviet Government referred to a suggestion on this subject submitted by a Communist group under the name "Association of Polish Patriots in the U. S. S. R."

This decision of the Soviet Government must be considered by the Polish Government as a grave violation of the sovereign rights of the Polish State—which alone has the right to dispose of the lives of her citizens in the ranks of the national army. This decision violates simultaneously the Polish-Soviet agreement signed on July 30, 1941, and the Polish-Soviet military agreement signed on August 14, 1941. According to the latter agreement, the strength and number of the Polish Army organized on the territory of the U. S. S. R. would depend only on manpower and equipment available. The Soviet Government which did not fulfill any of these conditions, in March 1942 suspended the enrollment of volunteers into the Polish Army and stopped the entire recruitment among Polish citizens who are present on the territory of the U. S. S. R.

On account of the unilateral decision of the Soviet Government to stop the enrollment in the Polish Army, the Polish Government has demanded several times by means of notes and oral demarches the resumption of the recruiting operations, as well as the transfer to the Polish Army of Poles who were forcibly conscripted by the German Army and afterwards taken as prisoners of war by the Soviet Army. A great number of these Poles deserted the German Army to be able to rejoin the Polish colors.

These demands were repeated many times by the Polish Government, but the Soviet Government rejected them in a categorical way.

Many Poles had to stay in the U. S. S. R. for a long time and now they are deprived—against their will and against the wish of the Polish Government—of the possibility to fight for the common cause. Now these same Poles have to face a menace of a fate, which in 1940 met three age groups due for enrollment, which were forcibly recruited into the Red Army on Polish territory then occupied by Soviet troops.

The Polish armed forces were the first to fight against the German invader and continued to fight without yielding on the side of the allied nations. Volunteers who overcome the greatest difficulties and dangers to be able to rejoin the Polish national army do not cease to arrive in Great Britain and the Near East from Poland and other countries. Apart from the German occupation, only the Poles re-

tained in the U. S. S. R. are deprived of the fundamental rights of any citizen to serve in the ranks of his national army. The assistance Poland is able to contribute to the common cause is unfortunately in consequence thereof considerably reduced.

With reference to the principles of international law and the explicit stipulations of the Polish-Soviet agreements, the Polish Government must take up this matter to defend Polish citizens of whom so many are still on the territory of the U. S. S. R. as well as to declare that they themselves ardently desire that we require their incorporation into the Polish Army.

No. 37

Telegram of the Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars of the U. S. S. R. to the members of the Presidium of the Convention of the Union of Polish Patriots in the U. S. S. R.*

I thank you that you referred so warmly and with such friendship to the Soviet government.

I ardently greet you and the Union of Polish Patriots which started the successful work of uniting its forces and of strengthening the friendship between the Polish people and the peoples of the Soviet Union.

You may be certain that the Soviet Union will do everything in her power to hasten the defeat of our common enemy—Hitler's Germany, to strengthen the Polish-Soviet friendship and, by all means, to join in the rebuilding of a strong and independent Poland.

I wish you success in your efforts.

J. STALIN.

No. 38

Notation of Mr. T. Romer, Minister of Foreign Affairs, from his conversation with Minister Eden, of August 12, 1943, containing the summary of the Polish point of view concerning the question of restoring Polish-Soviet relations

I. In an eventual conversation with Stalin he could make known:

a) that we are ready to discuss the reestablishment of diplomatic relations and enter upon the road of political collaboration, and in connection with that, to realize the cessation of controversial propaganda;

b) we propose the problem of evacuation and relief on a purely humanitarian basis;

c) we are presently not able to discuss the question of Soviet demands concerning our eastern boundaries; this question must be postponed until the time when all territorial questions arising from the war will be settled. The Government of the Polish Republic takes a firm stand on its former boundaries;

II. We attach extreme importance to the discussion between Churchill and Roosevelt concerning Polish problems, not only in reference to the U. S. S. R., but also concerning the bringing up of a common point of view for earnest warnings toward Germany and the world against the consequences of extermination carried on in Poland.

* "Wolna Polska" No. 15, July 16, 1943.

No. 39

*Aide Memoire of the Department of State of August 12, 1943,
submitted by the Ambassador of the United States to the Soviet
Government in Moscow concerning the reestablishment of
Polish-Soviet relations*

The Government of the United States as a member of the United Nations and as a cobelligerent of Poland and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is deeply concerned over the differences which have arisen between the two Governments of these two countries and which have resulted in a breach of diplomatic relations between them. In the opinion of the Government of the United States, the absence of friendly relations between the Polish and Soviet Governments is injurious to the common war effort in that it disrupts the unity of the United Nations, it lends encouragement to the endeavours of the enemy to create and intensify differences among the United Nations, it tends to strengthen those forces throughout the world which contend that prolonged cooperation among the United Nations during and after the war period is impossible and it distracts the minds of millions of persons who should be concentrating all their energies upon the winning of the war.

The American Government therefore feels that it should not fail to take any steps which might assist in settling the difference between the Polish and Soviet Governments, might lead to the reestablishment of relations between the two Governments on a firm, equitable and lasting basis and might lay the groundwork for friendly post-war cooperation. The Government of the United States has therefore instructed the United States Ambassador at Moscow to approach the Soviet Government with the suggestions set forth below in the hope that these suggestions may be of material aid in eliminating some of the differences which exist at the present time between the Polish and Soviet Governments.

1. All racial Poles in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics who were domiciled in Poland on September 1, 1939 to be immediately recognized by the Soviet Government as Polish citizens.

2. The Polish and Soviet Governments to permit all non-racial Poles in the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics who were domiciled in Poland on September 1, 1939 to opt for Polish or Soviet citizenship.

3. All racial Poles and non-racial Poles who opt for Polish citizenship and who have close relatives abroad, especially those who are members of the immediate families of the men in the Polish armed forces outside the Soviet Union, to be permitted to leave the Soviet Union as soon as possible.

4. Similarly every effort to be made to evacuate abroad Polish orphans and other Polish children as soon as suitable arrangements be made for their care in areas further removed from the war zones.

5. In order that Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may receive the relief supplies sent from the United States and elsewhere, the Polish Government to agree to aid relief and welfare work to be carried on by Soviet organizations, with the understanding that Polish citizens are to receive treatment no less favourable than that granted to Soviet citizens under similar circumstances.

6. To permit Polish citizens to have access to appropriate Polish consular officers.

No. 40

Memorandum of United States Ambassador A. J. Drexel Biddle of August 12, 1943, which contains explanations to the Aide Memoire of August 12, 1943

1. Mr. Biddle said that after careful study of the question, the United States Government feels that its suggestions, if accepted in the friendly spirit in which they are made, offer a possibility of bringing about as normal and permanent a relationship as the difficult situation permits.

2. Alluding to possible objections, particularly with regard to points 2 and 5, Mr. Biddle said that it is felt that the Polish Government after studying the proposals will agree that they eliminate the principal elements of friction in the Polish-Soviet agreement of 1941 and are of such a nature that, if they are accepted by both sides in a spirit of mutual confidence, they could form the basis for the establishment of an enduring relationship.

3. *Frontiers:* Mr. Biddle pointed out that the proposals do not involve in any way the question of frontiers. This is a matter which we feel is not subject to discussion at this time and which is not germane to the principal questions involved in the legitimate rights of individuals and the restoration of United Nations unity in order to attain the fullest possible cooperation in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy.

4. *Recruiting:* Mr. Biddle said that it was felt that the question of recruiting in the Soviet Union for the Polish armed forces should be taken up subsequently.

5. Mr. Biddle particularly stressed the fact that we feel that any conversations which may follow our proposals with regard to citizenship should not interfere with any plans agreed to by the Soviet Government for the immediate evacuation of special categories of Poles.

6. *British attitude:* Mr. Biddle remarked that it is the Department of State's understanding that the British Government has informed its Ambassador in Moscow that if the Russians inquire of him as to the British attitude on the position taken by us, he may state that his Government fully shares and supports the view of the United States.

LONDON, August 13, 1943.

No. 41

Minutes of Minister Romer on the Conference with Mr. Drexel-Biddle, Ambassador of the United States, on August 17, 1943, on Anglo-American Intervention, at Moscow, and on the Conference with Sir Owen O'Malley, Ambassador of Great Britain

I. WITH MR. DREXEL-BIDDLE, AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES

I communicated to him that the Polish Government was considering the aide-memoire delivered to me by the Ambassador on August 12, and that I was authorized by the Government to express to him in the name of the Polish Government the full satisfaction and appre-

ciation with which we accepted the initiative of the Government of the United States which fundamentally corresponds to our views, which I already confirmed in our last conference. I also informed him about the conclusion of deliberations of the Polish Government and especially as to the formulation of some points of the aide-memoire which aroused some doubts. It refers to the discrimination against native and non-native Polish citizens; to the question of option which is not recognized by the Soviet legislation and which is difficult to separate from the territorial problem; and to the fact of distribution of assistance among the Polish citizens in the U. S. S. R. by the Soviet organs without any foreign supervision. I also pointed out that the whole cause is dependent upon good or bad volition in its execution, even if the Soviet government fundamentally agrees to it. However, having in mind the importance and difficulties of negotiations we did not consider, for the time being, our remarks as having the character of formal reservations because we do not wish to raise any difficulties to the efforts of the American negotiators in this initial period of negotiations. If the Soviet side would show their inclination for negotiations on this basis in this case we reserve to ourselves the right to come back to our remarks in a more specified form and of course in a most friendly atmosphere.

Mr. Biddle made minutes on my remarks and promised to forward them to Washington. He promised me also to inform us immediately about the result of the steps undertaken by the American ambassador in Moscow. Now he only knows that Stalin received Ambassador Stanley, who delivered him the American memorandum. Molotov was present. Stalin allegedly promised him to look into the case carefully and give his answer. Mr. Biddle will urge Washington by telegram as he understands how urgent this case is.

I mentioned additionally that I decided to postpone my exposee in the National Council's Commission for Foreign Affairs fixed for tomorrow, having in mind that my speech even most cautiously written may serve as a pretext for making difficulties in American-Soviet negotiations in case of press misinterpretation of improper comments. Mr. Biddle appreciated it most cordially and congratulated me on this decision which he will report to the State Department.

II. WITH SIR OWEN O'MALLEY, AMBASSADOR OF GREAT BRITAIN

I delivered him a copy of the American aide-memoire of August 12, which he knew only from telegraphic texts. I repeated to him explanations of our position in this matter, especially emphasizing that the problem of frontiers is to be eliminated from any of our discussions. I asked him for reporting it to Mr. Eden in case if after Quebec it would come to a meeting with Stalin. Sir O'Malley does not know anything about such meeting and thinks that this is not yet decided so far. He asked me about the details and arguments on our negative position in the matter of undertaking negotiations on frontiers now. I affirmed him categorically and gave arguments of the Polish Government consistent with the views of the American Government in this matter. I informed him of my postponement of my exposee in the Commission for Foreign Affairs.

The Ambassador has an impression that the first report arrived from Moscow today but he does not know the contents of this report. He

will inform me immediately if there would be something material. He is anxious about the symptoms of aggravating relations between the Anglo-Saxon Governments and Soviet Russia because of their possible results but he is glad that the influential circles of British opinion are beginning to estimate better the Russian policy and all its dangers.

No. 42

Report of Ambassador E. Raczynski of September 3, 1943, concerning his conversation with Minister Eden held on September 3, 1943, after Eden's return from the Quebec Conference

This was the first meeting of Ambassador Raczynski with Minister Eden after Mr. Eden's return from America, where he participated in the Quebec Conference.

Ambassador Raczynski began by expressing to Mr. Eden the satisfaction of the Polish Government that Mr. Eden organized meetings in the Foreign Office for Ministers of Foreign Affairs of European countries now having their seats in England. These meetings are of symbolic significance, besides they are directly useful for the exchange of information and opinions. They confirm the solidarity among the European United Nations, regardless whether they are nations of western, southern, or central Europe. Such a reaction is simultaneously a complete separation from some of the ideas, which are circulating among the British opinion and press and which, in our opinion, should be condemned. So for instance, a few days ago, an article in the "Times" contrasted the cooperation of the great powers in the deliberation of all European and world problems—though by all means desirable—with leaving the exclusive influence in particular regions to the individual powers.

It should not be permitted that the Allied Nations become subordinated to agreements of the great powers. This is in contradiction to the role which they play among the fighting nations and to the present practice. This causes us to value all the more the initiative of Mr. Eden to uphold a steady contact among the European Allies.

Mr. Eden accepted the formulation as summarized above, which, as it seems, impressed him. Ambassador Raczynski asked whether Mr. Eden sees any kind of progress in the treatment of Polish matters. Were these matters subjects of discussions of the Allies in Quebec? Mr. Eden replied that the Anglo-American intervention made in Moscow by the Ambassadors of both nations unfortunately had no good results. The British Government did not repeat attempts of intervention in this way, believing that a better opportunity may arise in connection with the Anglo-American-Soviet conversations, which he assumes will probably soon be resumed. These conversations Mr. Eden considers desirable and necessary, because they should in their result bring about "one thing or another" in the mutual relations among the powers. Mr. Eden sees as a possible program for these discussions the following matters:

- 1) the question of warfare;
- 2) political problems directly connected with the war;
- 3) postwar organization in various fields [security, distribution of aid, reconstruction, etc.]

Ambassador Raczynski analyzing the above three points confirmed that the Polish Government will greet with satisfaction a consolidated action of the powers in the above mentioned basic problems. He, however, opposes strongly possible attempts to take out from the entire complex of political questions any specific Polish-Russian controversies—particularly broader questions, to settle them separately from the entire complex of postwar decisions and treaties. Mr. Eden agreed with the above, however, he could not foresee whether the Soviet side will not make attempts to force open the discussions of these individual controversial problems.

Minister Eden accepted with satisfaction the declaration submitted by Mr. Romer at the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on September 1, at which Minister Romer expressed his concern about upholding a close collaboration of the Allies. Mr. Eden then indicated that Mr. Maysky had agreed with him in reference to this, that a joint study of all the problems by all Allies may be better than a splitting up of the problems. Mr. Eden would, however, prefer that this circumstance be treated confidentially, because he was not quite sure to what degree Mr. Maysky's words had expressed only his own opinion, and to what degree it had reflected the opinion of his chiefs * * *

Mr. Raczynski referring to the explanation given by Mr. Eden two days ago at the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs asked in what way the problem of the Baltic States had been touched in the Eden-Maysky conversation. Minister Eden replied that his concern was to demonstrate to Mr. Maysky the pertinence of a joint study of the problems. As an example he cited the interest of the Soviets in French and Italian problems, the interest of Great Britain in Poland and Czechoslovakia and the interest of the United States in the fate of the Baltic States * * *

Ambassador Raczynski expressed his regret that the matter of British as well as Polish objections to Mr. Benes' trip to Moscow, and the signing there of a treaty between Czechoslovakia and the U. S. S. R. had become the subject of public controversy. This happened completely without our participation, knowledge, and against our wishes. The Polish Government appreciated the sincere British intentions and the concern of the British Government that the agreements which Mr. Benes concluded so speedily do not further complicate and do not inflame the situation in Central-Eastern Europe. On our side, we regret that Mr. Benes has chosen these tactics, which evidently was based on the desire to gain Moscow's gratitude and special favors for this zealous flattery but which jeopardized any broader settlement in this area. Mr. Eden stated that the British Government takes upon itself the responsibility to restrain Mr. Benes as heretofore from realizing his plans. He touched upon this subject in his talk with Mr. Maysky. The latter proposed a new alternative, that the U. S. S. R. and Czechoslovakia in making this agreement declare that Poland may join it. Mr. Eden did not express his views upon this point reserving it for his consideration. Ambassador Raczynski stated that, for the time being, he could only express his first impression, reserving the opinion of the Polish Government. The form suggested by Mr. Maysky is perhaps a certain improvement of Mr. Benes' original projects. This improvement, however, cannot wipe

away the negative sides of a political step, which anticipates the further evolution in the one-sided interest of Moscow.

The establishment of the committee of "Free Germany" in Moscow was touched upon briefly. Ambassador Raczynski called attention to the far reaching character of the activities of this committee in reference to German boundaries, the preservation of the "Reichswehr," and promises of an amnesty for Hitlerites, who join the movement of "Free Germany." Mr. Eden replied that the Soviet side explains this initiative simply as a means of propaganda which shall serve to weaken the German determination to fight! * * *

This part of the conversation was conducted in haste. Mr. Eden regretted that he is very busy in other urgent matters, and proposed to continue the conversation at lunch on Monday, September 6. Upon Mr. Raczynski's proposition, Mr. Eden included in this invitation Mr. Romer, and from the English side he invited Sir Orme Sargent to the meeting.

No. 43

Memorandum of October 9, 1943, of Mr. Zaranski, Secretary of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in London, concerning the conversation with Mr. Roberts of the Foreign Office held on October 8, 1943, in relation to the Soviet Reply to the Anglo-American demarche in Moscow

On October 8, 1943, Mr. Roberts informed me of the text of the Soviet reply to the Anglo-American demarche of August 11, 1943. When I, referring to the Ambassador, asked Mr. Roberts to send us a copy of the Document, he refused to do so, giving as the reason for his refusal that the document is confidential and was notified simultaneously to the British Government and the Government of the United States; he read to me, however, a certain number of paragraphs from a telegram of the Ambassador Clark-Kerr, which contained a summary of the Soviet note. Mr. Roberts did not want to tell me the date of the note and mentioned only that the Foreign Office had received the telegram with its summary some days ago. The following is the summary of the note which I have written on the basis of some annotations made according to Mr. Roberts' dictation:

"In the introduction the Soviet Government express their appreciation of the motives of the British and United States Governments in trying to regularize Soviet-Polish relations. Further, they make complaints about the anti-Soviet activities of the Polish Government which continue unrestrained. The rupture of diplomatic relations between the U. S. S. R. and Poland was not because of difficulties in settling questions of relief, citizenship and evacuation of Poles from the USSR., but was purely due to the exploitation by the Polish Government of the Katyn story in order to obtain territorial concessions

"1) With regard to the organization of relief to Poles in the Soviet Union the Soviet Government state again that the action they took against the existing Polish relief organization was due to Polish intelligence activities. The American proposal that relief to Poles should be distributed through Soviet organizations is based on misconception since this is already happening.

"2) Citizenship.—The note contains a repetition of all the old arguments and quotes Soviet decrees etc., issued since 1939. Further, the note refers to the position of Poles in the U. S. A., and of Frenchmen in Canada, who are respectively U. S. A. and British citizens. The question of citizenship must be settled by the laws of the country of residence. Poles, not residents of the districts of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, who found themselves in Russia owing to the war.—with regard to these the Soviet Government never raised and do not raise the question of their being made Soviet citizens against their will.

"3) Evacuation. As a token of their good-will, the Soviet Government refers to the evacuation of 75,000 troops and 37,000 civilians, including many Soviet citizens. The Soviet Government have stated and state again that no obstacles have ever existed or exist now to the departure of Polish citizens or families of troops evacuated to Persia. They point out, however, that their number is negligible. There is no direct reference to the question of orphans except the repudiation of the suggestion that Polish children are not being cared for, which is based on untrustworthy information.

"4) The Soviet Government complain of the failure of the British Government to control the Polish press, which is distinctly anti-Soviet.

"5) Finally, the Soviet Government share the opinion of both the British and American Governments as to the great importance of the resumption of friendly relations between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government, but for the reasons stated above it can not be achieved on the basis of Anglo-American proposals of the 11th of August 1943."

No. 44

Minute of Counselor Zaranski's conversation on November 9, 1943, with Mr. Roberts from the Foreign Office concerning the reestablishment of Polish-Soviet relations

(Excerpts)

Today I discussed the following matters with Mr. Roberts:

1) Mr. Roberts has informed me that after the Ambassador's conversation with Sir. A. Cadogan on the second instant, during which the Ambassador had asked for information about the subject of conversations among the representatives of the three powers in Moscow in relation to the Polish affairs, the Foreign Office sent a telegram to Minister Eden in Cairo. An answer has just been received; it confirms the information given by the Under Secretary of State Cadogan to the Ambassador, namely, that:

(a) Both Minister Eden and Secretary of State Hull have raised before Mr. Molotov the question of reestablishing diplomatic relations between Poland and the U. S. S. R. According to the report, Mr. Molotov answered that he too desires it. However, besides the general statement no other details either as to the time when this question would become timely or as to the means of its realization could be obtained from the Soviet delegation. To my question whether Mr. Molotov made a reference to the Soviet answer to the demarches of the English and American Ambassador submitted to Stalin in August 1943, which defined to a certain extent the Soviet conditions for

reestablishing relations, the answer of Mr. Roberts was negative. I put this question, because information from another source indicated that Molotov referred to the above mentioned Soviet answer.

(b) Minister Eden confirmed also that the problem of frontiers had not been discussed in Moscow, in accordance with the attitude of the Polish Government revealed to Mr. Eden before his departure to Moscow.

* * * * * *

No. 45

*Proclamation by the Plenipotentiary in Poland of the Polish Government on November 15, 1943, to the population in the border regions*⁷

“To the population of the border regions.

The end of the war is near. The German armies in their retreat are nearer to our frontiers. In their track moves the Russian army. It is difficult to foresee what further development the fight will take in the east, it is not, however, unlikely that the Soviet army may shortly cross the frontier and find itself in the territories of our eastern Provinces. In these lands for centuries Poles lived side by side with the Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Lithuanians, who enjoyed equal rights and liberties and to whom the Polish Republic continues to guarantee full freedom and rights for their cultural, social and economic development.

From the moment the war is transferred to our lands, the citizens of the Polish Republic shall face new, grave and difficult tasks, on the carrying out of which depends in a great measure the Polish character and future of our lands in the east. The withdrawing German army in its retreat destroys with complete disregard the evacuated territories: deports the population, plunders property and belongings, devastates common property, often burns down whole villages and towns. As the Plenipotentiary for Poland of the Polish Government, I call upon all citizens not to give way to panic, to stay put at their posts and not desert their families, villages and towns. All citizens of the Republic have the duty, not only to protect from plunder and fire their homes and their property, but also to extend care over all public buildings, installations and utilities, which are indispensable for the normal life of the population. The danger exists also, that the retreating German armies may want to drag along with them our youth, in order to send them to forced labor in Germany, or else induct them into the ranks of the German army.

It is the duty of all able to carry arms to take precautions before these attempts, to keep away from the lines of retreat of the German army and seek shelter in the forests.

Towards the entering Soviet troops Polish citizens of the Republic should maintain a dignified and correct attitude, mindful that they are comrades-in-arms of our great Allies in the struggle against the Germans.

Everywhere in our Eastern Territories, even on the smallest strip, evacuated by the Germans, Poles as the joint owners since time immemorial of these Territories should, until the time when authority

⁷ “Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Zolnierz,” No. 40, February 17, 1944.

will be taken over by the lawful organs of the Polish State, assume care over the whole of the National Property and remove all influences of the German occupant. It may be that for a transitory period in this war we shall be separated by the line of the front. There exists, however, no force in the world which could permanently separate and partition the Polish Nation.

The necessity for the military defeat of the Germans toward which we are jointly striving, may result in the presence on our Territories of the Soviet armies. Remember, however, that the Polish Authorities shall continuously watch over you, and behind you stands the whole Polish Nation.

The end of the war is near though its last phase may be very grave for the Polish Nation—final victory is certain. Poland was first in this war to resist the German invader. The unbending attitude of Poland, who for the fifth year bleeds and unceasingly fights the invaders, the valor of our armies at the side of our Allies, the activities of our Government—have earned general recognition. Therefore, in the outcome of this war Poland must emerge indivisible and great.

I call on all citizens of the Republic that, in this new and grave trial, when the war again approaches our frontiers, everyone shall carry out to the end his duty to the Fatherland.

PLENIPOTENTIARY FOR POLAND OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT.

WARSAW, *November 15, 1943.*

No. 46

Memorandum of the Polish Government of December 16, 1943, handed by Ambassador E. Raczynski to Minister Eden on the situation in Poland in connection with the Entry of Soviet Troops Onto Polish territory

The ascendancy established in the current campaign by the Soviet Army over the Germany Army in the Eastern theatre of war, in which the Allies rendered substantial help in the shape of military and air-force equipment, makes it necessary that the early entry of Soviet troops into Poland should be taken into consideration.

The defeat of Germany is an indispensable condition for Poland to regain her liberty, to rise from the ruins and to heal the deep wounds she received. The Polish Government, together with the entire nation, ardently desire it. The Poles, wherever they may be, whether in Poland or outside the mother country are doing all that lies in their power without reservation and without "re-insurance", in order to accelerate that hour. They are taking an active part in the armed struggle and they never relent in their implacable resistance against the German invader. This state of affairs entitles the Polish Government to take up with a clear conscience the duty, which rests upon it, of assuring the safety of the Polish population in the event of the entry of Soviet troops into Poland. In the light of the developments in Poland and also of the enunciations of Soviet publications, radiobroadcasts and of various agencies in Great Britain, in the United States and in other countries, the position must unfortunately be described as menacing, with the greatest danger threatening the most active and most patriotic and devoted individuals.

2) A direct warning is implied in the increasing activities of Soviet parachutists and bands on Polish territory. These activities were begun as early as 1941 and were the subject of a number of oral and written demarches made by the Polish Government to the Government of the USSR. The enclosed copy of the note delivered by the Foreign Minister Count Edward Raczynski to Ambassador Bogomolov on May 16th, 1942, [enclosure 1] throws additional light on this problem, which was also the subject of an Aide-Memoire delivered by the Foreign Minister Monsieur Romer to Ambassador O'Malley for transmission to the British Government on August 5th of this year. The documents make it clear that the Soviet emissaries do not aid the Polish population in its struggle against the occupying power, that they avoid challenging the Germans but that in operating in certain parts of the country on a large scale, they expose the Polish population to bloody German repressions. On the other hand the Soviet emissaries are engaged in Communist propaganda and in attempts to undermine the confidence in the leadership of the Polish Underground Movement, to destroy its cohesion and to weaken its forces. Consequently the aim in both cases—if it were achieved—could only weaken the "morale" and the effectiveness of the struggle carried on against the Germans.

With the present a further Memorandum is enclosed based on recently received information [enclosure 2]. It permits to estimate the further progress of the activities of Soviet emissaries and agents, who are attempting to build up a network of their own organisation on Polish territories and to pry into the activities of the Polish underground organisation. Inherent therein is the threat of denunciation as soon as Soviet troops enter Polish territory. In the opinion of the Polish underground organisation, there exists a more immediate danger of denunciation to the German authorities themselves, arising from the desire to cause the destruction of the leadership of Polish resistance through German hands even before the entry of Soviet troops. The Polish Government have been in fact informed of instances of denunciation to the Gestapo of Polish fighting patriots.

It should be emphasized that this unsatisfactory state of affairs represents an obstacle in the preparation of a general rising in the country against the Germans, which proclaimed at the suitable moment, must render valuable service to the cause of the United Nations.

3) Soviet propaganda by means of the press and the radio, both for foreign consumption and addressed to the Polish people themselves, strives to deprive Poland of the sympathies of public opinion in the Allied countries by constantly repeating the slanderous accusation that it is not the Polish Underground organisation which is carrying on the struggle against the occupying authorities, and that this organisation fights "Polish partisans", who are sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Polish listeners are being threatened by the Soviet radio stations such as the "Kosciuszko" and affiliated stations, with a reckoning repeating these threats after the Communist leaflets which are being distributed in Poland and which openly announce a bloody reckoning in the event of the entry of Soviet troops into Poland. Quite recently a new Soviet publication in Polish made its appearance in Great Britain entitled "Polska Trybuna" which openly accuses the Polish Underground organisation of "fratricide". This accusation is totally untrue and profoundly damaging. In spite of the ambiguous nature

of the activities of Soviet agencies in Poland and of the dangers with which they threaten the Polish Underground organisation, neither that organisation nor the Secret Army acting in accordance with instructions issued by the Polish Government and anxious to avoid friction, have ever taken any active steps against these agencies or their supporters. The accusation is an obvious lie, as anyone who follows the situation in Poland can testify. However, the fact that the accusation is being made at this particular juncture is both significant and ill-boding. The fear arises that this may be a deliberate attempt to prepare public opinion of the world for reprisals against the Polish population, particularly against the political and military leadership of Underground Poland, by the advancing Soviet armies and police under the pretext of punishment for the alleged crime of "fratricide".

LONDON, *December 16th, 1943.*

MEMORANDUM

The underground movement in Poland is of a special construction and character. It is formed not by disjointed patriotic organisations struggling against the occupying power and sustaining the morale of the community, but it represents an official state organism, discharging its tasks in the name of the Government. All the most important authorities, offices and institutions, which constitute an integral and essential part of a normally functioning democratic state, have been reestablished within the framework of the underground movement. The general principle has been adopted that the Polish state, as an organisation and legal authority, exists in Poland underground, while the Government of the Republic functions abroad in conditions of security and freedom.

This structure was adopted as early as the first half of 1940, and the fact that, thanks to the attitude of the Polish community and to the determination of the leadership of the underground movement, the Poles are the only exception in the world as a nation which did not produce any organisation co-operating politically with the occupying authorities, made its practical and full realisation possible.

The backbone of the underground movement in Poland consists of four elements of what is popularly described in Poland as the Polish Underground State, namely:

- 1) *The Government Plenipotentiary* representing the authority of the State. Its main task consists in the organisation and preparation of the so-called Secret Shadow Administration, which embraces within its scope all Polish provinces and whenever possible actually performs its functions, and will assume all its duties immediately on the departure from Polish soil of the German occupying power.

- 2) *The Secret Army* is the third official Polish army besides the two armies in the Middle East and Scotland. The Commander of this army and its members discharge all the duties and enjoy all the rights pertaining to military authority in time of war. Moreover, the Commander of the Secret Army has been given the right to proclaim, at the suitable time and after previous consultation with the Government, the mobilisation of specified classes of men.

- 3) *The Political Representation of the Home Country* consists of the representatives of the four major democratic parties: the Peasant

Party, the National Democratic Party, the Polish Socialist Party and the Labour Party. The Political Representation of the Home Country constitutes the Parliament in a nuclear form. Both the Government Plenipotentiary and the Commander of the Secret Army are politically responsible to this body. While the Government Plenipotentiary and the Commander of the Secret Army are appointed by the Government, members of the Political Representation of the Home Country have their delegates in London, who by entering the Government form the Government Coalition.

4) *The Directorate of Civic Resistance* watches over the morale of the community and i. a. is responsible for the rigid maintenance of an inflexible attitude towards the occupying power. The Directorate is authorised to pass sentences of infamy or death on German criminals in key positions or on disloyal Poles. This body represents a sort of a People's Tribunal.

This organisation of the Underground Movement began its activities in 1940 and it is prepared to come into the open as soon as the German authorities of occupation begin to withdraw, and the Polish Government in London is able, in any situation likely to arise, to assure the security of its open and free activities.

The Soviet agencies operating in Poland through Soviet partisans, the Polish Workers Party, loose groups and Communist centres are and have been since the beginning of the war disloyal towards the Polish Underground Movement, and disloyal towards the Polish people. The agencies attempted to penetrate into the Polish Underground Movement, to spread chaos and confusion within it, by assuming names connoting organisations of various Polish movements, in the first instance of the Socialist and Populist movement. They tried to trace not only Polish organisations but individual leaders, by making special efforts—contrary to all principles of conspiratorial loyalty—to discover their names, addresses and functions.

The Allied Governments are familiar with the relevant reports on this subject. Its most tragic aspect is not so much the disloyalty of these agencies towards the Polish Underground Movement than the fact of their unchanging conduct which remains constant and unaffected by the fluctuation of Polish-Russian relations.

This led to the growth of the belief repeatedly reported to the Polish Government from Poland that in its essence Russian policy remains uninfluenced by official declarations and aims at creating in Poland accomplished facts. There exists a general anxiety, equally reported to the Government, that appropriate Russian cells desire to get the Polish Underground Movement or its individual leaders into their grip in order either to denounce the movement to the Gestapo at a suitable moment, or to liquidate it themselves on the entry of Soviet armies into Poland. It has been repeatedly reported from Poland that there are grounds for the fear that the Soviet authorities will want to liquidate leading Polish elements and that they will try to justify it before the world by the assertion that these were elements advocating all the time inertness towards the Germans, that they were attached to Hitler, fascist, chauvinist, imperialist, hostile to the U. S. S. R.

Acting on express instructions of the Government, Polish underground authorities and particularly the Secret Army, abstained from any hostile acts directed against individual Soviet agencies, although

they could have taken the necessary action without much difficulty. These agencies represent a menace not so much through their influence, numerical strength or ideological sympathies within the Polish community, as through methods they employ in their activities, namely, methods of ruthlessness which can be more easily applied under conditions of conspiracy.

One of the recent characteristic acts of Soviet propaganda is the accusation levelled against the Polish Underground Movement indicting it of "acts hostile to the Polish Left, Soviet partisans, Polish Communists etc". By such tactics the Soviets hope to exculpate in advance their authorities should they proceed to carry out arrest in Poland by explaining before the world that "the arrested have incurred due punishment for their conduct under German occupation, towards the Polish Left and the Soviet partisans".

Political premises of Communist action.—Political action takes different forms in different parts of the country. In the Eastern provinces Soviet agencies either act on the ground of accomplished facts, namely, the plebiscite of 1940 carried out by the Soviet authorities of occupation, or conduct open anti Polish propaganda. Thus, according to a report of October 11th, 1943, a Soviet band under Pylypienko [member of the Town Council of Zhitomir in 1939], arrived in the district of Luck and instead of engaging in military operations against the Germans the band organises meetings which pass resolutions demanding union with the Soviets. The Orthodox population and more especially the Orthodox clergy received written instructions to agitate in favour of Russia on the ground that the Poles are hostile to the Orthodox religion. In the Central and even more in the Western provinces Soviet agencies employ different tactics. In these provinces Russia's claims to the Eastern part of Poland are not advanced, but the slogans emphasise the need of friendship with Russia, the fact that Russia is the only power which can liberate Poland from the German yoke, and finally the fact that both Great Britain and the United States of America are waging the war solely for their own sake and are not interested in Poland. It may be observed that in this respect the Soviet organisations in Poland and particularly the Communist press are being used as instruments for the elucidation of the goals of Soviet policy which official Soviet agencies do not find convenient to do. Thus the Communist "Tribune of Liberty", No. 41 of October 1st, 1943, wrote: "The imperialist democracies are not less responsible for the outbreak of the second world war than European fascism". The article goes on to accuse Great Britain and the U. S. A. of dragging the war out in the hope that the Red Army would be bled to death. The periodical "Robotnik" of September 23rd, 1943, wrote: "The war against the Nazis has become for England and America a screen behind which the two powers are preparing a counter-revolutionary dictatorship of Amgot in Europe. In the U. S. A. during the next acute social crisis of unprecedented dimensions and violence the revolutionary elan of the American proletariat—if timed to coincide with the downfall of Hitler—may overpower the counter-revolutionary Amgot policeman in Europe". The journal calls upon Poles to get rid of the effects of Anglo-Saxon propaganda.

Apart from sowing distrust of the Western powers, one aim is in any case common to all Communist activities throughout the whole of Poland, as far as short term political aims and arguments are

concerned. This is the most energetic agitation against the Polish Government and its organs in the home country, as well as all those Polish elements engaged in the struggle against Germany which remain unaffected by Communist influence.

The military aspect of Soviet activities.—The Soviet agencies are engaged on the following tasks: the infiltration of Eastern and Central Poland, wherever physical circumstances permit, of the greatest number of Russian partisan detachments, which hide in the wooded countryside, and, avoiding all encounters with the Germans, proceed with mobilising the local manpower in areas accessible to them and make ready for taking over these territories immediately after the collapse of Germany. Further West, where Soviet military detachments cannot subsist owing to a close network of railways and roads, lack of forests and tighter control on the part of the German administration, the methods of Soviet agencies are somewhat different. Here energetic propaganda is being made in favour of the local population forming fighting detachments. In many areas the Communists try to recruit young men for the partisan units of the so-called "People's Guard". As a preliminary step the Communists spread in the locality concerned rumors that the Polish Government have already proclaimed a general rising, but that reactionary leaders of local organisations acting in collusion with the occupying authorities, are keeping this proclamation secret. Subsequently, selected young men receive summons to report at a point in the nearest forest for military service in the Polish Army. A number of young men report at the appointed place. After they have joined, the commander of the unit makes a patriotic speech and takes the oath from the new recruits. Instruction in the use of arms and military drill follow. And in due course the recruits are subjected to a process of political indoctrination. It is at this stage only that the young men realise that they have fallen into Communist hands, and they want to withdraw, which, however, meets with considerable difficulties as the leaders strive by all means to retain the new recruits. Moreover, a return to civil life is not always possible, as apart from any other consideration they are being threatened with "liquidation" if they abandon the unit.

Harassing of the Polish population by Soviet agencies.—The activities of partisan Communist bands increased considerably on Polish territories during the autumn of 1943. In the province of Kielce Communist bands at large provoked German repressions against the Polish population and themselves harassed this population. Recently Communist bands in this area murdered a number of soldiers and members of the Polish Underground Movement. Partisans of these bands commit arson and murder while raiding Polish country-houses, vicarages and homes of the Polish educated class and of the more prosperous peasants. A considerable intensification of the activities of Soviet parachutists has been also observed in the central provinces in the districts of Lowicz, Garwolin, Pulawy and Lukow, who however, carefully avoid any armed action against the Germans. In July a Soviet partisan detachment numbering some hundreds of men penetrated into the city of Tarnopol where during several hours it completed a thorough robbery of the Post Office. In Polesie Soviet partisan detachments occupied in the same month the manorial estate of Mankiewiczze in the district of Stolin, where they burned down

the Radziwill residence. In the area of the district of Tomaszow Mazowiecki adjoining the district of Opoczyn, in the large forests of Spala and the neighbouring forests of Kielce, numerous partisans of various types operate robbing the Polish population. Many cases have been reported in which the partisans have pretended to belong to patriotic organisations and used national emblems. Recently well armed partisan formations appeared on the eastern fringe of the provinces of Lublin and Bialystok declaring themselves the Polish troops subordinated to General Berling commanding the "Kosciuszko Division" formed in Soviet Russia. In case of resistance or distrust the partisans terrorise the population as ruthlessly as do the German authorities of occupation. Thus, in the village of Czerniawy near Kobryn a Soviet band massacred 24 peasants for resisting requisitions, and in the village of Lasow, in the same district, 21 peasants were executed for the same reason. Recent reports from many parts of the country state that during July and August Soviet partisan bands systematically set fire to the growing and stacked corn, both on manorial estates and on peasant farms. Soviet agents who undertook this systematic destruction must have been aware that it will not harm the Germans, who extort their quotas from the farmers in any case, but that it will contribute to the starvation of the towns and of many peasant homesteads.

No. 47

Declaration of the Polish Government of January 5th, 1944 in connection with the Crossing of the Polish Frontiers by Soviet Troops

In their victorious struggle against the German invader, the Soviet forces are reported to have crossed the frontier of Poland.

This fact is another proof of the breaking down of the German resistance and it foreshadows the inevitable military defeat of Germany. It fills the Polish nation with the hope that the hour is drawing near.

Poland was the first to take up the German challenge and she has been fighting against the invader for over four years, at the cost of tremendous sacrifices and sufferings, without producing a single Quisling, and rejecting any form of compromise or collaboration with the aggressor.

The Underground Movement, among its many activities, has concentrated upon attacking the Germans in their most sensitive spots upon sabotage in every possible form, and in carrying out many death sentences on German officials whose conduct had been particularly outrageous.

The Polish forces, twice reorganized outside their country, have been fighting ceaselessly in the air, on the seas and on land side by side with our Allies. There is no front on which Polish blood has not been mingled with the blood of other defenders of freedom; there is no country in the world where Poles have not contributed to furthering the common cause.

The Polish nation, therefore, is entitled to expect full justice and redress as soon as it is liberated from enemy occupation. The first

condition of such justice is the earliest re-establishment of Polish sovereign administration in the liberated territories of the Republic of Poland and the protection of life and property of Polish citizens.

The Polish Government, as the only and legal steward and spokesman of the Polish nation recognized by Poles at home and abroad, as well as by the Allied and Free Governments, in conscious of Poland's contribution to the war and is responsible for the fate of the nation. It affirms its indestructible right to independence, confirmed by the principles of the Atlantic Charter, common to all the United Nations, and by binding international treaties. The provisions of those treaties, based on the free agreement of the parties, not on the enforcement of the will of one side to the detriment of the other, cannot be revised by accomplished facts. The conduct of the Polish nation in the course of the present war has proved that it has never recognized and will not recognize solutions imposed by force.

The Polish Government expects that the Soviet Union, sharing its view as to the importance of future friendly relations, between the two countries, in the interests of peace and with a view to preventing a German revenge, will not fail to respect the rights and interests of the Polish Republic and of its citizens.

Acting in that belief, the Polish Government instructed the underground authorities in Poland, on October 27th, 1943, to continue and intensify the resistance against the German invaders, to avoid all conflicts with the Soviet armies entering Poland in their battle against the Germans, and to enter into co-operation with the Soviet commanders in the event of the resumption of Polish-Soviet relations.

If a Polish-Soviet agreement such as the Polish Government had declared itself willing to conclude had preceded the crossing of the Polish frontier by the Soviet forces, such an agreement would enable the underground Polish army to co-ordinate its action against the Germans with the Soviet military authorities. The Polish Government still considers such an agreement highly desirable.

At this crucial moment, the importance of which for the course of the war and for its outcome in Europe is evident to everyone, the Polish Government issues the above declaration, confident in a final victory and in the triumph of the just principles for which the United Nations stand."

No. 48

Note of Ambassador Raczynski to the Foreign Office of January 16, 1944 Regarding the situation created in Poland by the entry of Soviet troops

SIR: The recent exchange of Polish and Soviet public declarations has so far led to the Polish Government approaching the British and United States Governments with a view to securing through their intermediary the discussion by the Polish and Soviet Governments with the participation of the British and American Governments of all outstanding questions, the settlement of which should lead to a friendly and permanent cooperation between Poland and the Soviet Union. The question whether such a discussion can be initiated, and if so brought to a successful conclusion still remains open.

In these circumstances I have been instructed to place before His Majesty's Government confidentially the most urgent requirements of the Polish Government in connection with the fact of the cross-

ing of the Polish frontier by Soviet troops, requirements which have already been in part communicated to His Majesty's Government on previous occasions.

1) The successful progress of the Soviet offensive makes it probable that already soon it may become possible and opportune for the Polish Government to issue orders foreseen in their instructions of October 27th, 1943, for the launching of military action on the largest scale by the Underground Polish Forces behind the lines of the German army retreating across occupied Poland. Such action in case it is adequately supported from outside may have an important bearing not only on the liberation of Polish territory from the enemy, but also on the speeding up of his ultimate defeat. The Polish Government feels therefore compelled to stress once more, most earnestly, the necessity and the exceptional urgency of supplying the Polish Underground Army with indispensable arms in accordance with the plans prepared for such emergency.

2) The Soviet forces have crossed the Polish frontier in the course of their fight with the common enemy but without that agreement with the Polish Government having been reached and the Political designs of the Soviet Government disclosed, designs on which a number of symptoms and indirect pronouncements have shed a highly disquieting light.

The Polish Government are on that account compelled to issue a protest safeguarding the territorial status of the Polish Republic based on valid international Treaties against the political and legal consequences of possible unilateral decisions or "faits accomplis."

The Polish Government do not doubt that their point of view will find full recognition on the part of His Majesty's Government in whose name the Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill issued in the House of Commons on September 5th, 1940, the following declaration:

"We have not at any time adopted since this war broke out the line that nothing could be changed in the territorial structure of various countries. On the other hand, we do not propose to recognise any territorial changes which take place during the war, unless they take place with the free-consent and goodwill of the parties concerned."

3) As the liberation of the territory of the Polish Republic from under German occupation progresses and military operations connected with it are brought nearer their end, there will arise the absolute necessity for the speedy reestablishment of a Polish Administration in conformity with the principles laid down by the Conference of Quebec. The Polish Underground Movement headed by the Deputy Prime Minister resident in Poland and by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Homeland is prepared, according to instructions issued by the Polish Government, to make itself known and to take over the government of the country. The Polish Government and the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Forces are also prepared to return at any moment to the liberated areas of the Country.

The Polish Government are looking forward to His Majesty's Government for support and the necessary facilities in this respect and also for cooperation in opposing possible attempts at violating Poland's sovereignty through forcing upon her illegal authorities by means of external pressure.

4) The progress of Soviet troops inside Polish territory is raising the urgent problem of the security of the Polish Underground Movement and of life and property of the people of Poland. This problem is singled out by the Polish Government from amongst those which demand immediate settlement not only in the Polish interest but also in that of the United Nations.

The Polish Government deem it indispensable to call His Majesty's Government attention to this question whatever may be the result of discussion thereon by the Polish-Soviet Governments with the participation of the British and American Governments, because as it appears from a radiogram received from Poland on January 14th of this year, the Polish Underground Army has obtained possession of the following order issued from Moscow to Soviet partisans on Polish territory:

"In conformity with Comrade Nozenko's instruction all partisans are ordered to disarm Polish units. All who resist are to be shot on the spot. All organisations to be liquidated and their leaders shot. Signed Dubow."

The issuing of such an order calls for immediate intervention with the Soviet authorities so that the information may be verified and serious consequences which would otherwise be likely to arise may be avoided.

If I am taking the liberty to approach you with the Polish Government's request that you would consent to act as intermediary in this particular question it is because my Government are convinced of the necessity illustrated not only by this one case to establish as speedily as possible by means of an international agreement of the principles and guarantees assuring the security of the Polish Underground Movement and also of the life and property of the Polish population.

In this connection the Polish Government reiterate their conviction that the sole real guarantee of such a security can be assured if together with Soviet troops entering Poland in the course of their war operations against Germany [and solely for as long as these operations last]—Polish, British and American troops should simultaneously enter Poland.

The Polish Government believe that at the same time the necessity will arise of the immediate appointment to the Headquarters of the Soviet occupying forces of military representatives of Great Britain and the United States.

The Polish Government confidently expect that the British Government will concur with their views and that they will see their way of despatching British troops to Poland in conditions as mentioned above.

The Polish Government would finally attach great importance to the assuring of access to the regions of Poland liberated from the enemy, of representatives of the Polish Red Cross in order that they may immediately undertake the organisation of relief with regard to nourishment, clothing and medical supplies for the Polish population and especially for Polish children who need it so urgently.

I have the honour to be, Sir, with the highest consideration,

Your obedient Servant,

/-/ E. RACZYNSKI.

No. 49

Excerpt from Hansard of January 26, 1944 containing the question of Mr. Pickthorns M. P. and the answer of Minister Eden in the matter of the Polish Soviet Frontier

Mr. Pickthorn asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the policy of His Majesty's Government is still represented by the Prime Minister's statement of 3rd September, 1940, that there would be no recognition of territorial changes taking place during the war, unless with the free consent and good will of the parties; by the Foreign Secretary's Note, quoted by him in the House on 30th July, 1941, that there would not be recognition of any territorial changes effected in Poland since August, 1939; and by the second principle of the Atlantic Charter against territorial changes not in accord with the freely-expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

Minister EDEN. The statement of the Prime Minister to which my hon. Friend refers is as follows:

"We have not at any time adopted, since this war broke out, the line that nothing could be changed in the territorial structure of various countries. On the other hand, we do not propose to recognise any territorial changes which take place during the war unless they take place with the free consent and good will of the parties concerned."

This statement represents the views of His Majesty's Government. The wording of the note which I addressed to General Sikorski after the signature of the Russo-Polish Agreement was:

"His Majesty's Government do not recognise any territorial changes which have been effected in Poland since August, 1939."

This remains the position. His Majesty's Government, of course, stand by the principles enunciated in the Atlantic Charter.

No. 50

***Remarks from Department of State Bulletin of January 29, 1944, with respect to the rejection by the Soviet Government of the good offices of the United States in the relationship between Poland and the U. S. S. R.*⁸**

At his press and radio news conference on January 26th the Secretary of State declared that the Soviet Government had replied to the inquiry whether the good offices of the United States with a view to arranging for the initiation of discussions between the Polish and Soviet Governments looking to a resumption of official relations between them would be agreeable to the Soviet Government. He added that the Soviet Government, after expressing appreciation of the offer made by the United States, has stated that it felt that conditions had not yet reached the stage where such good offices could be utilized to advantage.

⁸ "The Department of State Bulletin", January 29, 1944, Vol. X, No. 240 * Publication 2058, Page 116.

No. 51

Memorandum of the Department of State of February 1, 1944 containing the reply to the memorandum of Ambassador Ciechanowski of 26 January 1944 in the matter of the Polish Soviet Frontier

Reference is made to the memorandum of January 26th, 1944 which was handed by the Polish Ambassador to the Secretary of State.

With regard to the three questions contained in the memorandum which Premier Mikolajczyk requested be submitted to the President, the latter has instructed that the following replies be made to the numbered questions:

"1. The basic position of the United States Government that general discussions of the many European frontier questions during the period of active hostilities against the Axis will run the risk of creating confusion and diverting concentration from the over-all objective of defeating Germany is well known. This attitude, however, does not preclude the possibility of any two countries having mutual territorial problems from seeking a direct settlement by mutual accord. This Government recognizes that developments present certain complex and vital considerations which may render it desirable for the Polish Government to endeavour to reach a solution with regard to its territory without delay.

"2. The United States Government would in principle be prepared to assist in helping the Polish Government freely to reach a settlement of its territorial problems through the offer of good offices to the Polish and to the Soviet Governments to facilitate direct discussion between them. While this Government is not in a position to guarantee such a settlement, it would welcome the achievement of a solution by friendly accord of the outstanding questions between the Polish and Soviet Governments.

"3. The United States Government is prepared to lend its support to Prime Minister Churchill's endeavours to bring about the reestablishment of relations between the Polish and Soviet Governments on the basis of a friendly solution of all outstanding difficulties. As stated above, there can be no question of guarantees as far as the United States is concerned."

No. 52

Excerpt from Prime Minister Churchill's Address in the House of Commons of February 22, 1944 Regarding His Conversation with Stalin at Teheran on Problems of the Polish Soviet Frontier

I took occasion to raise personally with Marshal Stalin, the question of the future of Poland. I pointed out that it was in fulfilment of our guarantee to Poland that Great Britain declared war upon Nazi Germany and that we had never weakened in our resolve, even in the period when we were all alone, and that the fate of the Polish nation holds a prime place in the thoughts and policies of His Majesty's Government and of the British Parliament. It was with great pleasure that I heard from Marshal Stalin that he, too, was resolved upon the creation and maintenance of a strong integral independent Poland as one of the leading Powers in Europe. He has several times

repeated these declarations in public and I am convinced that they represent the settled policy of the Soviet Union.

Here I may remind the House that we ourselves have never in the past guaranteed, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, any particular frontier line in Poland. We did not approve of the Polish occupation of Vilna in 1920. The British view in 1919 stands expressed in the so-called Curzon line which attempted to deal, at any rate partially, with the problem. I have always held the opinion that all questions of territorial settlement and re-adjustment should stand over until the end of the war and that the victorious Powers should then arrive at formal and final agreements governing the articulation of Europe as a whole. That is still the wish of His Majesty's Government. However, the advance of the Russian armies into Polish regions in which the Polish underground army is active makes it indispensable that some kind of friendly working agreement should be arrived at to govern the wartime conditions and to enable all anti-Hitlerite forces to work together with the greatest advantage against the common foe.

During the last few weeks the Foreign Secretary and I together have laboured with the Polish Government in London with the object of establishing a working arrangement upon which the Fighting Forces can act, and upon which, I trust, an increasing structure of good will and comradeship may be built between Russians and Poles. I have an intense sympathy with the Poles, that heroic race whose national spirit centuries of misfortune cannot quench, but I also have sympathy with the Russian standpoint. Twice in our lifetime Russia has been violently assaulted by Germany. Many millions of Russians have been slain and vast tracts of Russian soil devastated as a result of repeated German aggression. Russia has the right of reassurance against future attacks from the West, and we are going all the way with her to see that she gets it, not only by the might of her arms but by the approval and assent of the United Nations. The liberation of Poland may presently be achieved by the Russian armies after these armies have suffered millions of casualties in breaking the German military machine. I cannot feel that the Russian demand for a reassurance about her Western frontiers goes beyond the limits of what is reasonable or just. Marshal Stalin and I also spoke and agreed upon the need for Poland to obtain compensation at the expense of Germany both in the North and in the West.

Here I may point out that the term "unconditional surrender" does not mean that the German people will be enslaved and destroyed. It means, however, that the Allies will not be bound to them at the moment of surrender by any pact or obligation. There will be, for instance, no question of the Atlantic Charter applying to Germany as a matter of right and barring territorial transferences or adjustments in enemy countries. No such arguments will be admitted by us as were used by Germany after the last war, saying that they surrendered in consequence of President Wilson's 14 points. Unconditional surrender means that the victors have a free hand. It does not mean that they are entitled to behave in a barbarous manner nor that they wish to blot out Germany from among the nations of Europe. If we are bound, we are bound by our own consciences to civilisations. We are not to be bound to the Germans as the result of a bargain struck. That is the meaning of "unconditional surrender".

It may be that I shall have a further statement to make to Parliament about Poland later on. For the present, what I have said, however, incomplete, is all that His Majesty's Government are able to say upon the subject and I hope that we shall not be pressed further in the Debate, because matters are still under discussion.

No. 53

Excerpt from Minister Eden's Statement in the House of Commons of February 23, 1944 in which he denies the division of Europe into spheres of influence

There is one assurance that I would like to give before I sit down, because I think that it is perhaps the most important matter that has been raised in the Debate. I think as I listen, particularly to many hon. Friends on this side of the House. I do not think that I am wrong—that they have a suspicion, or an impression, that in some way or other, either at Teheran or at Moscow, we Committed ourselves to limit or exclude our interest in certain parts of Europe. I can assure the House that there is no foundation or truth in this at all, absolutely none. We have not agreed to any spheres of influence. We have not been asked to agree to any spheres of influence. We have accepted no barriers. We have not been asked to accept any barriers. We are absolutely free to interest ourselves in the affairs of Europe and the nations of Europe and no spheres of influence have been agreed to by anybody.

No. 54

Letter of Ambassador Raczynski to Ambassador Eden of June 1, 1944 containing protest of the Polish Government against the mobilization ordered by Soviet authorities in the Eastern Provinces of Poland

SIR: In my letter dated March 28th, 1944, No. 49/WB/Sow/33 I had the honour to inform you of the report received from Underground Poland concerning the enforced mobilisation ordered by the Soviet authorities in that part of the Eastern provinces of Poland which has been cleared by the Red Armies of the German forces of occupation. Since then the Polish Government received from many quarters, not excluding Soviet sources, confirmation of this report.

Should this information be finally confirmed it would prove the conduct of the Soviet authorities to be contrary to the generally accepted principles of international law and as infringing the sovereignty of the Polish State by means of accomplished facts directed in this case by one United Nation against another.

Owing to the non-existence of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government, the Polish Government are not in the position to communicate with the government directly and to reserve explicitly the sovereign rights of Poland.

I am therefore instructed to call His Majesty's Government attention to this matter making it clear at the same time that the Polish Government's protest is directed exclusively against the violation of the rights of the Polish State, which is itself vitally interested in the mobilisation of the greatest possible number of its citizens in the strug-

gle against the common German enemy. The Polish Government are themselves fully prepared to take the necessary steps for mobilising in the liberated territories all persons fit for military service into units of the regular Polish Forces.

I have the honour, to be, Sir, with the highest consideration,

Yours obedient Servant,

/-/- E. RACZYNSKI.

No. 55

President Roosevelt's letter to Premier Mikolajczyk of June 14, 1944 and a letter of Premier Mikolajczyk in connection with the conclusion of his visit in Washington

Just before the departure of the Polish Prime Minister the President of the United States addressed the following letter to him:

MY DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I wish to take this opportunity, just before your departure, to wish you a safe return after your most welcome visit to Washington.

I particularly desire to express to you the pleasure I had in seeing you again, which enabled me to have most frank, sincere and friendly exchanges of views with you on the many questions which are of mutual interest to us.

I need hardly tell you how much the American people admire the courage and fortitude of the Polish people, who for almost five years have borne with brave and stout hearts the cruel hardships of war and oppression. Their steadfast determination to be free again and the indomitable spirit of their fighting men constitutes the best pledge that Poland shall reassume her rightful place among the free nations of the world.

The forces of liberation are on the march to certain victory and the establishment of a peace based upon the principles of freedom, democracy, mutual understanding, and security for all liberty-loving people.

Permit me to express again how much I appreciated the opportunity of renewing our acquaintance. I feel that such exchanges of views cannot but contribute to mutual understanding.

Very sincerely yours

(—) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

The Prime Minister of Poland, prior to his departure, sent the following letter to the President:

MR. PRESIDENT: I am deeply touched and most sincerely grateful for the great kindness and hospitality which I have received from you during my visit. May I thank you from the bottom of my heart for all the proofs of your kindness and for giving me so many opportunities of seeing you and having frank talks with you on the vital subjects and problems which affect Poland and Europe now and after this war.

I should like to thank you not only for your most friendly and kind reception but especially for your deep and so broad approach to the problems of the future.

The ideals and principles of the Atlantic Charter and of the Four Freedoms of which you are the initiator are for us Poles in our hard fight for the speedy liberation of our country that encouragement and

inspiration which we most need on our way of struggle, suffering and work.

The loss of individual freedom and of all that man possessed has strengthened in the Polish people their love, respect and yearning for that Freedom. The fate of the people shared by all social classes irrespective of their origin and religion has brought man closer to man in my country so strongly that it has cemented the foundations of Democracy and created the conditions necessary to mutual understanding and collaboration. This love of freedom increases the striving to make it secure when, after the final Victory, it will be necessary to build new foundations for nations and peace-loving peoples.

I leave greatly impressed by the conversations which I was privileged to have with you, by your views and your wide knowledge of human and national problems.

I would be very happy if the few modest suggestions which you gave me the opportunity of contributing in our talks could even in the slightest way serve the common cause and be of some use to you, Mr. President, who are leading your nation in this great fight for the common cause together with your Allies, giving so much of yourself and carrying so great a responsibility as regards the fulfillment of the ideals with which you have inspired the hearts of the soldiers and fighters for freedom.

(—) S. MIKOLAJCZYK.

No. 56

Memorandum of the Polish Ambassador to the United States of July 11, 1944 regarding Premier Mikolajczyk's conversation with representatives of the Soviet Government after his return to Washington

The Polish Ambassador communicated to the Undersecretary of State that he had received a telegram from Minister Romer dated London, July 9th, informing the Ambassador of the following latest developments in the matter of Polish-Soviet relations:

The American Chargé d'Affaires in London has been informed in detail, and asked to communicate to the Secretary of State, the results of very conclusive soundings undertaken by Premier Mikolajczyk with a representative of the Soviet Government after his return from Washington.

At first these soundings were of a favourable character and appeared to open the way to an understanding. However, in their further development they disclosed that Soviet territorial claims on Poland and their demands for personal changes in the composition of the Polish Government were not only maintained but, in fact, even accentuated.

While there are no means of ascertaining whether this present attitude on the part of the Soviets is only tactical and temporary, or if, on the contrary, it represents a definite policy, in these conditions the Polish Government was forced to discontinue the direct discreet conversations conducted by Premier Mikolajczyk. Notwithstanding this situation, the Polish Government has renewed its instructions to the Polish Underground Army to continue collaboration with the advancing Soviet Armies and the Government continues to supervise this collaboration in the action against the common enemy. The Polish Government notes that the Polish Underground Forces are

carrying out these orders most actively and effectively and are carrying on increasing activities against the Germans.

Regardless of renewed attacks on the Polish Government and the people by Soviet and pro-Soviet propaganda, the Polish Government continues to maintain an attitude of conciliatory reserve.

The British Government has been informed in detail of all the above facts and of the state of things arising therefrom, and has been assured of the continued good will and conciliatory spirit of the Polish Government. The British Government is showing its full understanding of the situation and fully realizes the impossibility in which the Polish Government finds itself of doing any more at this time after having shown so much good will and conciliatory spirit, and has assured the Polish Government of its fullest friendly support.

The Polish Government counts upon the moral support of the U. S. Government in accordance with the assurances given to Premier Mikolajczyk during his recent visit in Washington.

The Ambassador of Poland presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honor to inform him that he has received a telegraphic communication from Foreign Minister Romer dated July 9th, in which the Minister instructs the Ambassador to inform the Secretary of State that the Polish Government has renewed its instructions to the Polish Underground Army in Poland to continue and to increase its collaboration with the advancing Soviet armies against the German forces. He further communicates that, acting on these instructions of the Polish Government, the Polish Underground Army is carrying out these orders most actively and effectively and that it has greatly increased its activities against the German armed forces in Poland.

As communicated by the Polish Government to the United Press on July 10th, 1944, the Polish Underground Army has launched large scale operations against the retreating Germans on the Eastern front, especially in the Wilno and Nowogrodek areas. Acting on orders from the High Command of the Underground Army, other Polish detachments have been active against German communication and supply lines in Central Poland.

At the same time, the Polish Government Delegate in Poland has confirmed the instructions of the Polish Government to members of the Underground Organization to disclose themselves to the oncoming Soviet commanders and to disobey German evacuation orders. Further it is stated that another regiment of the Polish Underground Army has come out into the open near Lida and was fighting under its old regimental number as the Seventy-Seventh Infantry.

In Central Poland two divisions of the German armed forces are ruthlessly Polish Underground units, burning villages and killing or deporting their population.

No. 57

Decree of the National Council in the Homeland of July 21, 1944, on the establishment of the Polish Committee for National Liberation^a

A decisive strife has begun to drive out the German invaders from Poland. In the presence of these historical events, the National Coun-

^a "Wolna Polska", No. 27 of July 24, 1944.

cil in the Homeland appoints the Polish Committee for National Liberation as temporary executive authority to direct the fight of the people for liberation, to achieve independence and to rebuild the Polish State.

The Polish Committee for National Liberation is appointed as follows:

Chairman and Chief of the Department for Foreign Affairs—Edward Boleslaw Osobka-Morawski;

Vice Chairman—Wanda Wasilewska;

Chief of the Department for National Defense—General of Arms Michal Rola-Zymierski;

Deputy of the Chief of the Department for National Defense—Divisional General Zygmunt Berling;

Chief of the Department for Public Administration—Stanislaw Kotek-Agroszewski;

Chief of the Department for National Economy and Finances—Jan Stefan Taneman;

Chief of the Department for Justice—Jan Czechowski;

Chief of the Department for Public Security—Stanislaw Radkiewicz;

Chief of the Department for Labor, Public Welfare and Health—Dr. Boleslaw Drobner;

Chief of the Department for Communication, Postal and Telegraph Services—Engineer Jan Michal Grubecki;

Chief of the Department for War Damages—Dr. Emil Sommerstein;

Chief of the Department for Education—Dr. Stanislaw Skrzyszewski;

Chief of the Department of Culture and Art—Wincenty Rzymowski; and

Chief of the Department for Information and Propaganda—Dr. Stefan Jedrychowski.

The National Council in the Homeland delegated to the Polish Committee for National Liberation active workers in the underground movement, who forced their way through the frontline and Soviet collaborators of Polish origin.

Five members of the Polish Committee for National Liberation shall remain in the territory under German occupation, where they direct the fight for liberation and secure the connection with the National Council in the Homeland.

The names of these five members of the Polish Committee for National Liberation can not be revealed for comprehensive reasons.

National Council in the Homeland.

WARSAW, July 21, 1944.

No. 58

The Decree of the Polish National Council of July 21, 1944, on taking over the supreme command over the Polish Army in the U. S. S. R. and on the consolidation of the People's Army and the Polish Army in the U. S. S. R. in a unified Polish Army

The Polish National Council determines:

1. To assume the supreme power over the Polish Army in the U. S. S. R.;

2. To unify the People's Army with the Polish Army in the U. S. S. R.;

3. The unified Armies shall be called the Polish Army;

4. To set up the Supreme Command of the Polish Army, which shall involve: the Commander in Chief, two of his deputies and two members of the Command;

5. A generals' ranks in the Polish Army shall be granted by the Presidium of the Polish National Council upon the motion of the Supreme Command. The power of granting any other officers' ranks shall be delegated by the Presidium of the Polish National Council to the Supreme Command;

6. This decree does not prejudice the operational subordination of the Polish Army to the Supreme Command of the Red Army operating on the Soviet-German front.

No. 59

Memorandum of Minister T. Romer of July 25, 1944 submitted to Prime Minister Churchill regarding the formation of a "Polish Committee of National Liberation" at Chelm

On July the 22nd, 1944, at 8:15 p. m., the Moscow radio announced in Polish that a "Polish Committee of National Liberation" has been established in Chelm. The following points of this communique deserve special attention:

(1) The Committee has been formed in the first large town liberated from German occupation to the West of the frontier line established in the Soviet-German Agreements of September 28th and October 4th, 1939. Consequently, the town is situated in the territory to which the Soviet Union made no claims so far and does not make any claims now. It is characteristic that on July 22nd, after the announcement by Moscow radio of the communique concerning the occupation of Chelm, issued by Soviet H. C., the Polish national anthem was played.

(2) The Committee has been formed on territory occupied by Soviet troops. Its formation, therefore, took place with the knowledge of the Soviet authorities of occupation. Moreover, the broadcasting of the communique by the official Soviet radio would indicate that the Soviet Government approve of it, although no formal enunciation of the competent authorities of the Soviet Union has been made in this matter.

(3) The Committee is composed mostly of Communists, either completely unknown to the Polish people or of secondary importance. (Personal details enclosed.)

(4) It is true that the Committee has not assumed so far the title of Government, nevertheless its organisation is copied on that of a normal government. Moreover, the Committee, after declaring that the Polish Government in London "and its agency in Poland is a self-styled authority, based on the illegal fascist Constitution of April, 1953", announced that the so-called National Council of the Homeland is "The sole legal source of authority in Poland". Being unable to do so, the Committee does not give any grounds why the so-called National Council should be the sole legal source of authority in Poland. But such an assertion seems to indicate that the Committee and the Council tend to concentrate in their hands full state authority on Polish territories situated to the west of the line of September 28th,

1939, and the so-called National Council is described as the "provisional Parliament of the Polish Nation". The Committee regard themselves as the de facto, though provisional, Polish Government. The term "provisional" is applied in another description of the Committee as "the legal and provisional executive authority".

(5) The statement of the Committee declaring "the emigre Government in London and its agency in Poland" as "illegal" gives rise to fear that the Committee will not only refuse to recognise the Polish Underground Movement, but that it intends to break that organisation up and persecute its members who for nearly five years risked their lives in fighting the German authorities and troops of occupation, thereby aiding the war effort of the United Nations.

(6) The Committee have also announced their political, economic and social programme as well as their intention to put it in force at once to take over authority on the territories gradually occupied by Soviet troops. ("The Polish Committee of National Liberation is taking over the authority on liberated Polish territory".) They also announce their intention to form their own local administrative committees and to reconstruct the machinery of the Polish State including courts of justice and a citizens' militia.

II. In view of the above, it cannot be doubted that with the consent of the Soviet Government facts have been accomplished on Polish territory, undisputed by the Soviet Union and indicating their intention to impose on the Polish people an illegal administration which has nothing in common with the will of the nation. All this is happening contrary to the repeated assurances of Marshal Stalin that he desires the restoration of an independent Poland. Such moves, enacted on the territory of Poland, especially if the announced intentions of the Polish Committee for National Liberation should be realised, constitute an attempt against the independence of Poland.

III. The Polish Government have the honour to approach the British Government, who guaranteed the independence and vital interests of Poland, with a request that the situation created by unilateral acts accomplished under Soviet occupation should be jointly considered by the two Governments. The above mentioned facts should undoubtedly and directly interest the British Government as they make it impossible to the legal Government of Poland, recognised by the British and American Governments, to take over the administration of Polish territories not included in Soviet claims. It was only two months ago that the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill stated on May 24th: "* * * the Polish Government which we recognise and which we have always recognised."

The more officially the Soviet Government should engage themselves in this matter, the more difficult will it be for them to withdraw from his policy of accomplished facts. An immediate demarche in Moscow of the British Government seems, therefore, to be indispensable. Moreover, in order to avoid further confusion, it would be highly desirable if the British Government would seize an early public occasion in order to reiterate the Prime Minister's declaration of May 24th.

Should the matter in its initial stage be left without an immediate and explicit reaction on the part of the British Government, it may render considerably more difficult in future for the British Government to fulfil their obligations towards Poland while maintaining

at the same time political collaboration with the Soviet Government, because with the occupation by Soviet troops of further Polish territories the Soviet Government will in all probability engage themselves increasingly in a policy the first open manifestation of which is the creation of the Polish Committee of National Liberation.

LONDON, 24 July 1944.

ANNEX

On July 23rd, 1944, the Moscow radio broadcast the news that an executive organ had been created by the so-called Home National Council under the name of "Polish Committee of National Liberation."

This same broadcast stated that the Committee consists of 13 Departments. Below is given a list of these departments with the names of those standing at their heads, together with what information on them is so far available.

1. *Edward Boleslaw Osobka-Morawski, Chairman of the Committee and head of the Department for Foreign Affairs.*

Before the war administrator of a housing co-operative in Warsaw: member of the local branch of the Polish Socialist Party. At present member of the P. P. R. (Polish Workers' Party)—a communist organisation in Poland. Has so far played no part in political life.

2. *Andrzej Witos, Vice-Chairman of the Committee, head of the Agricultural Department*

Brother of the former Polish Premier Wincenty Witos. Left the Peasant Party in 1928 and joined the Government Block. In February 1940, deported from Poland to the interior of the U. S. S. R. and sentenced to death under Art. 58 of the Soviet Penal Code. The sentence was not carried out because of the amnesty resulting from the Polish-Soviet Agreement. Before his release Witos was forced to sign a declaration that he would collaborate with the NKWD. In April 1944, Witos was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Union of Polish Patriots, probably because of the great authority enjoyed by his brother.

3. *Wanda Wasilewska-Korneyczuk, Vice Chairman of the Committee*

Member of the Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R. and colonel of the Red Army. Wife of Alexander Korneyczuk, until recently Foreign Minister of the Ukrainian S. S. R. Before the war a journalist with pronounced communist views. She joined the Ukrainian communist party in November 1939, and obtained U. S. S. R. citizenship. Chairman of the Union of Polish Patriots in Moscow and editor of its press organ "Free Poland".

Korneyczuk is her third husband. Her first husband died before the outbreak of the war: her second, a Pole of the name Bogatko, was shot by the NKWD in Lwow.

4. *General Michal Rola-Zymierski, Head of the Department of National Defence*

His real name is Lyzminski. He assumed the name of Rola-Zymierski during the last war. In the late twenties he was reduced to the ranks of sentence of Court-Martial, dismissed from the army and sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment for fraudulent transaction in

a gas mask factory working for the army. At the time of this fraudulent action he was deputy Minister of War. When discharged from prison he entered commerce. Until taking up his present position in the Committee nothing has been known of his political activities.

5. *General Zygmunt Berling, Deputy Head of the Department of National Defence*

Lt/Colonel of the Polish Army. In 1940 a prisoner of war in the USSR. There he contacted the NKWD and signed a declaration of loyalty to the Soviet Union. Later he organized a group of 19 officers who were transferred in 1940 by the NKWD to a villa near Moscow where a course was held for Polish political officers of the Red Army. After the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet Agreement in 1941 he joined the Polish Army in Russia. When the Polish Army left the USSR in 1942 he deserted from the Army and remained in the Soviet Union. For his desertion he was reduced to the ranks by court-martial and dismissed from the Polish Army. In the middle of 1943 he began to organise Polish units in Russia and received rapid promotion from the Soviet authorities. He now holds the rank of Lt/General and is Commander of Polish units in Russia and a member of the Praesidium of the Union of Polish Patriots.

6. *Stanislaw Kotek-Agruszewski, Head of the Department of Public Administration*

No details available. Member of the P. P. R. (a communist organisation). Unknown in politics.

7. *Jan Stefan Haneman, Head of the Department of National Economy*

Before the war a bank clerk in Lodz, member of an atheist organisation with communist tendencies. Played no part in politics.

8. *Janusz Czeckowski, Head of the Department of Justice*

No details available. Member of the communist organization in Poland. Name unknown in Polish politics.

9. *Stanislaw Radkiewicz, Head of the Department of Public Security*

Lawyer. Since July 16th, 1944, member of the Praesidium of the Union of Polish Patriots. Name unknown in Polish Politics.

10. *Boleslaw Brobner, Head of the Department of Labour, Social Welfare and Health*

Member of the Polish Socialist Party which he repeatedly left to organise an independent Socialist Workers' Party with communist tendencies. In 1934-1935 expelled from the Polish Socialist Party, subsequently he was arrested as an organiser of strikes and sentenced to two years' imprisonment. In 1940 deported into the interior of the USSR. From April 1944 a member of the Praesidium of the Union of Polish Patriots.

11. *Jan Michal Grubecki, Head of the Department of Transport, Posts and Telegraphs*

Civil engineer. Since July 16th, 1944, a member of the Praesidium of the Union of Polish Patriots.

12. *Emil Sommerstein, Head of the Department of War Reparations*

Member of the parliamentary Zionists Club. Holds moderate views, voted in favour of the 1935 Constitution together with his Party. Arrested in 1939 he served a long sentence in Russian prisons. Released as a result of the efforts of the Polish Embassy in the USSR. Since April 1944, member of the Praesidium of the Union of Polish Patriots.

13. *Stanislaw Skrzyszowski, Head of the Department of Education*

Before the war lecturer in the Pedagogical Institute in Cracow. Played no part in Polish politics. At present member of the Praesidium of the Union of Polish Patriots.

14. *Wincenty Rzymowski, Head of the Department of Culture and Fine Arts*

Writer and prominent journalist of the "Kurjer Poranny", a Government newspaper in Warsaw. Was formerly a member of the Polish Academy of Literature. Before the war he published a book in which parts were found to have been copied from a book written by Russell. For this reason he had to resign from the Academy.

15. *Stefan Jedrychowski, Head of the Department of Propaganda and Information*

Member of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian SSR. Lawyer, well known before the war for his communist activities in Wilno. At present member of the Praesidium of the Union of Polish Patriots.

At the same time a Supreme Military Command has been created consisting of General Rola-Zymierski, General Zygmunt Berling and General Alexander Zawadzki.

The latter was a colonel in the Frontier Forces of the NKWD and commanded a sector on the border of Manchuria. In 1936 he was dismissed from the communist party and shortly afterwards arrested and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. In December 1943 he was posted to the "Kosciuszko Division" and 6 months later was promoted to the rank of Major-General and deputy to General Berling.

Thus it can be seen that of the 15 members of the Committee, 9 are at the same time members of the Praesidium of the Union of Polish Patriots in Moscow and 4 members of the communist organisation in occupied Poland known as the Polish Workers' Party. At least $\frac{2}{3}$ of the Committee are communists. Only 2 or 3 of the members have played a certain though a very modest part in politics; the rest are completely unknown and took no part in the public life of Poland.

Finally, two members of the Committee are members of the Supreme authorities of the USSR.

No. 60

Aide Memoire submitted by Minister Romer to Minister Eden of July 25, 1944 with regards to Bringing Pressure on the Soviet Government to regulate the relationship between the Red Army and the Home Army

In a letter addressed to Mr. Churchill on July 18th, 1944, Mr. Mikolajczyk pointed to the part played by the Polish Home Army in capturing the province and city of Wilno and to the danger which would in future threaten Polish-Soviet relations in the event of the Soviet authorities taking steps endangering the military collaboration between the Red Army and the Poles thus hindering the general war effort of the Allies.

Since the note referred to above was delivered, radio-grams dated July 19th have been received from the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Army. These contained the following facts:

After the fighting for the city Wilno had ended, units of the Home Army, totalling about two divisions, were grouped in the region of Wilno. On July 12th the Soviet authorities attached a liaison officer to the Officer Commanding the Wilno area. On July 15th the Officer Commanding the Wilno area, as Commander of the Home Army in this region, was invited to see the Soviet Commander of the 3rd White-Ruthenian Front, General Tcherniakhovsky, who unreservedly accepted the suggestion of the Polish Area Commander for the Home Army in this region to place in the common first line in the first instance one division of infantry and one brigade of cavalry. According to mutual agreement these units, after reorganisation and supplementary armament were shortly afterwards to return to the front as units of the Polish Army under orders of the Polish Government in London and the Polish Commander-in-Chief, and under operational orders of the Soviet Supreme Command.

Meanwhile, on July 17th the Soviet authorities arrested the Staff of the Home Army for the Areas of Wilno and Nowogrodek.

The Polish Government are obliged to state that this action of the Soviet authorities is one more proof of the lack of good will on the Soviet side towards the Polish forces fighting against the Germans, and that it is obviously inconsistent with the common Allied effort aimed at defeating the enemy in the shortest possible time.

In these circumstances the Polish Government consider it their duty to draw attention of the Allied British Government to the fact that the instructions issued some time ago to the Home Army and Administration, in agreement with the British Government, ordering their co-operation with the Soviet Forces and the coming into the open of the underground administration to meet the Soviet authorities,—may become impracticable owing to the attitude of the latter.

A situation has thus arisen which the Polish people and their administrative and military organs who, for the last 5 years have been fighting the German oppressor under the most tragic conditions, have now met on the part of the authorities of a member of the United Nation with arrests, which, as precedents in Volhynia have shown, may even lead to execution. The reaction to such measures of the Soviet authorities on the spirit of the population in other territories of Poland and of the Polish Forces fighting on other fronts at the side of the Allies, must naturally be the worst possible.

In view of the above the Polish Government venture to urge the British Government to use all their influence with the Soviet Government with a view to:

securing the release of the arrested members of the Home Army; enabling the Home Army to continue their struggle against the common enemy in operational cooperation with the Soviet Armies; Recognising of the Polish Home Army as an Allied force by the Soviet Government.

On the other hand the Polish Government have received information that as the Polish Home Army is waging open warfare behind the German lines, the Germans are murdering soldiers of the Polish Home Army who fall into their hands as prisoners of war. The Polish Government have therefore the honour to request the British Government for a declaration of the British and United States Governments stating that the Polish Home Army is an Allied Army with all the rights of a combatant.

No. 61

*Reuter's Telegram published in Evening Standard on July 27, 1944, concerning details of Agreement signed in Moscow between the Government of the U. S. S. R. and the Polish Committee for National Liberation*¹⁰

An agreement has been signed by the Soviet Government and the Polish Committee of National Liberation on relations between the Polish Administration and the Soviet High Command in Poland, said Moscow radio to-day.

The ceremony took place in the Kremlin in the presence of Marshal Stalin and for Russia, M. Viacheslav Molotov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs; M. Andrei Vyshinsky, Vice-Commissar; M. Shkalow, of the Soviet Foreign Commissariat; and Marshal Zhukov.

The Polish Committee of National Liberation was represented by M. Andrei Witos, vice-chairman, M. Edward Morawski, head of the Foreign Affairs Department, and Dr. Boleslaw Drobner, Director of Press Affairs.

General Michael Rola-Zymierski, the new Commander-in-Chief of the United Polish armed forces, was also present.

The Agreement contains 10 clauses:

1.—Supreme power in the zone of military operations where Red Army units are fighting on Polish territory for a period necessary for the conclusion of such operations is vested in the Soviet C.-in-C.

CO-OPERATION

2.—The Polish Committee on Polish liberated territory is to establish a Polish administration in accordance with the Polish constitution, create the machinery for recruiting men for the Polish armed forces and ensure active co-operation with the Soviet C.-in-C.

3.—The Polish military formations being created in the Soviet Union will operate on Polish territory.

4.—Liaison between the Soviet C.-in-C. and the Polish Committee of National Liberation will be maintained through a Polish Military Mission.

¹⁰ "Evening Standard", No. 37,401, July 27, 1944.

5.—In the area of military operations, liaison between the Polish administration and the Soviet C-in-C. will be maintained through an accredited agent of the Polish Committee of National Liberation.

FULL RESPONSIBILITY

6.—As soon as an area of liberated Poland ceases to be a zone of direct military operations, the Polish Committee will assume full responsibility in matters of Civil Government.

7.—All Soviet Army men will, while on Polish territory, be under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Command. Polish servicemen will be under Polish military law.

This also applies to civilians, even where crimes are committed against Soviet citizens, except in zones of military operations.

8.—In all zones of operations by Soviet troops and Polish Armed forces, the Polish forces will be under the Soviet Commander-in-Chief in operational matters and subordinate to the Polish Command in matters of men and internal organization.

9. Questions of finance and supply of both Soviet and Polish troops in Poland will be dealt with in a separate agreement.

10.—The agreement comes into force with its signature by the contracting parties.

No. 62

*Prime Minister Churchill's Declaration concerning Poland made in the House of Commons on August 2, 1944*¹¹

In the passage dealing with the Polish problem, Churchill said: "This, in my opinion, is a hopeful moment for Poland, for whose rights and independence we entered the war against Germany. We therefore did our best, my right hon. Friend (Eden) and I and others, late into the night, to promote the visit of Mr. Mikolajczyk and other members of his Cabinet to Moscow, where Marshal Stalin was willing to receive them. The President of the United States was also favorable. How could it be otherwise in these matters, considering his deep interest in the Polish question? The Russian Armies now stand before the gates of Warsaw. They bring the liberation of Poland in their hands. They offer freedom, sovereignty and independence to the Poles. They ask that there should be a Poland friendly to Russia. This seems to me very reasonable, considering the injuries which Russia has suffered through the Germans marching across Poland to attack her. The Allies would welcome any general rally or fusion of Polish Forces, both those who are working with the Western Powers and those who are working with the Soviet. We have several gallant Polish divisions fighting the Germans in our Armies now and there are others who have been fighting in Russia. Let them come together. We desire this union and it would be a marvelous thing if it could be proclaimed, or at least its foundations laid, at the moment when the famous capital of Poland, which so valiantly defended itself against the Germans, has been liberated by the bravery of the Russian Armies."

¹¹ "Parliamentary Debates" (Hansard) London 1944 p. 1482, "Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Zolnierza," No. 182 of August 3, 1944.

No. 63

Announcement of August 2, 1944, of the Radio Service concerning the Outbreak of the Uprising in Warsaw

The delegate of the Government for the Homeland and Chief Commander of the Home-Army, state that on August 1st at five o'clock P. M. units of the Home-Army began to fight in an open battle to seize Warsaw.

No. 64

Telegram of W. Raczkiewicz, President of the Republic of Poland, To President Roosevelt of August 12, 1944 concerning aid to Warsaw

MR. PRESIDENT: Since August last when Poland's Underground Army launched its attack in Warsaw against the Germans facing the advancing Soviet forces—the struggle continues unabated.

I grieve to say that during these 12 fateful days the support the need of which we have been constantly urging has not materialized. You will therefore I am sure understand the anxiety with which I am appealing to you, Mr. President.

In this struggle some scores of thousands of halfarmed Polish soldiers of Home Force are defying singlehanded between two and three heavily armed German divisions with tanks and strong air support.

On August 10th the Germans issued an ultimatum announcing that all civilians remaining in the City will be massacred. The United Nations and their leaders cannot tolerate that the heroic Capital of Poland should succumb unaided in its decisive fight for freedom on the eve of liberation.

I appeal to you, Mr. President, to order the American Air Force in the European Theatre of War to give immediate support to the Garrison of Warsaw by dropping arms and ammunition, bombing objectives held in the Warsaw area by the enemy, transporting Polish Airborne Units to take part in the fight for their Capital.

Any delay to afford help spells disaster to Warsaw. The Polish People could never understand why it should fail now at a moment when the common cause of the United Nations is championed by military power of unexampled strength.

WŁADYSŁAW RACZKIEWICZ,
President of Poland.

No. 65

A message of the Delegate for the Home-land, appointed by the Government, and of the Chairman of the Council of National Unity, of August 23, 1944, to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill concerning the wrong committed under Russian occupation in Poland

TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

We ask you to convey this message to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill:

"For the second time we are appealing to you. It is already for three weeks that we are carrying on our blood struggle left to rely

upon our own strength only, insufficiently supplied with weapons and ammunition and without air support. At the same time reports from all Polish territories occupied by the Soviets, whether disputed or not, show that the Civil Administration and Home Forces coming out into the open, are being interned, arrested or imprisoned by the Soviets in the ill-famed concentration camp of Majdanek. This applies to the same Home Forces which have so effectively assisted in fighting the Germans. In this way after 5 years unrelenting resistance against the Germans, for which we pay with our blood, the Polish Nation is coming under the no less cruel slavery of one of the Allies. Can the great peoples of the United States of America and of Great Britain watch passively this new hecatomb of friendly Poland? Is not even the Polish Air Force allowed to come to assistance of succumbing Warsaw? Is Poland to become victim to some division of spheres of interest?

We solemnly declare that we are fighting on the ruins of Warsaw ablaze, that we shall go on fighting for independence and that we shall continue to defend the latter against any kind of imperialism. The peasants, the workers and the intelligentsia stand united in this struggle.

The Polish Nation cannot understand either the passiveness of the Great Allies in face of succumbing Warsaw or the silent toleration of oppression and violence under Soviet occupation. Their reaction cannot be but one of bitter disappointment.

/—/ Delegate of the Polish Government.

/—/ Chairman of the Council of National Unity.

No. 66

Note of Ambassador E. Raczynski to Minister Eden of August 24, 1944, concerning the persecution of members of the Home Army and administrative authorities by Soviet Occupational Powers

SIR: I have the honour to submit to you enclosed a translation of messages received by the Polish Government in London from their representatives in Poland on the repressive measures taken by the Soviet authorities against the Home Army and Polish administrative authorities who, following the Polish Government's instructions, disclosed themselves to the incoming Soviet forces and offered them their cooperation.

The Polish Government in bringing this information to the notice of His Majesty's Government consider it their duty to raise a protest against unwarranted acts directed by the Soviet Union against a state member of the United Nations, a country which has never wavered in its loyalty to the common Allied cause.

I have the honour to be, Sir, with the highest consideration,

Your obedient Servant,

/—/ EDWARD RACZYNSKI,
Polish Ambassador.

ABRIDGED TRANSLATION OF MESSAGES RECEIVED BY THE POLISH GOVERNMENT IN LONDON FROM THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN POLAND, ON THE REPRESSIVE MEASURES DIRECTED BY THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES AGAINST THE HOME ARMY AND THE POLISH ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES

Date of message

- March 15, 1944. *Volhynia*: Soviet have disarmed our outpost in Przebraze, 12 klm. north-east of Kiwerce. Part of the men were arrested. C. C. were shot. On the 9th March in Rozyszcze the Commander of the Home Army Unit and 3 men were shot, 20 were arrested and taken to Luck where several were hanged.
- August 23, 1944. From the beginning of March the Soviet are carrying out executions of the officers of the Home Army in *Polesie, Volhynia and Eastern Galicia*. Those units which came out into the open were disarmed by the Soviets in the localities of Luzowa, Antonowka, Torczyn and Zaturec. In the region of Luck our officers: "Adam", "Czyzyk", "Siekacz" and "Kruk" were arrested.
- April 26, 1944. In *Volhynia* the Soviets withdrew to the eastern bank of the river Turia without informing our units, which in result were cut off and surrounded by the Germans.
- July 19, 1944. After a friendly meeting of July 15 between the Commander of the *Wilno* region of the Polish Home Army and General Chernyakhovsky Soviet Commander of the White Russian front, the Soviet authorities acting under false pretences arrested on the 17th June Polish Home Army's staffs of the regions of Wilno and Nowogrodek.
- July 27, 1944. On July 25th the Soviets started to disarm the 27th Infantry Division of the Home Army which before the entry of Soviet troops captured the region *Kock-Lubartow*.
- July 29, 1944. The Polish Home Army Commanding Officer in *Lublin* reports on July 26th that the Infantry Regiment in that region was disarmed by the Soviets. The O. C. the regiment was forced under threat of being shot on the spot, to sign a declaration to enlist into Berlin's Army. This incident occurred at *Bykawki* (Lublin district).
- July 30, 1944. Generally speaking—Officers of the Home Army and particularly those holding responsible positions are being arrested by the Soviets as soon as they come out into the open.
- August 2, 1944. *Lwow*: Officers of the Home Army were summoned to report at 9 p. m. on July 31st. All who reported were arrested.
- August 4, 1944. *Lwow*: Delegate of the Government was arrested today. A search was made in the home of the Chief of Staff for the district of Lwow. O. C. the District and others have been deported.
- July 29, 1944. *Zamosc*: I have obtained orders to disarm the regiment. I am carrying out the order.
- August 4, 1944. *Lublin and Lwow*: The bulk of the Home Army units have been disarmed. Those who came out into the open are prevented from carrying out their functions.
- August 6, 1944. *Brzesc*: Further arrests of officers in commanding positions.
- August 4, 1944. *Radom*: It is reported from Radom that the Soviets are taking prisoner soldiers of the Home Army and sending them on to Berlin.

August 7, 1944. *Lwow*: The Delegate of the Government and officers of the Home Army are in prison. No news about the O. C. and some others.

August 5, 1944. *Lwow*: About 30 officers of the Home Army who had been arrested on July 31st after they came out into the open, when fighting in Lwow have been imprisoned as "criminals and Polish fascists." Further arrests of soldiers of the Home Army and searches in houses which offered hospitality to these soldiers. The O. C. and the Delegate of the Government have not been set free. The NKVD and the Ukrainians are continuing the work of the Gestapo.

August 12, 1944. All throughout the country arrests and disarming of the Home Army soldiers by the Soviets under false pretences. Arrests cover the districts of Wilno, Lwow, Lublin, Nowogrodek and Biala Podlaska. Sixty officers were arrested in Lwow on July 31st.

August 7, 1944. On August 6th an O. C. a unit of the Home Army was after he had fulfilled his task, summoned to the quarters of the 121st Division of the name of Stalin, and then to the Divisional Staff at Studzianka, where he received order to disarm his unit and transfer the men to a Berling's unit at *Lublin*.

August 10, 1944. *Lublin*: The O. C. District of *Lublin*, the District Delegate of the Home Army and their deputies were interned, after personal interrogation (each separately). The Organisation of the Home Army was investigated upon by four Soviet generals from Moscow.

August 13, 1944. All throughout the country—after the signal "Tempest" arrests and disarming by the Soviets of the Home Army soldiers under false pretences. Until today the following have been arrested. G. O. C. districts: Wilno, Nowogrodek, Lublin, Lwow, the O. C. the area of Lwow and "Pskowski" (1) from the staff of Lwow, the O. C. the 27th Infantry Division, and the 3d Infantry Division, General Bitner, the O. C. the 9th Infantry Division, Lt. Col. Roman—Inspector in Biala Poslaska, Maj. Miller of the 35th Infantry Division and many others.

August 11, 1944. *Radom*: In spite of loyal collaboration of the Home Army and the help given the Red Army, the attitude towards us is hostile and distrustful. The "Liberation Committee" is being made most of. The London Government is assailed with invectives. A mobilisation for Berlin's Army is carried out in the Lublin district. We continue our diversive activities so as to help the Soviets.

Undated message. *Zamosc*: Registration of officers and N. C. O.'s is continued throughout the districts of Zamosc, Krasnystaw, Tomaszow, Bilgoraj. Those who fail to report are being prosecuted as deserters by military courts. Instructions are being issued by "the Polish Committee of National Liberation" on the strength of authorizations enacted by the National Council. The executive power is within the hands of the NKVD. Officers of the Home Army are arrested.

August 14, 1944. The Ninth Infantry Division is disarmed. Gen. Halka interned. The O. C. the district of Lublin and the District Delegate of the Government are interned as from July 26th.

The Soviets ascertain that they are in the hands of the "Liberation Committee". Further arrests of the Home Army soldiers and of the District Delegates who came out into the open. Passive resistance of the population. Proclamations have been prepared concerning the taking over of the security administration by the citizens militia.

August 14, 1944. *Lwow*: The O. C. with the Staff and officers, who had been arrested are still in Lwow. They have been accused of:

- 1) Collaboration in the murder of 2 Soviet soldiers in Lwow,
- 2) concealment of arms,
- 3) terroristic action against the Ukrainian population.

The Soviet military prosecutor is carrying a suit against the District Delegate of the Government. The charges against him are not known. In all about 180 soldiers of the Home Army have been arrested. Registration of men, born between 1894-1926 has been completed in Lwow. Individual enlistment is proceeding. It has not been ascertained whether Poles are being enlisted by Berling. Some villages have been surrounded and recruits seized. Medical examination is very superficial. Units of the Home Army operated in Lwow in 3 groups, each in the strength of one battalion. Battles east of Stryj, Drohobycz, and the region of Sambor, when for a second time the city passed into German hands, our units covered the retreat of the Soviets.

August 16, 1944. Diverisive activities helpful to the Soviets are continued in the Radom district. The attitude of the Soviets towards the Home Army is hostile. Part of our unit in Minsk Mazowiecki has been arrested. In the district of Lwow "voluntary" enlistment to the Army under compulsion. Men between 18-55 years of age and women up to 35 years of age have been deported from Tarnopol.

August 19, 1944. *Rzeszow*: In Rzeszow mass arrests comprise not only the officers commanding the region of Rzeszow but also staff officers with families.

August 19, 1944. *Lublin*: Mass arrests of the Home Army soldiers are carried throughout the district by the NKVD. The "Liberation Committee" complies with these measures. The people under arrest are kept in Majdanek. Among the prisoners are—members of the staff of the 8th Army and 9th Infantry Division with Gen. Halka, about 200 officers and N. C. O.'s and some 2500 men. The District Commander of the Home Army "Edward" and the Delegate of the Government "Cholewa" who are both interned since the 27th of July are to be tried under the charge of fascism and cooperation with the Germans.

Mobilisation of the last four age groups and of all officers, N. C. O.'s and of the reserve up to 50-60 years has been proclaimed. Losses sustained by the Nation and the Home Army are proportionately no less then during the German occupation.

Maltreatment goes as far as to the beating of the victims. We are again paying with our blood. By dint of terror and arrests the patience of the Polish population is exhausted; there may be uproars regardless of possible consequences. I am unable to prevent it in view of the breaking up of our organisation by force.

For their five-year heroic fight against the Germans the Poles demand from the Allies the granting of combattant right to the Home Army and the taking of the homeland under the Allies' protection by sending an Allied Mission to the liberated areas and informing the world about it. Passive resistance of the population is continuing. We want to fight against the Germans and come to the rescue of Warsaw. London's silence is very alarming to us.

August 19. "Blyskawica," 8:00 p. m.: From July 22nd to July 24th fighting went on in the district of Lublin. Our underground units fought alongside with the Red Army. After the taking of Lublin the local O. C. the district and the Delegate of the Government came out in the open. As long as fighting was going on the relation of the Soviet O. C.'s towards our officers was correct and loyal. It deteriorated visibly as soon as the front moved westward.

August 19. Communique of the Home Army. No. 47: District of Lublin. The Home Army takes its full share in the action. The most intense fighting went on between July 20th and 26th. The 15th Inf. Regiment cooperating with the Soviet Army has liberated Pulawy, occupied Belzec and Tomaszow Lubelski on July 25th. The third battalion fiercely fought near Garbow. Chelm was occupied without opposition. One tank and some ammunition were seized in a battle near Kurow. Konskawola and Krasnystaw have been captured on July 26th. The fighting in Lwow continued throughout July 22nd, 23rd and 24th. The O. C. the City of Lublin came out into the open on July 26th. The Peasant Party issued orders to the peasant battalions to proceed towards Warsaw to help the capital and as soon as ways of communication are open to bring supplies by horsedrawn carts.

August 20. "Blyskawica": Arrests of the O. C. the Home Army and further recruitment to Berling's units are being continued throughout the district of Lublin.

August 20. Lublin: It has been ascertained that a Soviet military Commission for the investigation of anti-Soviet activities in Poland is working in Lublin. They ascertain that the representatives of the Home Army and of the Government Administration are involved in these activities. In consequence those members of the underground organisations who come out into the open are being arrested. The Commission is very large with Gen. Bogdanov at its head. Other members are—Major Gen. Zhukov, liaison officer between the Red Army and the Polish Liberation Committee Col. Melnikov, Col. Stroilov, Lt. Gen. Ivanov, Cpt. Stanislaw Godlewski from Kijow, interpreter of the NKVD. The commission covers its activities under the cloak of putting into order Polish military affairs. To this end Berling's army serves as pretext.

August 20. "Blyskawica": On August 12th the Soviet authorities arrested in Tomaszow Lubelski and deported to an unknown destination the Delegate of the Polish Government with all the members of his staff. Further arrests of officers of the Home Army are taking place. Enlistment to Berling's Army is proceeding under terror.

August 21. Warsaw: General mobilisation was proclaimed by the Liberation Committee in the district of Zamosc. Officers of the Home Army are detained. Those failing to report are arrested as deserters. The registration of the age groups 1894-1926 has been completed in Lwow. Villages are being surrounded and recruits taken. The O. C. and the staff officers are still in prison in Lwow. They are accused of having concealed arms and exercised terror against the Ukrainian population. Mass arrests of members of the Underground Movement.

August 21. "Blyskawica," 10.00 a. p.: In the Bilgoraj and Krasnystaw districts registration of N. C. O.'s was ordered and general mobilisation decreed. All instructions issued by the "National Liberation Committee" are being carried out with the help of NKVD. On August 14th the O. C. the 34th Infantry Regiment of the Home Army was arrested in Biala Podlaska and taken in an unknown direction. Together with him were arrested the mayor of the city, Kowalewski, the deputy mayor, the O. C. the district.

In the province of Stanislawow units of the Home Army fought against the Germans in the region of Boryslaw Drohobycz.

No. 67

Memorandum delivered by Ambassador Ciechanowski to Mr. Durbrow of the Department of State for Foreign Affairs on August 25, 1944, concerning the conduct of the Soviets towards the uprising in Warsaw

The Ambassador of Poland informed Mr. Durbrow of the following developments in the Polish-Soviet situation on the basis of telegrams received by the Ambassador from Minister Romer, dated August 23 and 24.

Situation of Warsaw

Regarding this matter Premier Mikolajczyk sent a personal telegram to Marshal Stalin on August 13th in which he referred to his conversations with the Marshal in Moscow in the first days of August, and to the definite promises he obtained from the Marshal on August 9, that pending the entering into Warsaw of Soviet forces the Soviets would supply the Polish Home Army and population fighting there with arms and ammunitions according to the details which M. Mikolajczyk had communicated to the Soviet Government and to Marshal Stalin. In this telegram Premier Mikolajczyk further explains that the Commander of Warsaw started the open fight against the Germans on the basis of blanket orders from the Polish Government to do so as soon as he considered it imperative to start the fight in order to help the Soviets enter Warsaw at the earliest possible moment to save the objectives of strategical value, the communications and public utilities. Further Premier Mikolajczyk referred to the constant appeals broadcast by Russian wireless stations calling on the population of Warsaw to rise. These appeals were continuous and were heard as early as July 27th.

Premier Mikolajczyk further asks whether the inactivity on the part of the Home Army and the population in Warsaw at the time

when the Soviet armies were practically at the gates of the city would not have been regarded as worthy of blame. He likewise points out that the entire population of Warsaw, regardless of its convictions, has joined the Polish Home Army in its struggle against the common foe. He adds that for 18 days now this army and the heroic population have been fighting a solitary and unequal fight with the clear aim of helping the effort of the Soviet Army. He appeals for immediate help to Marshal Stalin, not only for the sake of Warsaw and its population, but in the name of his own efforts to build up the bases for real friendship between Poland and the Soviets.

The Ambassador is informed that the situation of Warsaw is becoming increasingly tragical although the fight continues. Help is needed most urgently. Lack of help would be terrible in its consequences as it could not fail to create a new crisis in Soviet-Polish relations by building up a justifiable resentment, and such a situation would also react on the United Nation's unity.

The Ambassador is informed by Minister Romer of the kind intervention of the President and Prime Minister Churchill. Minister Romer has been informed by Mr. Eden that Marshal Stalin limits his reply to this intervention to polemics about the Polish underground and Home Army, and appears to give no answer as regards the definite question of Soviet aid to Warsaw.

Premier Mikolajczyk has not hitherto received any reply to his second telegram to Marshal Stalin of August 16th.

As the answer of Marshal Stalin to the British intervention does not express any direct opposition to aid being given on the part of the British and American Air Forces, Mr. Eden has taken into consideration with the appropriate military authorities the matter of aid being sent to Warsaw by British and American planes, which, after dropping this aid over Poland would continue their way to Soviet bases in Poland. The British Air Force is doing its best in the way of night flights over Warsaw from Southern European airports, but this aid is still inadequate.

Finally, Mr. Eden's suggestion to broadcast from London a British Government declaration that the Polish Home Army should be regarded as a fully combatant co-belligerent army was accepted by the British Cabinet. Mr. Mikolajczyk would be very grateful if a similar declaration could be broadcast on behalf of the United States Government or military command.

The Ambassador of Poland encloses for the confidential information of the President and the Secretary of State the verbatim translation of an original telegram received from Warsaw in London on August 7th (dated Warsaw August 5) from Captain Konstantin Kalugin of the Soviet Army to Marshal Stalin. This telegram was re-transmitted by courtesy of the British Foreign Office to Marshal Stalin on August 7. This fact alone proves that liaison could easily have been established by the Soviet military authorities with Warsaw if the Soviets had desired to do so.

Enc.

Translation of the Telegram from Captain Kalugin to Marshal Stalin.

On August 5th, a Soviet officer reported to the Polish Headquarters in the City and after having appreciated the situation on the spot promised to try and get in touch with the Soviet Command in order

to get some help from that side. The Soviet officer's message was received in London on August 7th and re-transmitted to Moscow.

"Moscow Marshal Comrade Stalin, August 5, 1944.

I am in personal contact with the Commander of Warsaw Garrison, who is leading the heroic partisan fight of the Nation—against Hitlerite bandits. After acquainting myself with the general military situation I come to a conclusion—that in spite of heroism of the Army and the entire Warsaw population—there are still needs which if made good would permit a speedier victory over our common foe. These needs are automatic arms, ammunition, grenades, A/tk weapons.

Drop arms on: Wilson sq., Invalids sq., Ghetto, Krasinski sq., Zelazna Brama sq., Napoleon sq., Mokotowskie Field and Cavalry Barracks in Powisle and Bielany. Recognition signals: white and red sheets. German air force destroys the City and kills civilian population.

Direct artillery fire on Vistula bridges, in the Warsaw area, on Saski Garden, Aleje Jerozolimskie, as these are the main channels of movement for the German Army. The enemy is bombing from Okecie and Bielany airfields. The heroic population of Warsaw trusts that in a few hours time you will give them armed support.

Help me to get in touch with Marshal Rokossovsky.

Cpt. KONSTANTY KALUGIN
from Czarny Group 66804. Warsaw".

No. 68

Declaration of the British Government, of August 30, 1944, concerning the recognition of rights of combatants to the Members of the Polish Home Army

His Majesty's Government have consistently done all in their power to ensure that all members of the armed forces of the Powers at war with Germany should be treated by the German military authorities in accordance with the laws and customs of war. They are, however, receiving numerous reports which show that members of the Polish Home Army, which is engaged in active operations in the struggle against the common enemy, are being treated by the German military authorities in a manner contrary to the laws and customs of war.

His Majesty's Government therefore make this formal declaration:

(1) The Polish Home Army, which is now mobilized, constitutes a combatant force forming an integral part of the Polish Armed Forces.

(2) Members of the Polish Home Army are instructed to conduct their military operations in accordance with the rules of war, and in so doing they bear their arms openly against the enemy. They operate in units under responsible commanders. They are provided with a distinctive emblem or with Polish uniforms.

(3) In these circumstances reprisals against members of the Polish Army violate the rules of war, by which Germany is bound. His Majesty's Government therefore solemnly warn all Germans who take any part in or are in any way responsible for such violations that they do so at their peril and will be held answerable for their crimes.

No. 69

Communique of the Soviet Radio, of September 14, 1944, concerning the conclusion of an agreement between the Polish Committee for National Liberation and the Governments of the Ukrainian S. S. R. and the Byelorussian S. S. R. of September 9, 1944, concerning the transfer of population

POLISH-UKRAINIAN MUTUAL EVACUATION AGREEMENT SIGNED: Negotiations have taken place between the Polish Committee of National Liberation and the Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and an agreement has been signed concerning the evacuation of Polish citizens from the Ukraine and Byelorussia to Poland, provided these citizens were Polish subjects before September 17th, 1939, and the evacuation of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian population from Polish territory to the Ukraine and Byelorussia.

The agreement provides that the evacuation will be voluntary and its conditions made known to the population by special representatives of the Polish Liberation Committee and the Councils of People's Commissars of the Ukraine and Byelorussia who will supervise the evacuation.

The settling and provision of employment for the evacuees will be provided for by the respective Governments. Persons evacuated from Poland to Ukrainian and Byelorussian territory will be either fixed up in collective farms or allotted plots of land for the cultivation of individual peasant homesteads. Persons evacuated from the Ukraine and Byelorussia to Polish territory will also receive land on a scale in accordance with the law governing agrarian reforms in Poland.

Evacuated peasants who held no land will also receive land on the general basis.

The agreement provides for various privileges for the evacuees.

All their arrears of deliveries in kind, arrears in taxes and payments for insurance are to be written off. All evacuated homesteads in the three territories are freed from all State taxes and insurance payments for two years. The evacuees will be granted assistance in each—the sum of 5,000 Zloty (or Rubles) per homestead to buy agricultural equipment, etc. This sum is to be paid off in five years.

The evacuees will also be permitted to take with them various household and agricultural articles to the total weight of two tons per family and the cattle and fowl they own. When an evacuee has to leave his harvest behind the State will provide full compensation, a harvest of equal quantity, for him at the place to which he is being evacuated. All evacuees who have sown winter crops on their present holdings, will receive an equal amount of winter crops at their destination.

The cost of movable and immovable property left behind after the evacuation is to be paid to the evacuees according to the laws existing in Poland, the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussia SSR. The agreement was signed on behalf of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR by Comrade Khrushchev, on behalf of the Polish Liberation Committee by Osobka-Morawski and on behalf of the Byelorussian SSR, by Comrade Pomarenko.

No. 70

Radio Communique from the Polish Committee for National Liberation dated Lublin, September 23, 1944, concerning the Agreement signed with the Government of the SSR of Lithuania with respect to the transfer of the population

POLISH-LITHUANIAN TRANSFERENCE AGREEMENT: In the last few days, negotiations were conducted between the Polish Committee of National Liberation and the Government of the Lithuanian SSR concerning the transference of the Polish population from the Lithuanian SSR and of the Lithuanian population from Poland. As a result of these negotiations, which were carried on in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding, an agreement was signed in Lublin on September 22nd.

The agreement provides that the transference shall be carried out on the foundation of complete free will. The conditions and periods of transference will be announced by the special Commissioners of the Polish Committee for National Liberation and of the Council of the People's Commissars, who will carry out the transference on Polish and Lithuanian territory. The Polish Committee of National Liberation and the Government of the Lithuanian SSR are in charge of the settlement and employment of the transferred population in their respective territories. People transferred from Lithuania to Poland, will receive, if they desire it, land to an amount in conformity with the Law of the Agrarian Reform in Poland. Both in Poland and in Lithuania, the transferred small-holders will receive land in accordance with the general principles set out above. Other persons transferred will be enabled to get work in accordance with their education and special abilities. People transferred from Poland to the Lithuanian SSR will receive, if they desire, land for carrying on their farming on a scale not smaller than enjoyed before, subject to a maximum of 10 to 15 hectares for every single farm. Otherwise, they will also be able to receive work in accordance with their education and special abilities.

The agreement provides for various measures for the transferred persons. All their outstanding taxes, insurance contributions and quotas of produce are annulled. All the farms allotted to transferred persons, both in Poland and in the Lithuanian SSR, are free of all State taxation and insurance contributions for two years. The transferred persons will receive a loan of 5,000 Zlotys or Rubles per farm for starting their farming and for other expenses. The loan is to be repaid in five years. If they give up their crops to the State, these crops will be returned to them in the same quantities, in the place to which they are transferred. The same applies to supplies of seed grain. They will receive payment for all live and dead belongings which they leave behind, except the land, in accordance with the respective laws of Poland and the Lithuanian SSR.

The Agreement was signed by E. Osobka-Morawski for the Polish Committee of National Liberation and by Gedvila, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars for the Lithuanian SSR.

No. 71

Telegram sent by Premier Mikolajczyk to Marshal Stalin through the good offices of Prime Minister Churchill, dated September 29, 1944

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER: In accordance with our today's conversation I hasten to forward to you the message to Marshal Stalin and would be most grateful for your own support of my appeal to him.

Yours sincerely,

(—) ST. MIKOLAJCZYK.

TO MARSHAL STALIN, *Moscow.*

YOUR EXCELLENCY: After 60 days relentless fighting against the common enemy the defenders of Warsaw have reached the limit of human endurance. General Bor reports that after the fall of the southern sector of resistance Warsaw can hold only for several days more. At this extreme hour of need I appeal to you, Marshal, to issue orders for immediate operations which would relieve the garrison of Warsaw and result in the liberation of the capital. General Bor has addressed the same appeal to Marshal Rokossovski.

(—) STANISLAW MIKOLAJCZYK.

No. 72

Note of T. Romer, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, of October 7, 1944, characterizing Soviet policy in reference to Poland

As a result of joint Allied military operations against Germany, victoriously conducted on three main fronts, in which Polish armed forces are taking active part, large areas of Polish territory have been gradually liberated from German occupation and the armed forces of one of the United Nations, the U. S. S. R., entered those areas advancing in pursuit of the common enemy.

I need hardly stress the sense of profound relief with which the Polish nation welcome the liberation of their native soil from the cruel German oppression. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that this feeling is being seriously disturbed by the series of unilateral acts accomplished on Polish territory by the Government of the U. S. S. R., in violation of the rules of International Law and more particularly of the principles by which the United Nations are being guided.

The Polish Government who have not ceased to do their utmost to reach a Polish-Soviet understanding, which could effectively put an end to the present deplorable state of affairs, deliberately avoided to the present any public discussion on the subject. Nevertheless, they cannot allow that this conduct on their part, instead of facilitating an understanding, should constitute an encouragement for the continuation and perpetuation of illegal acts or be regarded as acquiescence with these acts.

For this reason and further to the formal reservations formulated in each case as to the legality of unilateral facts accomplished to the detriment of Poland during the course of the present war, I have the honour, acting on instructions of the Polish Government, to bring to

the notice of the United States Government the actual position and the opinion thereon of the Polish Government in view of their interest in bringing about a Polish-Soviet understanding, will give due consideration to these matters, which may not only gravely impair but altogether frustrate the chances of an understanding.

* * * * *

Authoritative declarations made by the representatives of the British Government as also the joint declaration made by the United Nations and known as the Atlantic Charter, leave no doubt whatsoever that no unilateral territorial changes will be recognised by the United Nations as legally binding. The Government of the U. S. S. R. adhered to this principle by signing the Atlantic Charter. They expressly recognised as null and void all agreements previously concluded with the German Reich (Art. 1. Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941) concerning the territories of the Polish State. Apart from this Government of the U. S. S. R. declared explicitly in a Note presented to the Polish Embassy in Kuibyshev on December 1, 1941, that in their opinion: “* * * the question of the frontiers between the U. S. S. R. and Poland has not been settled and will be subject to a settlement in the future * * *.”

Contrary to the above-mentioned declarations, the Soviet Government are treating the territories incorporated with the Soviet Union in 1939 as their own state territories and are introducing thereon their own administration and their own economic and social institutions. According to information received by the Polish Government a regular conscription to the Red Army of men between the ages of 18-52 is being carried out in these territories. This is the third call-up to be carried out by the Soviet authorities in these territories. The first took place in the Spring of 1940 and the second in the Spring of 1941, involving a total of about 150,000 men.

Furthermore, the Lithuanian, White Russian, and Ukrainian Soviet Union Republics, acting obviously in accordance with instructions of the Government of the U. S. S. R., have concluded agreements with the so-called Polish Committee of National Liberation, on the basis of which an exchange of population on the territories under their administration is being carried out. On the other hand, the relevant agreements do not cover the repatriation of the Polish citizens deported into the interior of Russia in 1939-41, which seems to indicate that in this case the Soviet Government had a purely political effect in view. In this way they are attempting by means of accomplished facts and unilateral decision to change the traditional ethnographical face of these territories by arbitrarily moving masses of millions of people. It would be impossible to exaggerate the calamity inflicted on this population by the expulsion from their ancestral homes of a large mass of people who have already endured the afflictions of the last five years and their settlement in new places of domicile while the war is still going on.

The Polish Government are not in a position to ascertain what demarcation line the Soviet Government have laid down between the areas administered by the Soviets and the Committee of National Liberation respectively as no authoritative document, decree or announcement dealing with the matter has been made public. Apart from these

obscurities the indisputable fact remains that the Soviet Government have carried out a new partition of Poland and consequent upon it are creating facts, on the strength of their own decisions.

* * * * *

Another part of Polish territory regarded even by the Soviet Government as indisputably Polish State territory has been bequeathed by the Soviet Government with a puppet administration under thinly veiled Soviet leadership. In order to give the impression that this administration represents the Polish nation, the Polish Worker's Party, which used to be a member of the Comintern and is the successor of the Polish Communist Party, founded the so-called National Council of the Homeland in German-occupied Poland in January 1944. On July 21st, 1944, the Council appointed an executive body under the name of the "Committee of National Liberation," most of whose members are members of the Polish Worker's Party or trusted Comintern men who had been active in that capacity in Poland, Russia, Austria and Czechoslovakia before 1939. The Committee also includes Soviet citizens who are members of the highest Soviet authorities.

Immediately on its formation the Committee was given the support of the Soviet Government which concluded an agreement with it on July 26th, 1944, authorising the Committee to take over the administration of the territories of the Polish State liberated from the German occupation. This agreement was not preceded, as happened in all similar cases, by consultations with any Allied Government. In principle it is modelled on the lines of the Russo-Czechoslovak Agreement of May 8th, 1944. Furthermore, the Committee and the Soviet Government exchanged representatives, and the Soviet representative, characteristically enough, takes part in the deliberations of the Committee.

The National Council of the Homeland and the Committee of National Liberation, taking advantage of the support given them by the Soviet Government, are creating further accomplished facts by which they are gradually assuming the attributes of the legal Polish Government. In its resolution of September 11th, 1944, the National Council of the Homeland arrogated to itself the prerogatives of both Houses of the Polish Parliament, the Sejm and the Senate. The Council declared in that resolution that the Chairman of the Council would carry out the duties of the President of the Republic. During the same session a decree was passed setting out the political administrative organisation, based on "parish councils" (parish soviets), "district councils" and "provincial councils" ("town councils" in the towns)—a decree in fact modelled strictly on the Soviet administrative system and entirely opposed by the Western democratic system of separating political authority from local autonomous bodies. Among other decrees the one on agricultural reforms should be mentioned which provides for the formation of local commissions composed, as the resolution puts it (see Soviet Home Service, August 8, 1944 and the UPP in Moscow, August 19, 1944) "of the broadest political and economic elements in the village" which the Committee obviously desire to turn in due course into a convenient political tool of the new regime in the same way in which the "workers-peasants committees" were used in Russia in 1917-18 and in the Polish provinces occupied by the Soviets in 1939-41. Further "decrees" too cut deeply into the legal and economic structure of the Republic—f. i. the decree on the issue of treasury notes for one thousand million zloty.

Simultaneously with the formation of the "Polish Committee of National Liberation" a decree was issued on July 21st, 1944, in which it declared that it was: "assuming the authority over the Polish Army in the U. S. S. R. and amalgamating the Polish People's Army and the Polish Army in the U. S. S. R. into one force," and appointing a new staff to command it. The Committee then called up the age-groups 1921-24, motor mechanics up to the age of 40, doctors and veterinary surgeons up to the age of 50 and N. C. O.'s of the reserve and of secret military organisations and officers on active service and on the retired list up to the age of 60.

It is worth mentioning here that out of the eleven generals of the newly created Polish Army nine were formerly officers either of the Red Army or of the N. K. V. D. and that a considerable number of staff positions are also held by the Soviet officers.

The formation of the National Council of the Homeland, the Polish Committee of National Liberation and the Supreme Command of the Polish Army is tantamount to the Soviet Government taking over the attributes of Polish state sovereignty through the medium of Polish Communist elements and of Soviet citizens of Polish descent.

In connection with these acts of the Soviet authorities it may be noted that:

a) The Committee takes over the administration of territories liberated from German occupation approximately west of the frontier laid down in the Soviet-German Agreements of September 28 and October 4, 1939, i. e. territory to which the Soviet Union made no claims.

b) The Committee was formed on territory occupied by Soviet forces. Its formation took place not only with the knowledge of the Soviet authorities but the Soviet Union gave it official recognition in the Agreement of July 26th, 1944. The fact that a Soviet representative has been appointed to the Committee, the agreements made with the Committee concerning the taking over of the administration and the exchange of population leave no doubt that the Soviet Government intend in future to transform that Committee into a Government subservient to themselves.

c) It is true that the Committee has not yet assumed the title of Government but its organization is modelled on that of a normal government. Moreover, the Committee is declaring that the so-called National Council of the Homeland is "the sole legal source of authority in Poland." The Committee gives no reason—since it is not in a position to do so—why the so-called National Council of the Homeland should be the legal source of authority in Poland, but the bare statement enabled the Council to arrogate to itself the rights of the Sejm (Diet) and the Senate of the Polish Republic with all the legal consequences resulting therefrom. The Committee considers itself the Polish Government de facto, even though a provisional one. The term "provisional" is used in another description of the Committee: "The legal and provisional executive authority."

d) The Committee has declared that "the emigré Government in London and its agency in Poland are illegal" and stated that it does not recognise the Polish Underground Organisation and intends to break it up and to use repressive measures against its members—those men, who, with the support of the British and American Governments have for nearly five years risked their lives in the struggle against the

German authorities and garrisons of occupation in Poland, thus assisting the war effort of the United Nations to the utmost of their power. In accordance with this announcement the "Council" issued a decree on September 11th, 1944, outlawing the Underground Army in Poland.

e) The Committee has also published its political, economic and social programme and is already putting it into practice in the territories which are being gradually occupied by Soviet forces. It is also forming under its aegis local administration bodies modeled on Soviet organisations.

f) In the light of the above there cannot be any doubt that with the approval of the Soviet Government facts have been accomplished on Polish territories designed to impose on the Polish nation an illegal administration which in no way reflects the will of the nation, contrary to repeated assurances of Marshal Stalin that he is striving to rebuild an independent Poland and that he does not intend to interfere in Poland's internal affairs. The enterprises carried out in Poland represent obviously violations of the independence of the Polish State.

* * * * *

In bringing the above facts to the notice of the United States Government I have the honour to state that the Polish Government regard as devoid of all legal validity and in no way binding on them the unilateral facts accomplished by the U. S. S. R. Government in respect of the territories and the sovereignty of the Polish Republic, either directly or through the so-called Committee of National Liberation, as also the agreements concluded with this committee and the measures enacted on the strength of these agreements. These facts are a violation of the stipulations of International Law and of the principles proclaimed by the United Nations and in particular a violation of the rights of the Polish Republic and her legal Government.

The Polish Government trusts that the United States Government will take all opportune measures in order to prevent further developments of a situation which presents a direct and imminent threat to the independence of Poland.

If the matter were left in its initial stage without an effective reaction on the part of the United States Government, it may add considerably to the difficulties of its subsequent settlement. With the further advance of Soviet troops into Poland, the Soviet Government might become more deeply involved in a policy the initial act of which has been the formation of the so-called Committee of National Liberation. Moreover, there cannot be any doubt that the existing state of affairs may seriously hinder the organisation and maintenance of peace in Europe.

No. 73—Encl. 1

Minister T. Romer's Report on the Second Journey of Premier Mikolajczyk to Moscow (October 10-22, 1944)

(19 enclosures contain the minutes of conversations and conferences based on notes of Minister T. Romer)

The delegation consisted of:

Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, Chairman of the Council of Ministers

Tadeusz Romer, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Professor Stanislaw Grabski, Chairman of the National Council

General Stanislaw Tabor, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces

Colonel Stanislaw Nowicki
Counsellor Jozef Zaranski
Counsellor Aleksander Mniszek
Marceli Karczewski

TIMETABLE

Tuesday, October 10, 21,25 hours: Departure from Paddington Station in London.

Wednesday, October 11, 1,10 hours: Takeoff in a special York plane from airfield in Swindon.

Wednesday, October 11, 7,50 hours: Landing in Malta.

Wednesday, October 11, 10,10 hours: Takeoff from Malta.

Wednesday, October 11, 15,40 hours: Landing on airfield in desert near Cairo. We proceed to the suburban residence of Lord Moyne near the Pyramids, accompanied by Envoy Zazulinski. Before dinner, we are visited by the British High Commissioner for the Middle East, Lord Moyne, and the Commander of the Allied Forces in the Near East, General Sir Bernard Paget.

Thursday, October 12, 0,50 hours: Takeoff from Cairo.

October 12, 12,15 hours: Landing in Moscow. On the airfield we are greeted by Mr. Jackiewicz, the representative of Protocol of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and Colonel X, representative of the department of foreign relations in the People's Commissariat for Defence, as well as Millard, the personal secretary of Minister Eden, and Crosthwaite, first secretary of the British Embassy in Moscow. We proceed from the airfield to Hotel Metropol, where the Soviet Government accommodated the Polish Delegation.

Thursday, October 12, 17,00-19,00 hours: Conversation between Premier Mikolajczyk and Minister Romer with Minister Eden and Ambassador Clark-Kerr at the British Embassy: They inform us of the friendly atmosphere in which agreement was already reached in the course of the British-Soviet talks on Balkan affairs, they announce for tomorrow the meeting of the Moscow Conference on Polish affairs with our participation and without the participation of representatives from the Lublin Committee, and foresee that the main difficulty will be the matter of the 1935 Constitution.

Friday, October 13, 11,00 hours: We are visited by American Ambassador Harriman who, in the course of an hour-long conversation, informs us of the political atmosphere in Moscow, expressing a conviction that the exceptional opportunity which constitutes the presence here of Churchill and Eden is the last and sole chance to reach agreement on Polish questions, which should be exploited, since the influences of the KWN are slowly but constantly gaining ground in the liberated parts of Poland.

Friday, October 13, 15,00 hours: A brief welcoming visit of Mikolajczyk, Romer and Grabski with Molotov at the Kremlin. (Report.)

Friday, October 13, 15,30 hours: Romer with Eden at the Embassy, to advise him of the conversation with Molotov and once more to make a formal reservation against the presence of representatives of the KWN at today's meeting of the Moscow Conference, which, in a telephone call this morning to Mniszek from the Protocol of the Narkomindel, was indicated, though later withdrawn. Eden explains that in accordance with the previously established programme, the meeting with us is called for 17,00 hours and with the Committee sepa-

rately for 22,00 hours. A joint meeting is anticipated only after the bases of an agreement are reached between the Polish and Soviet Governments.

Friday, October 13, 17,00–19,50 hours: Session of the Moscow Conference devoted to Polish affairs: Memorandum of the Polish Government, the establishment in Poland of a new Polish Government, the matter of the future frontiers of Poland. (Detailed report: Enclosure No. 2.)

Friday, October 13, 22,00 hours: Session of the Moscow Conference regarding Polish affairs continues, this time without the Delegation of the Polish Government but with the participation of representatives of the Committee of National Liberation: Bierut, Osubka-Morawski, Zymierski.

Saturday, October 14, 11,30–14,00 hours: At the British Embassy, conversation of Prime Minister Churchill with Premier Mikolajczyk, participants on the British side: Minister Eden, Ambassador Clark-Kerr, Harvey and secretaires, and on the Polish side: Professor Grab-ski, Minister Romer and Counsellor Zaranski. Churchill strongly insists that we accept without delay conditions regarding frontiers, which were brought forth the day prior to the Conference, and argues their necessity and benefits for Poland; on meeting with opposition from the Polish side, he himself drafts a proposal of a Soviet-British-Polish agreement which contains the expressed consent of the Polish Government to the Curzon Line as a basis for the Polish-Soviet frontier, in return for definite guarantees of the Soviet and British Governments of the territorial accessions in favor of Poland in the north and west and the removal from there of the German population. Provision is also made for the taking over of the administration of the liberated areas of Poland by a united Polish Government in Poland and the establishment between it and the Soviet Government of friendly relations and co-operation, while leaving untouched the relations of Poland with other countries. (Text: Enclosure No. 3.) Premier Mikolajczyk takes this proposal for consideration and opinion, before Churchill submits it on his own behalf to Stalin. (Zaranski's report from the conversation: Enclosure No. 4.)

Saturday, October 14, 15, 30–17,00 hours: At the residence of Prime Minister Churchill, conversation with the same persons present as before except for Eden. Premier Mikolajczyk gives material and formal reasons for the impossibility of acceptance by us of the Curzon Line as a solution to the frontier problem. The conversation becomes extremely violent on Churchill's part, who goes so far as to threaten to leave the Polish Government to its own fate and even to break off all relations with it and give notice to terminate the hospitality which it enjoys in London, if it persists in a refusal which harms not only Poland's own interests but also those of the allied powers and prolongs the war. Premier Mikolajczyk maintains calmly his negative position. The deliberations are interrupted by Churchill's departure for a talk with Stalin. (Zaranski's report: Enclosure 5.)

Saturday, October 14, 22,00 hours–Sunday, October 15, 1,30 hours: At the British Embassy, conversation between Eden, Clark-Kerr with Mikolajczyk and Romer, together with Harvey and two British secretaries. Eden reports the result of Churchill's talk with Stalin of the same evening. Stalin expressed agreement in principle to the proposal submitted to him, demanding only that the following words be stricken

out: * * * "subject to their right to discuss minor adjustments at the armistice or peace conference * * * ", which limited the consent of the Polish Government to the Curzon Line as basis for the future eastern frontier. Premier Mikolajczyk motivates and upholds our refusal: both sides undertake a thorough discussion of their respective arguments in a calm and friendly manner. With regard to Professor Grabski's concept, that it is more proper to treat the Polish territorial concessions in the East as our response to the granting to Poland of some accessions in the north and west, and not the opposite, with no diminution in the overall area of Poland as a result of this war, upon suggestion of the Ambassador, Eden, on his own responsibility, instructs the secretaries to rephrase in that sense, during the conversation, Churchill's proposal. This results in the second text of the proposal (Enclosure No. 6), which we take with us for further study and opinion. (A separate report from this conversation was not prepared.)

Sunday, October 15, 10,00-12,00 hours: The drawing up of the Polish comments on and amendments to the second version of the British proposal. Among the thirteen points, the two most important deal with:

Consideration of the Curzon Line with the exclusion of the eastern "Malopolska", where the so-called Line "B" would apply, leaving with Poland Lwow and the oil region; also, immediately after signing the agreement, the resumption of diplomatic relations between the Soviet and Polish Governments; the latter would be reorganized in Poland on a broader basis founded on the five main political parties. (Enclosure No. 7.)

Sunday, October 15, 12,30-14,00 hours: At Churchill's residence, conversation in which on the Polish side participate: Premier Mikolajczyk and Minister Romer, and on the British side: Prime Minister Churchill, Minister Eden, Ambassador Clark-Kerr, Harvey and secretaries. Churchill considers the second version of the British proposal as better than the first and expresses readiness to defend it before Stalin. Mikolajczyk submits in writing the Polish amendments, adding that in reply to Churchill's reproach of yesterday that he is afraid to assume unto himself the responsibility for a necessary decision, he has agreed to accept it, but within the limits outlined in our counter-proposal. The joint reviewing of its particular points proceeds aptly and calmly. Only when it comes to the question of Lwow, Churchill becomes again excited and renews his reproaches and threats of yesterday, to which Mikolajczyk retorts no less energetically and firmly. When after a prolonged, excitable and extremely unpleasant discussion, which the embarrassed British bystanders witness in dead silence, Mikolajczyk maintains his refusal to change his attitude, Churchill cancels his afternoon visit with Stalin and leaves us without bidding good-bye, stating that everything between us is finished. Mikolajczyk bids his good-bye to Eden without a handshake. (A separate report of this conversation was not prepared.)

Sunday, October 15, 15,30-17,30 hours: At the British Embassy, a conversation on Eden's initiative, in which apart from him, participate Messrs Mikolajczyk, Romer, Clark-Kerr and Harvey. Eden attempts to find excuses for the rough behaviour of Churchill towards us, vindicating it by his extremely vital concern with the Polish problem in view of the general international situation, and his deep conviction

that he best defends in that way the essential interests of Poland. There follows a long, calm and friendly discussion to the point, during which both sides once more analyse and reason their own points of view. When this does not lead to anything definite, Premier Mikolajczyk, on departing, suggests the idea of reverting again to the attempt of submitting to the Russians the Curzon Line as a line of demarcation. He adds that Professor Grabski will also attempt personally to convince Molotov on the need for the Soviet side to relinquish its demands towards Lwow and the oil region and asks that Churchill take it up in that sense with Stalin. Eden explains that Churchill might be prepared to do so, but only on condition that in the case of Stalin's refusal, he shall be authorized to submit to him the consent of the Poles to a third revision of the British proposal, which would partly take into consideration the Polish amendments, though with the exclusion of the most important ones, which he hands to us. (Enclosure No. 8.) In view of Premier Mikolajczyk's refusal, Eden promises again to influence Churchill in order to induce him to an unconditional intervention with Stalin. (A separate report from this conversation with Eden was not prepared.)

Sunday, October 15, 17.00-17.40 hours: At the Kremlin, a private conversation of Professor Grabski with Molotov. Earnest argumentation on general political and factual aspects concerning the leaving of Lwow and the oil region with Poland meets with counter argumentation, which disregards realities, and a definite refusal on the part of Molotov. (Professor Grabski's report: Enclosure No. 9.)

Monday, October 16, 11.30-12.15 hours: Minister Romer with the American Ambassador Harriman, hands him Premier Mikolajczyk's letter of October 16, asking for an explanation of contradictions between statements imputed by Molotov at the session of the Moscow Conference on October 13, to have been made by President Roosevelt at the meeting of the Big Three in Teheran, concerning the Curzon Line, and those which the President himself made to Mikolajczyk in April in Washington. (Enclosure No. 10.) Harriman, who in the next few days leaves for Washington, promises to take the letter and to deliver it personally. He himself declares that Molotov acted in a disloyal manner and wrongly presented the President's remarks. The Ambassador did not take immediate exception to it, since he attends the Conference merely as an observer, and this matter threatens an American-Soviet incident, and the loss by the President of a million votes in the election. The Ambassador is therefore sincerely grateful to Premier Mikolajczyk for his tactful restraint from taking up this question directly at the Conference. Romer submits to the Ambassador the extremely difficult situation in which we have found ourselves as a result of the Soviet territorial demands and British pressure and inquiries if we may in this matter count on some support from the American side. The Ambassador refers to the election period in the United States and, purely privately, recommends that even later one should not overestimate the possibility of an active American intervention in European territorial affairs; he sees, however, much greater chances of an active interest by the American Government in the defence of the independence and sovereignty of Poland in the event of Russia's violation of the agreement, the conclusion of which he strongly recommends, without going into its merits, but

arguing that each delay can only worsen the situation of the Polish Government, both in Poland and abroad.

Monday, October 16, 12,30-13,00 hours: At the British Embassy, conversation in which Eden, Clark-Kerr, Mikolajczyk and Romer participate. Eden informs that, in view of Churchill's temporary indisposition yesterday evening, it fell to him to substitute for him in the conversation with Stalin concerning Lwow. Despite a fervent British appeal Stalin remained unbent to Eden's arguments, stating that he absolutely cannot yield in that matter, but he is prepared in other matters to give proof of his good will, in the same manner as he has done towards Great Britain in Balkan problems. Mikolajczyk informs Eden of Grabski's failure in his analogous attempts with Molotov. Eden invites us for an afternoon talk with Churchill, who, after having had fever during the night, feels much better.

Monday, October 16, 15,30-16,30 hours: In Churchill's residence, conversation in which he, Eden, Clark-Kerr and Harvey participate, and on the Polish side: Mikolajczyk and Romer. Churchill, self-possessed, calm and politely friendly, mentions the failure of Eden's intervention with Stalin, according to our wishes, concerning Lwow, and adds that he himself is prepared to renew it once again, even today, personally, though he does not believe that in the present state of affairs this step will have any effect. In agreement with Eden, he resolved to undertake a new effort to propose to Stalin, in order to prevent the collapse of the talks concerning the Polish problems, so undesirable to all, to accept the Curzon Line as a demarcation line between Poland and the USSR. Premier Mikolajczyk gratefully accepts this idea, though he does not hide that he realizes that it may become an important precedent for the ultimate settlement of the frontier question. In view of this, we proceeded to discuss in a factual way, the fourth version of the text of the British proposal. Eden explained that, fearing the Germans may intensify their resistance in the event of a public disclosure of our agreements, he must insist that it should not be taken as a foregone fact that the whole line of the Oder, together with the inclusion of Stettin, becomes the western frontier of Poland, but rather that we revert to the previous formula, which left this matter to the wishes of the Polish. Mikolajczyk stressed that this had the disadvantage of shifting to us the odium of the decision, which, on our part, must mean that the greater the sacrifices that await us in the east, so the further we have to go to the west. Churchill, not sharing Eden's reservation, expressed readiness to take upon himself the responsibility for an open solidarity with Stalin's position, even in the matter of Stettin, although it might cost more sacrifices in the war. Having adopted the conception of the Curzon Line as the line of demarcation, the passage which weakened the Polish consent and which made reservations for a ratification by Parliament, was taken from the text. Eden suggested, to simplify the proposal and facilitate the agreement in its initial stage, to eliminate, for separate negotiations and agreements, our additional demands concerning restitution of national and cultural monuments, the evacuation of Soviet troops from Poland, and the participation of Polish troops in the occupation of Germany. The participation of the United States in the agreement is considered by Churchill and Eden as very desirable, but, at present, it must be excluded. The formal guarantee by Great Britain of the independence and sover-

eighty of Poland within the new frontiers constitutes, in the political and legal sense, a precedent which it is impossible to consider for the time being. However, the British Government consents to a formal agreement concluded separately between us, for the extension of the British-Polish alliance, for the same period of time as that for which a Polish-Russian alliance would be concluded. As a result of the conversation (of which a separate report had not been made), we were handed the fourth version of the British proposal (Enclosure No. 12), which Churchill had undertaken to submit to Stalin in his conversation even this very day.

Monday, October 16, 21,45-22,30 hours: At Churchill's residence, the same persons are present as before. Churchill informs us that he had a two-and-a-half hour talk alone with Stalin, in a very friendly and constructive atmosphere. Despite the strong insistence of Churchill, who pointed out the whole difficulty of the problem for the Polish side, Stalin demanded unconditionally that two basic amendments be made in the British proposal, namely: 1) in the sentence: "In consideration of the foregoing agreement, the Polish Government accept the Curzon Line as the line of demarcation between Poland and the U. S. S. R." in place of "line of demarcation" "basis for the frontier": 2) instead of the sentence: "It is agreed that a Polish Government of national unity under Prime Minister Mikolajczyk will be set up at once in the territory already liberated by Russian arms", the sentence: "It is agreed that a Polish Government of national unity, in accordance with the agreement (or understanding) reached between the Polish Government in London and the Polish Committee of National Liberation in Lublin, will be set up at once in the territory already liberated by Russian arms." In deleting the name of Premier Mikolajczyk, Stalin assured Churchill that he upholds without reservation his sole candidacy. Churchill understands that these changes may be unacceptable to us. Then we would have to return to London, avoiding publicity of the failure, and there, try further to overcome the difficulties, in which the British Government offers its full assistance. In any case, the greatest discretion is necessary. Nevertheless, Churchill strongly advises that we reconsider the immediate acceptance of Stalin's amendments, because he believes that a delay may bring us only harm, and that Stalin is indeed prepared to meet us in all other matters. For his part, Churchill promises the strongest support in the matter of the Polish Government in Poland, his establishing of and dealing with it. Premier Mikolajczyk reminds how far and with what good will he has already proceeded in the conversations, and explains that now the acceptance of the Soviet proposal would be impossible for him, both in the formal and material sense. It would not be in the best British or Soviet interests to extort from the Polish Premier such a consent, which would expose him to the disavowal of Polish public opinion and ostracism. Churchill and Eden beg Premier Mikolajczyk nevertheless to think it over till tomorrow. Churchill fervently stresses his sympathy and benevolence towards Poland, and apologises for his earlier over-impulsive outburst towards us, hoping that we shall not hold against him the temperament with which he gave expression to his concern, with the best of intention, with the fate of Poland. Upon assurances by Mikolajczyk, the conversation which was con-

ducted in an excellent atmosphere, ends. (A separate report was not prepared.)

Tuesday, October 17, 12,00–13,00 hours: At the British Embassy, conversation in which the participants are : Eden, Clark-Kerr, Mikolajczyk and Romer. Premier Mikolajczyk advises and states the reasons for his decision to return to London in order to agree with the Polish Government on further line of conduct, in the hope that this will make possible an understanding with the USSR and an early return to Poland. Before his departure, however, he intends to talk once more alone with Stalin, in order to clarify the prospects and conditions for the establishment and operation of a new government in Poland, also purely privately with Mr. Bierut, for a similar purpose. He would like to be able to count upon a determined support of the British Government in these matters. Eden promises this and declares that he shall immediately report this conversation to Churchill, together with an explanation, and already today, support our position before Stalin and Molotov. (A separate report of this conversation: Enclosure No. 13.)

Tuesday, October 17, 16,00 hours: Visit to Ambassador of Mexico Quintanilla.

Tuesday, October 17, 17,00 hours: Premier Mikolajczyk talks alone with Mr. Bierut, at tea in the Gran Hotel. (At another table Mr. Mniszek with Major Raugiewicz, Bierut's chief of the military cabinet.) Explanation of causes for the failure to take place of our joint deliberations—thrice announced—with the Committee and the participation of the Russians (Molotov) and the British (Eden), the matter of the Curzon Line, to which, as Bierut informs—the representatives of the KWN have formally agreed at the session of the Moscow Conference with them on October 13, the political and economic situation in areas administered by the KWN, the need of aid from abroad, the attitude of the KWN to the memorandum of the Polish Government, and the possibility of creation by Premier Mikolajczyk of a new Polish Government in Poland, the matter of the Constitution. (Report by Premier Mikolajczyk from this conversation: Enclosure No. 14.)

Tuesday, October 17, 17,00–19,30 hours: Minister Romer pays a visit to the Italian Ambassador in Moscow, Pietro Quaroni. An exhaustive conversation on the internal and external situation of the USSR, on the international situation and on Italian and Polish affairs. (A report was not prepared.)

Wednesday, October 18, 11,00–12,30 hours: Premier Mikolajczyk and Minister Romer with American Ambassador Harriman. The Premier informs him in detail of the last stage of the conversation on Polish matters and of his plans, asking him to advise President Roosevelt about it. He indicates that he shall forward his analysis of the political situation as a result of the meeting of the Moscow Conference of October 13, with which he made Eden and his colleagues familiar during a talk from the 14th to 15th October. (Letter to Harriman on this matter: Enclosure No. 15.) Harriman repeats the information communicated to Minister Romer on October 16, concerning the statement made by President Roosevelt at the Conference in Teheran. (A separate report of this conversation was not prepared.)

Wednesday, October 18, 16,30 hours: The Canadian Ambassador to Moscow pays us a visit.

Wednesday, October 18, 18,00–19,07 hours: Premier Mikolajczyk's conversation with Marshal Stalin at the Kremlin, in the presence of Mniszek and Pawlow as interpreters. Premier Mikolajczyk once more appeals for a change in the Soviet attitude toward Lwow and the oil basin. Stalin refuses. Discussed against the background of the proposed Polish-Soviet understanding, the possibilities of an independent Polish foreign policy and the conditions for the creation of a new Polish government in Poland, and also the participation of Poland in the occupation of Germany. It was provided that in the event that Premier Mikolajczyk agrees upon his further plans in London, he will be given the opportunity to go to Lublin for further political exploration, without any formal obligations. (Mniszek's report of this conversation: Enclosure No. 16.)

Wednesday, October 18, 18,00 hours: The Apostolic Administrator in Moscow, O Braun, visits Minister Romer and holds with him a longer conversation, concerning the situation of the Churches in Russia and the activities of foreign charitable societies in the USSR. (No separate report was prepared.)

Wednesday, October 18, 19,15–19,45 hours: At Churchill's residence, Premier Mikolajczyk pays him and Eden a visit to inform them on his conversations with Stalin and Bierut. Churchill and Eden, who immediately afterwards were to attend a farewell banquet given by Stalin, indicate that they will strongly stress to him that Premier Mikolajczyk must have a free hand in the selection of the new Polish Government in Poland, and that only under such conditions can such a Government court upon recognition by the western democracies. (Premier Mikolajczyk's report from this conversation: Enclosure No. 17.)

Thursday, October 19, 10,30 hours: Churchill and Eden depart by plane from Moscow.

Thursday, October 19, 11,30–11,45 hours: Farewell visit of the Polish Delegation at the British Embassy with Ambassador Clark-Kerr. He informs us of the favorable impression gained by Churchill and Eden during yesterday's farewell banquet on Stalin's attitude concerning the formation by Premier Mikolajczyk of a Polish Government in Poland.

Thursday, October 19, 11,55–12,05 hours: Farewell visit of the Polish Delegation with Molotov at the Kremlin. Upon the wish of Premier Mikolajczyk, Molotov confirms agreement to his return at any time to Moscow, and agrees also to communication from London through the Soviet Embassy, as well as to the establishment of an intelligence contact with Soviet military representatives in London, on matters concerning the activities of the Home Army under the German occupation. (Report from this conversation: Enclosure No. 18.)

Thursday, October 19, 13,00 hours: Our departure from Moscow by plane did not take place because of the late hour.

Friday, October 20, 10,30 hours: Takeoff from Moscow by a special York plane.

Friday, October 20, 15,15 hours: Landed at airfield near Symferopol in Crimea.

Saturday, October 21, 13,00 hours: Takeoff from Crimea.

Saturday, October 21, 7,05 hours: Landed at airfield Cairo-west.

Saturday, October 21, 12,45 hours: Takeoff from Cairo.

Saturday, October 21, 18,45 hours: Landed at Castel Benito near Tripoli.

Sunday, October 22, 7,30 hours: Takeoff from Castel Benito.

Sunday, October 22, 15,30 hours: Landed in London.

No. 73—Encl. 2

The Conference in Moscow

Talks on Polish subjects on Friday, October 13th, 1944 from 5 to 7: 50 p. m. in the "Spiridonovka" Palace of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

Those present were:

The Soviet Delegation: Marshal Stalin, Foreign Commisar Molotov, Soviet Ambassador in London Gusev, interpreter Pavlov, and two secretaries.

The British Delegation: Premier Churchill, Foreign Secretary Eden, British Ambassador in Moscow Clark Kerr, an interpreter.

The Polish Delegation: Premier Mikolajczyk, Foreign Minister Romer, Chairman of the National Council Grabski, interpreter Mniszek.

American Observer: U. S. Ambassador in Moscow Harriman, Secretary of the U. S. Embassy.

When we arrived at 5 o'clock we already found the British Delegation waiting in the white drawing room. Premier Churchill, in the uniform of an army colonel, looked in good health and spirits. Shortly afterwards Marshal Stalin arrived with his colleagues, he was clad in a field uniform without decorations; he greeted everyone cordially and as other members of the conference were coming in, he told Churchill through an interpreter that the Soviet forces had captured Riga and that several German divisions had been cut off in Hungary. Churchill congratulated him upon the success. They both admired a great mural painting representing the scene of the signing of the Anglo-Soviet alliance.

At the invitation of Molotov, who is acting as host, we all go to the conference hall at the other end of his luxuriously appointed house. In the middle of the hall there is a great round table; on each of its sides are small tables for secretaries. After a moment's polite hesitation Churchill took his place to Stalin's right, Molotov and Gusev and Harriman to his left. Mikolajczyk with Grabski to his right and Romer to his left sat facing Stalin. To their left was the British Ambassador and Eden. The interpreters sat next to the heads of the delegations.

Stalin and Molotov spoke in Russian with Pavlov translating into English. Churchill spoke English with the interpreter of the British Embassy translating. Premier Mikolajczyk spoke Polish, and occasionally English, with Mniszek translating into Russian sentence by sentence and the British interpreter translating from Russian into English.

The Conference was open at 5:10 by Molotov who acted as unofficial chairman. He mentioned those present, including "our Polish guests" whose names he referred to without their official titles. He pointed to Premier Mikolajczyk as the initiator of the Conference and suggested that therefore he should be first to put forward his point of view.

Mikolajczyk thanked Stalin and Molotov for their hospitality and expressed his gratitude to Churchill for not forgetting us although he was so far away.

He began his speech by describing the Polish Memorandum which in his opinion was the best solution of the Polish-Soviet difficulties. He emphasized that he took into account the fact that the Soviet Government had signed an agreement with the Polish Committee of National Liberation on the day before the Polish Delegation had arrived in Moscow for the first time, and the prestige of the Government which had signed it.

The Memorandum dealt with the fundamental problems; the international relations between Poland and the USSR and the Polish internal situation. When asked by Molotov, Mikolajczyk explained that he was speaking of the Memorandum of the Polish Government of August 29th, delivered in London to Ambassador Lebedev. It was my intention—he continued—for the whole Polish Nation thus to take part, as it were, in the understanding with Russia.

He then proceeded to describe in brief the memorandum point by point. At the first point which dealt with the formation of a new government after the liberation of Warsaw, Stalin intervened that the text which was received by the Soviet Government speaks of the liberation of Poland and not of her capital. This was probably a cypher mistake made by the Soviet Embassy in London, because Eden confirmed that he had the correct text. Churchill solved the difficulty by suggesting that this discrepancy should be noted and that Premier Mikolajczyk should continue.

When reference was made to the evacuation of Polish territory by the Soviet Forces as soon as hostilities have ended, Churchill inquired whether it had been taken into consideration to secure lines of communication for the Soviet forces, which will be occupying Germany. Mikolajczyk replied in the affirmative.

He ended his long speech by emphasizing that the memorandum was sent to the Polish Underground authorities and approved unanimously by all political parties.

STALIN asked whether there existed in Poland political parties under German occupation and when Mikolajczyk replied in the affirmative he inquired whether the approval of the parties was obtained on the basis of a published document and whether meetings and public conferences were convened in this connection.

MIKOLAJCZYK explained that the decision of the parties had to be taken in the course of the heaviest fighting for Warsaw, and that the memorandum was not published in full but a detailed precis was given by the Premier in a press interview.

STALIN expressed his doubts concerning such methods of approval, to which

MIKOLAJCZYK replied: I know that Marshal Stalin before he became the great leader of his nation knew how to contact his followers in the underground effectively in a similar way.

STALIN. Excuse me, my practice at the time when we were hiding underground from political persecution was entirely different. During that period we held 6 conferences, 6 congresses, 12 meetings and 20 to 25 conferences of the Central Committee of the Party where the programme was approved.

MIKOLAJCZYK. I always looked with great admiration to these methods of underground warfare and today it is with the same admiration that I treat the 5 years of work and combat and methods of liaison of my friends and colleagues of the underground. I want once more to emphasize that in my opinion and in the opinion of other members of the Polish Government our memorandum is the best way of uniting all the forces of the Nation in a programme of Polish-Soviet friendship and co-operation.

CHURCHILL suggests that either now or later there should be a discussion on the verbal comments laid before the Soviet Ambassador together with the memorandum and which, in his opinion throws an interesting light on its contents.

MIKOLAJCZYK is under the impression that he had included this aspect in his analysis of the memorandum.

STALIN stated that he had not received the commentaries in question and asked for details.

GRABSKI [in Russian]. When I was presenting, on instructions of the Polish Government the memorandum to Lebedev for further transmission to Moscow, I made some verbal comments on its subject, which evidently interested him because he called a stenographer, with my consent, who took them down in shorthand.

In particular I spoke of the necessity of the new Government in Poland being appointed by the Polish President. So long as the greater part of Poland is occupied by the Germans there is no legal means of changing the Constitution or of electing a President.

The Constitution of 1935 is by no means dear to us. Many of us, including myself opposed it vehemently just as we did the Pilsudskiytes.

The person of the President is not of importance in this connection; he has, as a matter of fact, recently changed his successor.

What is however of importance is the legal procedure which is to facilitate a Polish-Soviet agreement. I also spoke of the importance of co-operation between our two nations not only during the war but also, and especially after it when Central Europe will have to be made safe from the danger of a German revenge.

CHURCHILL. I can thus see that these verbal comments were a development of the memorandum itself which in my understanding, provides a basis for a compromise between the Polish Government and the Committee of National Liberation. For example the fact that the Polish Workers' Party is to be included among the five parties which are to form the future Government in Poland does not surely imply an intention to diminish the Committee's part in such a Government.

MIKOLAJCZYK. I am a realist. I realise that the fusion of the Government and the Committee would be impossible. One has therefore to go deeper and to seek support among the political parties.

The Polish Government is based on the four principal parties. The Committee I believe is based on one, although it claims to have a wider basis. It would be useless to quarrel about it. It will suffice to base the Government on the five principal parties each of which would receive a fifth of the ministries, as suggested by the memorandum.

CHURCHILL. That is not how I understood the matter. I thought that it would be necessary to seek a more equal proportion between the Government and the Committee. We could now fix the numerical ratio.

I imagined that the general agreement for which we are now working would be concluded between the Polish and the Soviet Governments, while its application would be arranged between the Polish Government and the Committee of Liberation.

I also understood that Premier Mikolajczyk and his colleagues would be prepared to discuss the problem of a new constitution with the Soviet Government and with the Committee. I say this, because I think that the memorandum is only the basis for discussion.

I should like to know whether I have understood M. Mikolajczyk correctly.

MIKOLAJCZYK. The actual state of affairs is such: the Soviet Government have concluded an agreement with the Committee. The Polish Government are recognised by the British, American and other governments. These discrepancies should be brought to a common denominator.

The memorandum envisages the participation in a new government of the representatives of both parties. Thus a new government would be constituted which would be recognised by all of the three principal powers.

CHURCHILL. So the memorandum is the best basis for discussion?

MIKOLAJCZYK. The memorandum is the best solution that we have been able to find.

STALIN. In my opinion the Polish memorandum has two important defects which may make an understanding impossible.

The first of them is that it ignores the Committee of National Liberation. How can one ignore such a fact and how can one close one's eyes on reality. Mr. Mikolajczyk should know that the Committee is carrying out an important task in liberated Poland. Recently there took place there conferences of the Socialist and the Peasant parties in the course of which important practical problems were discussed and the opinion of the Liberation Committee was taken into account. Who ignores these facts is against an understanding.

An analysis of the present situation on the Polish sector shows that there is either no Government in Poland or else that there are two, which amounts to the same thing. For this reason a Government must be formed on the basis of a compromise between the two authorities which claim to be the Government.

Another defect of the memorandum is that it does not settle the problem of the Eastern frontiers of Poland on the basis of the Curzon Line. If you want to have relations with the Soviet Government you can only do it by recognising the Curzon Line as the principle.

On the other hand what I find that is good in the memorandum is the scheme which it contains for future Polish-Soviet relations. That part of the memorandum merits the approval of everybody who desires good relations between Poland and the USSR. It is a matter, however, which concerns the future but we must also consider the present.

A weak point in the memorandum is its treatment of the constitution of which Professor Grabski has spoken. Personally I think that the Polish constitution of 1921 is better than the constitution of 1935. But this should not be an obstacle in the way to improving Polish-Soviet relations. In the long run it is an internal Polish problem.

CHURCHILL. I see a gleam of hope in what Marshal Stalin has just said because I understand that the Polish Government desires a

friendly understanding with the Committee and the memorandum is no obstacle in its way.

As regards the frontier problems, I must declare on behalf of the British Government that the sacrifices made by the Soviet Union in the course of the war against Germany and its effort toward liberating Poland entitle it, in our opinion, to a Western frontier along the Curzon Line. I said so several times to my Polish friends in the course of last year.

I also understand that the Allies will be continuing the struggle against Germany in order to obtain in return for the Polish concessions in the East an equal balance [Mr. Churchill first said "full compensation" and then corrected himself] in the form of territories in the North and in the West, in East Prussia and in Silesia including a good sea coast, an excellent port in Danzig and valuable raw materials in Silesia.

It will be a great country, not quite the same as the one designed at Versailles but constituting a real and solid structure in which the Polish Nation will be able to live and develop in security, prosperity and freedom. Britain attaches the greatest importance to this problem. If I were to take part in the Peace Conference, that is if I should still enjoy the confidence of the Government and of the Parliament, I should use the very same arguments.

MIKOLAJCZYK. Marshal Stalin stated that our memorandum ignored the existence of the Committee of National Liberation. To a certain extent this is true, but to a certain extent it is not.

Please bear in mind that during five years the Polish Government has struggled to create quite a substantial army, navy and air-force which have fought with distinction on all the fronts of the West, the South and on distant seas.

STALIN. That I appreciate.

MIKOLAJCZYK. For five years the Polish Government has also been organising an underground army in Poland. But you, Marshal Stalin, ignore this particular Government and recognise the Committee.

STALIN. I do not ignore it as far as a compromise is concerned. And the memorandum makes no mention of the Committee at all.

MIKOLAJCZYK. Because it goes down to the very foundations on which both the Government and the Committee are based. I should also like to quote certain details over which the press has been silent but which were broadcast by the Lublin radio and which concerned the meetings referred to by Marshal Stalin.

Among the names which were cited in this connection there was not one which belonged to anyone who I know for certain is at present in those parts. For example the Conference of the Peasant Party mentioned Bartnicki, who only joined the party recently and Antoniuk of whom no one had ever heard before. The Conference sent greetings, telegrams which every one present here would agree to sign; they contained a message of welcome to the Red Army who are coming as liberators and they expressed the desire for a free Poland, free to settle her own fate.

CHURCHILL. I can't understand anything.

STALIN. Mr. Mikolajczyk evidently wants to deny that the Conferences took place in Lublin.

MIKOLAJCZYK. Not at all.

STALIN. That is good.

Mikolajczyk quotes a telegram which he himself received from a Conference of the Peasant Party in Lublin.

STALIN. This information was publicly denied.

CHURCHILL. I think that we have more important things to discuss.

MIKOLAJCZYK. I agree, but I want to add one observation. On the liberated Polish territory good things and bad things are happening.

STALIN. I think that is the case everywhere. [Smiles among those present.]

MIKOLAJCZYK. I think it would be a better thing if we did not receive telegrams about arrests and deportations. [Stalin is silent.]

And now as regards the Curzon Line. In this matter I disagree both with Premier Churchill and with Marshal Stalin. I cannot decide this problem for the decision lies with the Polish Nation: you would form a very bad opinion of me were I to agree to ceding 40 percent of the territory of Poland and 5 million Poles. Were I to concede it would seem that what the Polish soldier and the soldier of the Home Army was shedding his blood for the politician has sold.

STALIN. It is Ukrainian territory and a non-Polish population which is in question.

MIKOLAJCZYK. The population of the whole territory amounts to 11 million. The soldiers of the Polish Army and of the Polish Home Army are fighting in the hope that they will return to their homes which I am asked to give away.

Were I to do so, I should lose all the confidence I enjoy. It would not serve the Polish-Soviet understanding well, and it is for that understanding that I am working.

STALIN. But you do not seem to notice that a million and a half Ukrainians are fighting for these territories in the ranks of the Red Army. The Ukraine and White Ruthenia have suffered for this reason even more than Poland. Mr. Mikolajczyk does not think of this, he would like to incorporate these territories and by that he proves that he is an imperialist.

MIKOLAJCZYK. I bow my head before the heroism of the Soviet soldiers, but, as a Pole I remember above all else that Poland has lost 5,000,000 men murdered by the Germans in the course of this war.

CHURCHILL. We recognise Poland's sufferings but in order to bring them to an end a new Government will have to be created which would receive the recognition of all the principal United powers. If that is not done, further suffering and sacrifices will not be avoided.

STALIN. Quite correct.

CHURCHILL. What should be done, then?

MIKOLAJCZYK. I think that the solution lies in an understanding between the three principal powers and in a generous conciliatory gesture on the part of the Soviet Union. If I am asked to cede 40 percent of our territory and not to demand guarantees of our independence, then * * *

STALIN [interrupts]. Who is it that threatens the independence of Poland? Is it perhaps the Soviet Union?

MIKOLAJCZYK. I ask for full independence, for the return of all Poles to Poland and for free work for everybody.

CHURCHILL. I thought that we had come to an agreement regarding the return of the population and its exchange.

STALIN. Of course.

MIKOLAJCZYK. But the facts are different. All the Governments of the liberated countries of Europe were able to return with the one exception of the Polish Government.

CHURCHILL. It is the result of the absence of the understanding for which we are now working. And as a matter of fact not all Governments has as yet returned to their countries. Heavy and hard fighting is still in progress, and will still be for some time on all the European fronts.

I had hoped that Mr. Mikolajczyk would have been in a position to state that he recognises the fact that the British Government support the Soviet Government in their proposals concerning the new Eastern frontiers of Poland. The Poles may deplore this, but it is an important fact. We do not ask Mr. Mikolajczyk to come forward with the initiative for a Polish recognition of the new frontiers but to consider that this is a matter of a new home for the Polish Nation.

As far as I understand Marshal Stalin desires just as we and our American friends do a sovereign, strong and independent Poland and of course friendly towards the Soviet Union, though I admit that such feelings cannot be in practice unanimous.

STALIN [interrupts]. Quite true. The Russians not only say so but are actually helping towards this end.

CHURCHILL. Were we not to reach an understanding in respect of the frontiers I should not be in a position to maintain my efforts any further. I feel it is Russia's attitude that Poland should again arise free, independent and sovereign, and that this is her attitude not because she feels strong but because she considers that she is right.

But no Government could suffer an unfriendly attitude on the part of a neighbour if it had been through what Russia has in this war. [Stalin nods in approval.]

I really do not know what would be the best solution to this problem. Perhaps Mr. Mikolajczyk could make a statement concerning the frontiers which would be acceptable to the Soviet Government, but I am afraid that in such a case he would be denounced in the following day by the Polish public opinion which supports him. He could perhaps state that for practical purposes the Polish Government accept the frontier solution but that they reserve the right to appeal in this matter at the peace conference. I do not know whether this would be acceptable to both parties.

MIKOLAJCZYK. Some time ago I suggested a line of demarcation but I did not imagine that today we were to undertake a new partition of Poland.

STALIN. I am against a partition of Poland but you, on your part want to carry out a partition of the Ukraine and of White Ruthenia.

MIKOLAJCZYK. I have heard public declarations concerning the partition of Poland but I have so far heard nothing of a partition of Germany.

CHURCHILL [after having whispered something to Eden]. We have discussed this and the problem of Germany was to be settled here but we avoided any publicity which would only have the result of stiffening resistance.

MOLOTOV. Quite correct.

CHURCHILL. I do not wish to avoid replying to this question. I only appeal to Mr. Mikolajczyk to make a great effort on his part to help the British Government in their endeavour.

Though badly prepared, Britain came into the war to save the Polish Nation from destruction. I think that our duty will have been fulfilled if as a result of this war a great, free, sovereign and independent Poland will arise and will take the whole nation under its wing.

Our attitude is as follows: the Curzon Line, as the Eastern frontier of Poland and in the West and in the North a change of frontiers for Poland's benefit. I do not think in this state of affairs it would be in the interest of the Polish Government to estrange themselves from the British Government.

In the course of this war we were a hair's breadth from defeat: a sword hung over our necks. We have therefore the right to ask the Poles for a great gesture in the interest of European peace. [He turns to Premier Mikolajczyk] I hope that you will not hold against me these unpleasant but frank words which I have spoken with the best of intentions.

MIKOLAJCZYK. I have already heard so many unpleasant things in the course of this war that one more will not let me lose my balance.

MOLOTOV. I should like to add a few words about what was discussed in Teheran on the subject of Poland. All those who took part are here today with the exception of President Roosevelt. I should like to repeat what he declared and if I am inexact I hope that the other witnesses will correct me.

I can quite well remember that President Roosevelt said that he fully agreed to the Curzon Line and that he considered it to be a just frontier between Poland and the Soviet Union; he thought, however, that for the time being it would be advisable not to give publicity to his view. We can therefore draw the conclusion that the Curzon Line does not only correspond with the attitude of the Soviet Government but it has also the concurrence of all of the three great powers. I wanted to emphasize this as Mr. Mikolajczyk referred to the attitude of the three powers.

MIKOLAJCZYK. And may I learn what was decided in Teheran with regard to the Western frontiers of Poland?

MOLOTOV. The opinion was that the line of the Oder was just. I do not remember anybody objecting.

CHURCHILL. I also agreed.

EDEN. The formula in Teheran was that the new frontier of Poland in the West would go as far towards the Oder as the Poles would wish. [All concur.]

CHURCHILL. In East Prussia, the territories earmarked for Poland extend to the west and south of Königsberg. Would a new united Polish Government accept the Curzon Line, on these conditions, as the de facto Eastern frontier with the reservation that the matter will be settled finally at the Peace Conference. I must add that I have not yet had the opportunity to discuss this suggestion with the Soviet Government.

MIKOLAJCZYK. I have no authority to make such a declaration.

CHURCHILL. I have not in mind a solemn declaration but a working formula. I do not want to expose Mr. Mikolajczyk to an immediate denouncement by Polish public opinion, but all the same I think that such a settlement would best help to create a united Polish Government.

MIKOLAJCZYK. Even the Committee of National Liberation has recently announced publicly that they have not lost hope that Lwow may be saved for Poland—and I am asked to be put into a worse condition by being made to agree to the Curzon Line.

STALIN. We do not use Ukrainian soil for barter. The rumour you quoted is without foundation.

CHURCHILL. My attitude should not be given such a ruthless interpretation as the Poles have given it. Danzig is certainly not worth less to Poland than Lwow. Does not Marshal Stalin think that it would be better now to interrupt our discussion and to give the Poles time to think the matter over?

STALIN. I should only like to declare that we Russians also speak of including in Poland not only Danzig but also Stettin.

CHURCHILL. Of course.

STALIN. We have all sympathy for this project.

CHURCHILL. So has the British Government. [He turns to Premier Mikolajczyk.]

Please consider this in all seriousness. The problems are to us of the greatest importance:

1. acceptance of the Curzon Line as the de facto Eastern frontier of Poland with the right of a final discussion of the matter at the Peace Conference; and

2. a friendly agreement with the Committee of National Liberation on the subject of forming a united Polish Government which in time could undergo such modifications as circumstances would require.

I think this would be the best solution in this final phase of the war. If before taking a decision Mr. Mikolajczyk would like to talk to me or Mr. Eden, we are of course at his disposal.

On my part I consider these two matters as the most important.

ROMER. Are we to understand that Mr. Churchill's suggestion has also the support of the Soviet Government?

STALIN [who has been standing for some time while all the others were sitting]. In order that the whole matter may be quite clear and that there may be no doubts I want to state categorically that the Soviet Government cannot accept Premier Churchill's formula concerning the Curzon Line. [Churchill makes a gesture of disappointment and helplessness.]

I must add the following correction, as far as we are concerned, to this formula:

The Curzon Line must be accepted as the future Polish-Soviet frontier. One cannot keep changing the frontier for the social and economic organisations are different here and different in Poland. We have collective farms which we introduce in all our lands, and Poland has the system of private property of land. If in these conditions we start questioning to whom certain territories belong it will only increase the suffering of the population.

That is why, just as in the case of Roumania and Finland, we aim at determining a definite frontier with Poland. This is a source of surprise among many of our foreign friends but it is, in our opinion, the only just solution of the problem in view of the difference of our economic systems.

With the rest of Premier Churchill's statement I fully agree.

I repeat once more: The Curzon Line as the basis of the frontier. In its definite delimitation I agree, of course, to certain corrections for local reasons which may move the frontier 3 or 4 [he corrects himself], 6 or 7 miles one way or the other.

MIKOŁAJCZYK. May we be told what is actually considered as the Curzon Line?

CHURCHILL. We shall let you have a map showing it.

MIKOŁAJCZYK. Is the Curzon Line identical to the demarcation line introduced in 1939?

STALIN. No, not by any means. The Curzon Line gives you Białystok, Łomża and Przemysł.

Thus ended the conference.

No. 73—Encl. 3

British draft of an understanding in the Polish problem in Moscow: First redaction Drafted personally by Churchill in the British Embassy on October 14, 1944

In view of the declaration made to them in Moscow by the Soviet Government and His Majesty's Government, the Polish Government accept and undertake to recommend to their parliament the Curzon Line as defined by those Governments as the basis for the frontier of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, subject to their right to discuss minor adjustments at the armistice or peace conference and provided that the necessary measures be taken for the transfer of all persons wishing to change their allegiance in accordance with their freely expressed wishes, and provided that the free city of Danzig, the regions of East Prussia west and south of Königsberg, Oppeln-Silesia, and the lands desired by Poland to the East of the line of the Oder be added to Poland and their possession guaranteed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty's Government. It being also understood that the German populations of the said regions shall be repatriated to Germany and that all Poles in Germany shall at their wishes be repatriated to Poland.

It is agreed that a united Polish Government will be at once set up in the territory already liberated by Russian arms.

The Soviet Government take this occasion of reaffirming their unchanging policy of supporting the establishment within the territorial limits set forth of a sovereign independent Poland, free in every way to manage its own affairs and to make a treaty of durable friendship and mutual aid with a Polish Government established on an anti-Fascist and democratic basis.

The treaty and relationships established with other United Nations will be unaffected by this settlement all parties to which declare again their implacable resolve to wage war against the Nazi tyranny until it has surrendered unconditionally.

No. 73—Encl. 4

Conference of Prime Minister Mikolajczyk with Prime Minister Churchill at the British Embassy in Moscow, held on October 10, 1944, from 11:30 A. M. to 2 P. M.

Present:

On the Polish side:

Prime Minister Mikolajczyk,
Minister Romer,
Professor Grabski,
J. Zaranski

On the British side:

Prime Minister Churchill,
Foreign Minister Eden,
Ambassador Clark Kerr,
Oliver Harvey,
Denis Allen

Before the arrival of Prime Minister Churchill, Minister Eden summarizes briefly the events of the sitting held last night. Osobka-Morawski made a propaganda speech on the economic and social "benefits" brought to Poland by the Committee. He dwelled mainly upon the land reform, stating that the principles of the land reform were based on individual ownership system. Prime Minister Mikolajczyk explains the true situation.

Then Mr. Eden reiterates Stalin's declaration that Stalin is not interested in the Polish Constitution and for that reason the difficulties in this matter will appear lesser than was previously anticipated. Finally, Mr. Eden informed [them] that he had received a document from Mr. Osobka-Morawski which Mr. Osobka-Morawski defined as directives of the Polish Government for the people, instructing them about behavior toward the Committee and the Soviet authorities. Mr. Eden hands this document over to Mr. Mikolajczyk after some hesitation. The Prime Minister, after reading it, remarks that these directives seem to him quite reasonable and just.

Mr. Eden made it known that, following Mr. Churchill's instruction, Ambassador Clark Kerr notified Stalin of Mr. Churchill's desire of holding a conference with him *tete-a-tete* on Poland and that this conference would take place probably at four o'clock p. m. The Polish position should be explained before this conference takes place.

Prime Minister Churchill arrived at 11:45 and started expounding his view.

He said the following:

"It is the crisis of the fortunes of Poland. No such opportunity will ever return and the damage done would be irreparable if we lose today the chance of agreement. Everything hinges on one thing: the eastern frontier of Poland. If this is settled and announced, in one or two sentences, then agreement can be reached easily. How near we got

at the beginning of the year. If you had come to an agreement with the Russians at that time, you would not have had today those other people. They are going to be a frightful nuisance to you. They will build up a rival Government and gradually take over authority in Poland. Fighting will begin with the Russians siding with the rival Government. I shall tell Parliament what I have agreed with Stalin and what His Majesty's Government's attitude is. When you have a victorious army behind you, there is quite enough to make a show, especially when the others will be liquidated. They have unlimited means to do this. Therefore you must never leave Russia, but must go to Poland and form a united Government there. Our relations with Russia are much better than they have ever been. I talked to General Anders the other day to whom I took great liking. He entertains the hope that after the defeat of Germany the Russians will be beaten. This is crazy, you cannot defeat the Russians.

I beg you to settle upon the frontier question. You must take responsibilities. If you reach a formula with me I'll go to Stalin at 4 P. M.

What is there else beside the frontier question? It means compensation in the west and the disentanglement of populations. If you agree on the frontier then the Russians will withdraw the support from the committee. When I criticized the Lublin Poles last night Stalin on many occasions supported me. You are really dealing with Russia. The word "basis" is very helpful; we were nearly at it in January. If you do not agree now that means that you are going to use again the "Liberum Veto" which shattered the independence of Poland. What does it matter supposing you lose the support of some of the Poles? Think what you will gain in return! Ambassadors will come. The British Ambassador will be with you. The Americans will have an Ambassador the greatest military power in the world. You *must* do this. If you miss this moment everything will be lost."

Answering this long argument of Prime Minister Churchill, *Prime Minister Mikolajczyk* said that he had been thinking over all night the questions discussed during yesterday's conference. It follows that the decisions of Poland's problems were taken up at the Teheran Conference, and now the only thing that remains is for the Polish Government to place its signature upon them. The Prime Minister's personal decision is a different question and it is still a different decision of those who collaborate with the Prime Minister and support him. Firstly, we should have to decide to deprive ourselves of the Polish territory, and secondly we should have to agree to join the Committee. Although Stalin declared that he was not interested in the Polish Constitution, there still remains the problem of the independence of the rest of Poland.

MR. CHURCHILL (interrupts). There are other Powers involved in the settlement.

MR. MIKOLAJCZYK. Should I sign a death sentence against myself?

MR. EDEN. If the formula on the Curzon Line is agreed upon, then it will be possible to gain from Stalin full guarantees of the independence of Poland.

MR. MIKOLAJCZYK. The problem of frontiers is of such a nature that all the Polish people should express their opinion.

Mr. CHURCHILL. Had Pilsudski lived, things would take a different turn. Although I had no opportunity to meet him, I cherish great respect for his person and I am convinced that "if he had not died, Beck would not have done what he did with the Czechs."

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. Coming back to the frontiers question, states that Stalin declared that the Curzon Line must be the boundary line between Poland and Russia.

Mr. CHURCHILL (angrily). I wash my hands off; as far as I am concerned we shall give the business up. Because of quarrels between Poles we are not going to wreck the peace of Europe. In your obstinacy you do not see what is at stake. It is not in friendship that we shall part. We shall tell the world how unreasonable you are. You will start another war in which 25 million lives will be lost. But you don't care.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. I know that our fate was sealed in Teheran.

Mr. CHURCHILL. It was *saved* in Teheran.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. I am not a person completely washed out of patriotic feeling, to give away half of Poland.

Mr. CHURCHILL. What do you mean by saying "you are not washed out of patriotic feeling"? 25 years ago *we* have reconstituted Poland although in the last war more Poles fought against us than for us. Now again we are preserving you from disappearance, but you will not play. You are absolutely crazy.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. But this solution does not change anything.

Mr. CHURCHILL. Unless you accept the frontier you are out of business forever. The Russians will sweep through your country and your people will be liquidated. You are on the verge of annihilation.

Mr. EDEN. Supposing we get an understanding on the Curzon Line, on all the other things we will get agreement from the Russians. You will get a guarantee from us.

Mr. CHURCHILL. Poland will be guaranteed by the three Great Powers and certainly by us. The American Constitution makes it difficult for the President to commit the U. S. In any case you are not giving up anything because the Russians are there already.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. We are losing everything.

Mr. CHURCHILL. The Pripet marshes and 5 million people. The Ukrainians are not your people. You are saving your own people and enable us to act with vigour.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. If we are going to lose independence, must we sign this?

Mr. CHURCHILL. You have only one thing to do. It makes the greatest difference if you agree.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. Would it not be possible to proclaim that the three Great Powers have decided about the frontiers of Poland without our presence?

Mr. CHURCHILL. We will be sick and tired of you if you go on arguing.

Mr. EDEN. Could you say that in view of the declaration made by the British and Soviet Governments you accept a *de facto* formula, under protest if you like, and put the blame on us. I quite see the difficulty of saying it of your own volition.

Mr. CHURCHILL (coming back to the question of consolidation of the Government with the Committee). I might get better than fifty-fifty. I think I ought to get 60:40. It is your fault that the Lublin

Poles have come into existence. With regard to the frontiers think what you get in Silesia.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK explains that the eastern territories do not contain mere marshes and non-arable land. On the contrary. The province of Tarnopol, for instance, has the most fertile soil among all the provinces. On the other hand, Eastern Prussia is a poor country, full of lakes and marshes.

Mr. CHURCHILL. If you accept the frontier the USA will take a great interest in the rehabilitation of Poland and may grant you a big loan after this war. At any rate I will try to get for you the best possible solution.

Mr. CHURCHILL leaves the room to draw up a declaration.

Mr. ROMER. Two months ago Stalin said to us that we can postpone the frontier issue.

Mr. EDEN. Stalin is not interested in the Constitution. The only thing he talked about is the Curzon Line. The Russians will drop the other things. We could endlessly argue, everybody stating his case. We could try the other way, get first an agreement with the Committee.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. We lose all authority in Poland if we accept the Curzon Line, and furthermore nothing is said about what we could get from the Germans.

Mr. EDEN. I think we could do this, we could take this risk. We could say what you are going to get.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. The only way out is: the three Powers announce their decision and we make a formal protest. A government which wants to retain authority with its people cannot give up territory. Stalin put forward two conditions: 1. the Curzon Line, 2. recognition of the Committee.

Mr. EDEN. Prime Minister Churchill intends to offer Stalin the Curzon Line in exchange for his concession in matters of the Committee and Constitution. If you reject agreement now, then all people in Poland will rally around the Committee because they will have nothing else to rally around.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. cites Lenin's utterances on Hungary, according to which the Soviet policy made a mistake in commencing to set up a Communist government there. On the contrary, a temporary leftist government should have been admitted, which would have paved the way for the assumption of government by the Communists.

Mr. EDEN. I quite realize that you cannot say it of your own.

Mr. ROMER translates the Polish draft into English.

Mr. EDEN. This is not acceptable, as it means that you would like to retain in the East everything you had before and to gain the territory up to the Oder.

Mr. ROMER explains that in the case of France and Belgium the allies do not claim the right for compensation in the form of a territorial cession in exchange for liberation of their countries from the Germans. Why then is this required from Poland?

Mr. EDEN. The Russians have a strong case on the Curzon Line, plus compensation for Poland in the West.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. But it may end that we shall have been cut off in the East and shall not have gained anything in the West.

Mr. EDEN. We could make a public pronouncement on that matter. There was no binding commitment at Teheran, but only an expression of opinion.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK explains what President Roosevelt told the Prime Minister on Poland's frontiers in June 1944 in Washington.

Mr. EDEN. The British War Cabinet decided over a year ago what their attitude is on that matter.

Mr. ROMER. It is the most important thing for Poland to be really in good relations with Russia and they cannot be built up upon the feelings of harm of the Polish people.

Mr. CHURCHILL (comes back with the draft of declaration). Before the draft was read he announced that he would have to phone London to get approval, as well as to Washington in order to get the explanation of the position of the United States before the declaration is signed. Publication at present of what it is intended to take away from the Germans in the East would arouse the German fury and this would cost many human lives. On the other hand if the agreement between Poland and Russia is not reached now, it would also cause victims in human beings.

Mr. CHURCHILL then reads the draft of his declaration and says that he intends to declare the following to Stalin: "If I can procure the agreement of the Polish Government to this, will you back it up and support it in the letter and in the spirit?" Churchill speaks further on: "If Stalin's answer is negative or unsatisfactory, and I doubt if it would be, you'll lose nothing, on the contrary you'll go back to London strengthened and will continue to have our support. If, on the other hand, Stalin thinks that it is all right, then I would put off the meeting with the Lublin Poles in the presence of Eden, Molotov and the representatives of the USA. You are bound to accept the decision of the Great Powers."

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK says that he cannot agree to the word "accept."

Mr. CHURCHILL (angrily and with a gesture of impatience). I take no interest in you.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK once again explains the reasons why he cannot express his consent to Churchill's formula.

Mr. CHURCHILL. Everything is in the word "accept."

On the question asked by Mr. Romer whether Prime Minister Churchill would agree to cede the British territory, Churchill answers: "I certainly would and be blessed by future generations if I were in your situation. Look what is the alternative? You are threatened with virtual extinction, you will be effaced as a nation."

At this moment Professor Grabski takes the seat near Churchill and expounds him in French his opinion on the solution of the Russo-Polish conflict. He begins with the statement that for thirty years he has been struggling for friendly relations between Poland and Russia. Professor Grabski explains the importance to Poland of Lwow and of the oil fields in particular and concludes with the expression of the view that the public opinion of Poland would not be able to understand and to agree to that paradox that Poland, who first opposed German aggression, would be diminished in her territory after the war.

Mr. CHURCHILL (ironically). Nothing can prevent Poland from declaring war on Russia once she is deprived of support by other Powers * * * What is public opinion? The right to be destroyed * * * I want to save the flower of the Polish nation * * *

Mr. CHURCHILL before he leaves addresses Mr. Mikolajczyk with sympathy and mentioning the Committee says: "I don't envy you. I took a considerable dislike to them."

The conference concluded a few minutes before two o'clock. The Polish delegation remained at the British Embassy to work on remarks with regard to the English project. These remarks were to be presented to Prime Minister Churchill before his conference with Stalin.

During the one hour break between 2:15 and 3:15 P. M. the Polish delegation was not able to elaborate in writing their reservations as to the British declaration. Ultimately it was agreed that the Polish side could not express their consent for the acceptance of the Curzon Line as a frontier between Poland and Russia and this decision should be conveyed orally to Prime Minister Churchill by Prime Minister Mikolajczyk.

No. 73—Encl. 5

Conference of Prime Minister Mikolajczyk with Prime Minister Churchill at Mr. Churchill's urban residence in Moscow, held on October 14, 1944, from 3:40 P. M. to 4:20 P. M.

Present:

On the Polish side:

Prime Minister Mikolajczyk,
Minister Romer,
Professor Grabski,
J. Zaranski.

On the British side:

Prime Minister Churchill.

The Polish delegation arrived at Mr. Churchill's urban residence in Moscow, situated in Markomindiel's "Osobniak" [private residence, mansion] Ostrowski Street, at 3:30 P. M. The forty-minute-long conference, which nobody else attended on the British side, was carried on by Mr. Churchill in a very violent mood.

Mr. CHURCHILL started with an announcement that he had not yet received an answer as to the meeting with Stalin. The Soviets replied that Stalin was "out of town" and that really means that Stalin takes a rest in the afternoon—as Mr. Churchill used to do.

Prime Minister MIKOLAJCZYK, answering Mr. Churchill's question, informs him that after a renewed consideration he cannot give his consent to the acceptance of the Curzon Line as a frontier for the reasons expounded several times. The Polish Government cannot determine the loss of nearly half of the Polish territory in the east without hearing the opinion of the Polish people, which is decisive for the government.

Mr. CHURCHILL. You are no Government if you are incapable of taking any decision. You are callous people who want to wreck Europe. I shall leave you to your own troubles. You have no sense of responsibility when you want to abandon your people at home, to whose sufferings you are indifferent. You do not care about the future of Europe, you have only your own miserable selfish interests in mind. I will have to call on the other Poles and this Lublin Government may function very well. It will be *the Government*. It is a criminal attempt on your part to wreck, by your "Liberum Veto", agreement between the Allies. It is cowardice on your part.

On the remark of Prime Minister Mikolajczyk that Prime Minister Churchill may set forth to Stalin his declaration as his project, toward

which the Polish Government will confine itself to sheer protest, Mr. CHURCHILL replies: "I am not going to worry Mr. Stalin. If you want to conquer Russia we shall leave you to do it. I feel like being in a lunatic asylum. I don't know whether the British Government will continue to recognize you."

Mr. Churchill then states with passion that Great Britain is powerless toward Russia. On Prime Minister Mikolajczyk's remark that the Polish Government must secure to itself the right to defend the interests of Poland at the peace conference, Mr. CHURCHILL replies: "You are not going to be in a better position at the peace conference. I cannot speak for the American Government. The USA is not represented here."

In the last war more Poles fought against us than for us. In this war what is your contribution to the Allied effort? What did you throw into the common pool? You may withdraw your divisions if you like. You are absolutely incapable of facing facts. Never in my life have I seen such people."

Mr. CHURCHILL then cites General Anders' words that "after the Germans' defeat we shall beat the Russians" and remarks with emphasis "You hate the Russians, I know you hate them."

On Minister Romer's remark that the presence of the Polish delegation here is the best proof that the reproach of hateful feelings of Poles towards Russians and their reluctance to achieve good relations with them is a lie, Mr. CHURCHILL reiterates with obstinacy: "You hate the Russians."

Mr. ROMER makes a statement that Prime Minister Churchill cannot expect that the Polish delegation within an hour undertake a decision determining the Polish consent to cede Eastern Poland to Russia and Mr. CHURCHILL several times with emphasis reiterates that he did not want to obtain from the Poles decisions of this kind by coercion at all but only a consent, not binding toward Russia, to accept the Curzon Line as a demarcation line for the future frontier between Poland and the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister MIKOLAJCZYK repeats his request that Mr. Churchill in his conference with Stalin should not refer to the Polish declaration as amounting to a definite acceptance of the British project of declaration by the Polish side, as it might frustrate the possibility of reaching an agreement. In connection with Mr. Churchill's remark that in this situation there is no reason for the Polish delegation to come back to London, Mr. Mikolajczyk states that because of the position taken by Prime Minister Churchill he himself understands very well that the Polish Government will not be able to stay in London any longer.

The conference is interrupted at 4:20 P. M. by Mr. Martin, Chief of Mr. Churchill's Secretariat, who announces that Marshal Stalin will receive the British Prime Minister at 4:30 P. M. Mr. Churchill leaves in haste, almost not saying good-bye. After a while the Polish delegation leaves also.

No. 73—Encl. 6

The British Draft of the Agreement on Poland in Moscow, Second Draft, Made upon the order of Mr. Eden in the British Embassy on October 15, 1944

The Government of the U. S. S. R. and His Majesty's Government, upon the conclusion of the discussions at Moscow in October, 1944,

between themselves and with the Polish Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, make the following declaration:

Upon the unconditional surrender of Germany the territory of Poland on the west will include the Free City of Danzig, the regions of East Prussia west and south of Königsberg, Oppeln-Silesia and the lands desired by Poland to the east of the line of the Oder. It is further agreed that the possession of these territories shall be guaranteed to Poland by the Government of the U. S. S. R. and H. M. G. It is also understood that the German populations of the said regions shall be repatriated to Germany and that all Poles in Germany shall at their wish be repatriated to Poland.

In consideration of the foregoing declaration, and upon the urgent advice of H. M. G., the Polish Government are prepared to admit the necessity of accepting the Curzon Line as the basis of the future Polish-Russian frontier, and undertake to recommend such a settlement to their Parliament. It is agreed that the necessary measures will be taken for the transfer of all persons of both countries desiring to change their allegiance in accordance with their freely expressed wishes.

It is agreed that a united Polish Government will be at once set up in the territory already liberated by Russian arms.

The Government of the U. S. S. R. takes this occasion of reaffirming their unchanging policy of supporting the establishment within the territorial limits set forth of a sovereign independent Poland, free in every way to manage its own affairs and to make a treaty of durable friendship and mutual aid with a Polish Government established on an anti-Fascist and democratic basis.

The treaty and relationship established with other United Nations will be unaffected by this settlement, all parties to which declare again their implacable resolve to wage war against the Nazi tyranny until it has surrendered unconditionally.

No. 73—Encl. 7

Counter-propositions referring to the British draft on Polish Affairs made and handed over to Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden in Moscow on October 15, 1944 (Refers to the second British draft)

POLISH OBSERVATIONS ON THE BRITISH DRAFT

1. Participation of the United States Government in the Arrangement, if only on the military plane, through General Eisenhower, is highly desirable. If the Arrangement is to be signed in London, on the basis of texts established in Moscow, American participation could be secured in the meantime.

2. to Par. 1. Instead of: "Polish Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs" insert: "Polish Government."

3. to Par. 1. Instead of: "make the following declaration" insert: "reached the following agreement."

4. to Par. 2. Instead of: "territory of Poland on the west will include the Free City of Danzig, the regions of East Prussia west and south of Königsberg, Oppeln-Silesia and the lands desired by Poland to the east of the line of the Oder" insert: "the northern and western frontiers of Poland will include the Free City of Danzig, the regions of East Prussia west and south of Königsberg, the Regency of Oppeln

in Silesia, and follow the river Oder from the point where it leaves the Regency of Oppeln to its estuary including the town and harbour of Stettin. A map showing the new frontier is enclosed herewith."

5. to Par. 2. Instead of: "German populations of the said regions shall be repatriated to Germany" insert: "Germans of the said regions shall be removed."

6. to Par. 3. Instead of: "the Curzon Line" insert: "the so-called Curzon Line, and in former Eastern Galicia the so-called Line "B".

7. to Par. 3. Add to last sentence: "Separate Polish-Soviet agreements will regulate the reciprocal transfer and the repatriation of the population of both countries, the release of persons detained, and the restitution of cultural, artistic and historical values situated in territories to be ceded by Poland to the Soviet Union".

8. to Par. 4. Instead of: "it is agreed that a united Polish Government will be at once set up in the territory already liberated by Russian arms" insert: "Upon the signature of the present agreement diplomatic relations will be reestablished between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government in London. The Prime Minister of this Government will thereupon proceed to the territory of Poland already liberated by Russian arms in order to effect the reconstruction of the Government based on the five main political parties, on democratic anti-Fascist lines. This new Government will function until the convocation of a Parliament elected by free and democratic vote, and will at once negotiate the envisaged agreements with the U. S. S. R.".

9. to Par. 5. Instead of: "durable friendship and mutual aid with a Polish Government established on an anti-Fascist and democratic basis" insert: "durable friendship and mutual aid with a Polish Government re-established in their homeland. On their part H. M. G. (and—if possible—the U. S. Government) will guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Poland within her new frontiers".

10. to Par. 6. Instead of: "the treaty and relationships established with other United Nations" insert: "the treaties and relationships existing between Poland and other countries".

11. Add: "On the cessation of hostilities all foreign troops will immediately be withdrawn from Polish territories".

12. Add: "Polish armed forces will take part in the occupation of Germany especially of her Eastern territories to be surrendered to Poland".

13. The prolongation of the Alliance between Great Britain and Poland will be dealt with by an exchange of letters between the respective Prime Ministers.

Moscow, *October 15th, 1944.*

No. 73—Encl. 8

British Draft of an understanding in the Polish problems in Moscow: Third redaction, Prepared by the British Embassy on Sunday, October 15, p. m.

The British and Soviet Governments, upon the conclusion of the discussions at Moscow in October, 1944, between themselves and with the Polish Government have reached the following agreement:

Upon the unconditional surrender of Germany the territory of Poland in the west will include the Free City of Danzig, the regions

of East Prussia west and south of Königsberg, the Administrative District of Oppeln in Silesia, and the lands desired by Poland to the east of the line of the Oder. It is further agreed that the possession of these territories shall be guaranteed to Poland by the Soviet and British Governments. It is understood that the Germans in the said regions shall be repatriated to Germany and that all Poles in Germany shall at their wish be repatriated to Poland.

In consideration of the foregoing agreement, and upon the urgent advice of His Majesty's Government, the Polish Government are prepared to admit the necessity of accepting the Curzon Line as the basis of the future Polish-Russian frontier, and undertake to recommend such a settlement to their Parliament. It is agreed that the necessary measures will be taken for the transfer of all persons of both countries desiring to change their allegiance in accordance with their freely expressed wishes.

Separate Soviet-Polish agreements will regulate reciprocal transfer and the repatriation of population of both countries, and the release of persons detained.

It is agreed that a Polish Government of national unity under Prime Minister M. Mikolajczyk will be set up at once in the territory already liberated by Russian armies.

The Soviet Government take this occasion of reaffirming their unchanging policy of supporting the establishment within its territorial limits set forth of a sovereign independent Poland, free in every way to manage its own affairs, and their intention to make a treaty of durable friendship and mutual aid with the Polish Government which it is understood will be established on an anti-Fascist and democratic basis.

The treaties and relationships existing between Poland and other countries will be unaffected by this settlement, the parties to which declare again their implacable resolve to wage war against the Nazi tyranny until it has surrendered unconditionally.

No. 73—Encl. 10

Letters of Prime Minister Mikolajczyk to the American Ambassador Harriman

Moscow, 16th October 1944.

MR. AMBASSADOR: I learned with the shock of surprise from Mr. Molotov's statement at the meeting on October 13th that at the Teheran conference the representatives of all the three Great Powers had definitely agreed that the so-called Curzon Line should be the frontier between Poland and the Soviet Union.

In this connection I should like to recall that during the conversations which I had the honour to have with the President in Washington in June 1944, I was told that only Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill had agreed on the Curzon Line. In particular, the President indicated that the policy of the U. S. Government was contrary to the settlement of territorial problems before the end of the war. The President said that at the Teheran Conference he had made it clear that he held the view that the Polish-Soviet conflict should not be settled on the basis of the so-called Curzon Line and he assured me that at the appropriate time he would help Poland to retain Lwów, Drohobycz and Tarnopol and to obtain East Prussia, including

Konigsberg, and Silesia. On the other hand, the President expressed the view that Marshal Stalin would not give his consent to the return of Wilno to Poland.

I would be most grateful to you, Mr. Ambassador, if you could help to clear this misunderstanding on a subject of such vital importance to Poland.

Accept, Mr. Ambassador, the expression of my high consideration and esteem.

(—) ST. MIKOLAJCZYK.

His Excellency

The Hon. AVERELL HARRIMAN,

*United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union,
Moscow.*

No. 73—Encl. 12

The British Draft of Agreement on Poland in Moscow—The Fourth and the Last Draft made at Mr. Churchill's residence in Moscow on October 16, 1944, in the afternoon

The British and Soviet Governments, upon the conclusion of the discussions at Moscow in October, 1944, between themselves and with the Polish Government, have reached the following agreement:

Upon the unconditional surrender of Germany the territory of Poland in the West will include the Free City of Danzig, the regions of East Prussia west and south of Konigsberg, the Administrative District of Oppeln Silesia and the lands desired by Poland to the east of the line of the Oder. It is further agreed that the possession of these territories shall be guaranteed to Poland by the Soviet and British Governments. It is understood that the Germans in the said regions shall be repatriated to Germany and that all Poles in Germany shall at their wish be repatriated to Poland.

In consideration of the foregoing agreement, the Polish Government accept the Curzon Line as the (+) line of demarcation (÷) between Poland the U. S. S. R.

Separate Soviet-Polish agreements will regulate reciprocal transfer and the repatriation of the population of both countries and the release of persons detained. It is agreed that the necessary measures will be taken for the transfer of all persons of both countries desiring to change their allegiance in accordance with their freely expressed wishes.

It is agreed that a Polish Government of national unity (') under Prime Minister Mikolajczyk (') will be set up at once in the territory already liberated by Russian arms.

The Soviet Government take this occasion of reaffirming their unchanging policy of supporting the establishment, within the territorial limits set forth, of a sovereign, independent Poland, free in every way to manage its own affairs, and their intention to make a treaty of durable friendship and mutual aid with the Polish Government, which it is understood will be established on an anti-Fascist and democratic basis.

The treaties and relationships existing between Poland and other countries will be unaffected by this settlement, the parties to which declare again their implacable resolve to wage war against the Nazi tyranny until it has surrendered unconditionally.

* * * * *

Stalin during a conference with Mr. Churchill on October 16 demanded replacing

1. (÷)—(÷) with the words: "basis for frontier" and
2. (')—(') with the words: "in accordance with the agreement (or understanding) reached between the Polish Government in London and the Polish Committee of National Liberation in Lublin."

No. 73—Encl. 13

Conference at the British Embassy on Tuesday, October 17, hours 12-1¹²

Attended: Mr. Eden, Mr. Clark Kerr, Mr. Mikolajczyk and Mr. Romer.

Prime Minister Mikolajczyk reminds the conference that he left London not having received exact information as to the topic of the Moscow conferences, as well as not having received the Soviet answer to the memorandum of the Polish Government. The conferences held up to today affirmed that the Soviet Government absolutely makes an agreement dependent on the condition that our side consents to the Curzon Line without any change whatsoever, as well as on this further condition that the Committee of the National Liberation takes part in the formation of the new Polish Government in Poland. It is clear that the Prime Minister has no authority in this respect. He does not avoid undertaking decision and responsibility. He proved it in consenting to the Curzon Line on the condition that Lwow and the oil fields would remain in Poland according to the so called line "B" in Galicia, as well as having consented to the Curzon Line as a line of demarcation. In both cases it extended far beyond our position taken up to now. The Soviet Government refused both these suggestions. Now if the Prime Minister would follow British suggestions and accept the Soviet proposals, he would expose himself to a sure and immediate repudiation before he would be able to reach London. It would result in a complete chaos in the Government and in the Army and it would not be possible to improve it in the future. Consequently the consent by the Prime Minister here on the spot at Moscow would only superficially contribute to the agreement so ardently desired by Mr. Churchill. It would in fact confuse everything and frustrate the endeavors of Mr. Mikolajczyk. If the Polish people have to agree with the boundary solution which is forced upon us, the people cannot be taken by surprise and must be prepared for it. For this purpose the presence of the Prime Minister in London even for a short time is indispensable. It cannot be denied that it is not good to leave Moscow now because such opportunity as now, when Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden are simultaneously present here will not happen again, and in addition every delay may involve new fait accompli and new complications. However, it does

¹² Written by Minister Romer from his own minutes.

not change the arguments cited above. The Prime Minister understands his present departure for London not as a breach of negotiations but on the contrary as a continuation of efforts in preparation for an agreement even in the way of the hardest sacrifices on our part. The Prime Minister wishes, however, to have a sincere conference with Stalin *tete-a-tete* before he leaves Moscow and to ask him several clear questions leading to the explanation of whether and what, if any, real chances exist for the creation, with Stalin's indispensable backing, of a new government in Poland in conditions securing her real independence and sovereignty. It is the most decisive moment for the undertaking of a decision which we shall have to reach in London. The Prime Minister wishes also to have a private and extensive conversation with Mr. Bierut in order to ascertain his opinion and intentions on these matters. He understands well that the prestige of the Soviet Government, which made an agreement with the Committee of the National Liberation, may require some stressing of its position. The Prime Minister will not hesitate at a proper time to give satisfaction of this kind to the Soviet Government and the Committee of the National Liberation if such necessity arises. At present he wishes by means of personal contact with Mr. Bierut forestall exasperation on the other side because of not having reached the official negotiations for which it was brought from Lublin with great propaganda. In case of choosing the way for the formation of the government in Poland, the Prime Minister has to count on one thing, namely on the clear and determined support given to him in this case in every respect by the British Government.

Minister Eden is afraid of consequences resulting from Prime Minister's Mikolajczyk's leaving Moscow without reaching a Polish-Soviet agreement. However, he does not raise any reservations against the motives of his decision, which he considers as just and convincing. He will report it to Mr. Churchill today and assures him that Mr. Churchill as well as he himself will support Mr. Mikolajczyk's efforts, those in conferences which will still be held tonight with Stalin and Molotov at Moscow, or those to be held in the future in London and in the following period in Moscow or in Poland.

The propaganda question was also discussed. According to the opinion of both sides it should be especially discreet and cautious in this period of time. Mr. Eden promised the most friendly collaboration of the Foreign Office in this matter.

The whole conference was held in the atmosphere of a very friendly mutual understanding.

No. 73—Encl. 14

Report on the Conversation of Prime Minister Mikolajczyk with Mr. Bierut, the Chairman of the National Council, held at Moscow on October 17, 1944, from 5 to 8 p. m.

When it became clear that it would not be possible to settle anything at Moscow without recognition of the Curzon Line as a boundary line, I decided:

(a) to have a conference with Stalin *tete-a-tete* on the boundary problems as well as those relating to the Polish Government for the purpose of presenting to him how I see the way of solution of these problems;

(b) to get information from Bierut and get acquainted with their point of view.

A meeting with Bierut was arranged by Mniszek, whom I sent to Bierut with the suggestion of holding a private conversation tete-a-tete. The meeting took place on October 17, at five o'clock at the "Grand Hotel" restaurant. Mr. Bierut arrived with Major Raugiewicz, chief of his military cabinet. The conversation was held tete-a-tete.

Mr. Bierut at the outset asked me why the conference between the members of the Polish Government and those of the Committee of the National Liberation was not arranged. They were informed, as Mr. Bierut explained, that Mr. Churchill was not well.

I answered that the meeting was not arranged because the disagreement as to frontiers between the Soviet and Polish governments has not been settled yet. I continued further that Marshal Stalin, on Mr. Churchill's suggestion settled with us, answered that he absolutely requires a clear declaration in the matter of the eastern frontiers. You, I said, consented to the Curzon Line, I cannot, and above all I was not prepared for it. I was not informed by the British Government that this request would be raised and the Soviet Government did not take any position as to the Polish memorandum except notification of having forwarded it to the Committee. Because I did not receive agreement for any other frontier solution than that suggested by Stalin, I have to depart. Before I leave, however, I wish to inquire privately what possibilities of agreement would exist if the frontier problem were settled between the Polish and Soviet governments and if the question of my return to Moscow became real.

There are two fundamental questions:

I. The first is the frontier question and this one is clear to me.

II. The second one is the Government question, and I wish to have a clear situation for my return to London.

Mr. Bierut answered the first question that it is true that they consented to the Curzon Line; as to the second question—that they uphold their previous proposals and they would like to know what London proposes instead.

I asked what was their position as to the memorandum and as to the method of solution of the government problem. Bierut answered that they did not look into the memorandum because it was not addressed to them. I replied that Professor Grabski handing over the memorandum to Mr. Lebediew remarked that it was destined for the Soviet Government as well as for the Committee.

Mr. BIERUT. Yes, it was delivered to them, but they did not consider it because the Committee was not mentioned in the memorandum and that means that the Committee is not recognized. In addition, the method suggested is not acceptable for them.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. A Committee which does not recognize the Polish Government cannot expect recognition by this Government. But this is not the matter. I understand that the dignity of the Soviet Government is involved here because of conclusion of an agreement with the Committee and the form of the ultimate disposition is a different thing from that of the solution in meritum. We propose to form a Government consisting of five parties.

Mr. BIERUT. This is not only a matter of the dignity of the Soviet Government, but also a matter of our just position. We ardently desire an agreement. We want a democratic Poland and we took responsibility that she would be such. We have confidence in you that you are a democrat and we ask you to come to Poland. We guarantee full freedom of political activities. We are not any Soviet agents; we do not want to sovietize Poland; we wish only one thing—democratic Poland and to destroy reactionaries. For this reason the land reform has to be carried out immediately. We are less radical in other fields, as for instance the resolutions of the Council of the National Unity, for which we are being attacked. Working conditions are difficult; winter is approaching; we are cut off from coal; there are no means of transportation; we receive something from Russia but it is not sufficient. There is a need of unity of all.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. Are you not able to get trucks or planes?

Mr. BIERUT. No, because they are necessary for supporting the Army.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. Do you think that I can immediately give the solution of these difficulties?

Mr. BIERUT. No, but together it will be easier to survive. Besides, we shall have to apply more serious measures if we come to an understanding. All Pilsudski's people, O. N. R. members and reactionaries hide themselves behind the back of the London Government and commit acts of sabotage. They infiltrate into the government agencies and sabotage us. Over 50 listed officers were shot to death last month—allegedly upon the order of the London Government. We cannot tolerate that the Army officers abduct recruits to the forest. Military conscription was boycotted; there were threats with shooting; despite these facts the conscription was effective. The majority of the parties is with us. The minority of each party is still loyal to the London Government, but it will cease to be after some time. Now to help you in your negotiations an uprising was ordered—but it did not break out.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. I know that the situation as regards parties is different from what you say. But even if it were as you say, then the more justified would be my proposal as to the drawing in the political parties into collaboration.

Mr. BIERUT. We cannot agree that we receive one fifth and you gentlemen from London four fifths.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. It is not the case. We can settle the names: some will be from London; others who lastly arrived in London from Poland; and when we come to an understanding we can extricate people from the German occupation. One thing, however, has to be clear: the candidates shall be appointed by the parties or candidacies will be settled with the parties respectively; but it cannot be tolerated that you will dictate us as candidates those people who allegedly are the members of the respective parties.

Mr. BIERUT. Nevertheless, they are on the spot and every party is disrupted: one part is with us and the other with you. After all, we took responsibility for democratization of Poland and therefore we must have the majority. We may agree to include one fifth or one

fourth of you from London, and on the spot you will find your followers among the people of several parties in the Committee.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. This is nonsense. You cannot speak for any party but the Polish Workers' Party.

Mr. BIERUT. It is not so, because five years have had their effect.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. We have people from Poland who left Poland not long ago or returned there and we perfectly well know what is the situation there; and not only in the Lublin or Rzeszow regions but throughout all of Poland.

Mr. BIERUT. We received a telegram from the Radom region that they are with us.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. Only one telegram. You know well how easy it is to send such a telegram. You should receive telegrams from the entire country, from all its parts—it would then mean something; and if you have only one from the Radom region then it is very bad with you. What then is the definite proposal as to the Government consisting of five parties?

The war will last a very short time; it is then possible to settle the names and to form the government as agreed. Even if while liberating other territories people are not brought from there at once, there will be no misfortune. They may be appointed to the National Council and the government—let the government of able men and those of strong characters govern until first elections are held. We have many names at our disposal. I consider among your people such able men as: you, Mrs. Wasilewska, Mr. Jedrychowski, Mr. Sommerstein. There are many to be chosen from. From among the members of the Polish Socialist Party in London I see Mr. Kwapinski, Mr. Ciolkosz, Mr. Stanczyk, Mr. G. Rosfeld; they certainly have somebody in the country. From the National Democratic Party, for instance, Mr. Seyda, Dr. Celichowski, Mr. Komarnicki; unless you do not want the National Democratic Party at all. From the Peasant Party: Mr. Kot, Mr. Banaczyk, Mr. Bartnicki, Mr. Bielak, the latter ones arrived from Poland not long ago; besides Mr. Bien, Mr. Baginski. From the Christian Democratic Party: Mr. Popiel, Rev. Kaczynski, Dr. Hagen. This party will be of great importance in Silesia, Poznan region, and Pomerania.

Mr. BIERUT. Kwapinski is a senator, Ciolkosz perhaps later, as you assume so much about his usefulness. All W. R. N. people from Rzeszow joined us after some consideration after all. We do not have anything against Mr. Seyda and Mr. Celichowski. All right, the National Democratic Party may be included, but without Fascists and O. N. R. But Bielecki's people have control in the National Democratic Party in Poland. How can you distinguish Fascist from non-Fascist there? Popiel of course, a serious man, but Father Kaczynski is a reactionary. You should not struggle for the inclusion of Mr. Banaczyk: a weak character and minister; you will find others on the spot.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. This is the business of the Prime Minister whom he will select in accordance with several parties and invite to the Government. But it has to be observed as a rule that not you but only parties themselves will determine who belongs to them.

Mr. BIERUT. We have these parties and you have those who remained loyal to you. We may speak for ours and you for yours.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. This is not serious. Let us not discuss this question.

Mr. BIERUT. And what about the Constitution, do you agree to accept the Constitution of 1921?

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. No, because each legitimate government in Poland has to be appointed by the President. This is not the question of a person but that of an institution. Only a revolutionary government does not need it. And you do not want to pass for a revolutionary government, but for a legitimate government and such government may be formed only on the basis of the 1935 Constitution. We got rid in this Constitution of everything that was antidemocratic, but the institution of a President appointing the government cannot be secured in any other way but through the 1935 Constitution. Otherwise one has to resort to such ridiculous interpretations as you do.

Mr. BIERUT. If you go with us then we shall be recognized by the British and United States Governments.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. If we do not come you will never be recognized, not by the people, either; the further to the West, this "no" will be the stronger. After all, we may settle our joint Constitutional declaration and oblige ourselves to support it at the first Sejm.

Mr. BIERUT. Let us then settle the Constitutional declaration now and form a government based upon it, omitting both Constitutions.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. The 1935 Constitution up to the new elections and then—a new Constitution. I see that we shall not come to an understanding. And why did you throw out Mr. Jedlinski?

Mr. BIERUT. Because he declared loyalty to us and worked for the London Government.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. And Witos—the same. In addition, he proved that he was not qualified for his office.

Mr. BIERUT. I regret very much that you do not want to accept our terms and return. We guarantee you full freedom of activities and arrangement of political problems in your party. It refers to other parties. Shall we see each other in the future?

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. I do not know. Probably not. I am going to see Stalin tomorrow and leave afterwards. If your approach would have been different, then perhaps yes. But as you put things as you do, I see no purpose for our conversations.

(The conversation took about three hours. It was evident that Bierut was less determined as to the Constitution, but had made up his mind to obtain the majority in the new government, fearing that being in the minority Russian support would not be enough for maintaining his influence in the country in view of the opinion of the population.)

No. 73—Encl. 15

*Letter of Prime Minister Mikolajczyk to Mr. Harriman,
Ambassador of the United States*

Moscow, October 18, 1944.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR: Following our conversation of this morning I hasten to send you, for your private information, copy of the observations which I made after the meeting held on October 13th.

I also enclose a copy of my statement to the Press made on August 31st, after my return from Moscow.

Believe me, my dear Ambassador,
Yours sincerely

(—) ST. MIKOLAJCZYK.

His Excellency The Honorable AVERELL HARRIMAN,
United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union,
Moscow.

Observations of the Polish Prime Minister on the situation of Poland in connection with the Moscow Conference held in October 1944

After the meeting held on October 13th I have given much thought to the problems discussed with the view to assess the situation in a most objective way. The results can be summed up as follows:

1. At the Teheran Conference decisions were taken as to the change of Poland's eastern frontier without the knowledge and consultation of the Polish Government.

In view of the fact, however, that there exist public pronouncements of the British and U. S. Governments, which are in force inasmuch as public opinion is concerned, namely that the British and U. S. Government do not recognize any territorial changes which take place during the war, except changes arrived at with the consent of the parties concerned, it is now expected that the Polish Government or its Premier should—of their own volition—express consent to the decisions of the Teheran Conference.

2. The Soviet Government have brought into being—without consulting the Allied Governments—the Polish Committee of National Liberation which is a “de facto” rival Polish Government. The prerogatives of the Committee, such as the conclusion of international agreements, the emission of banknotes, conscription to the army, the transfer of the population, the decreeing of laws changing the social and economic structure of the country, etc. etc., require some form of legalization.

It is expected that this would be achieved by the fusion of the legitimate Polish Government with the rival Polish Government created by the Soviets.

The Polish Government or its Premier would now have to:

- a) legalize the Soviet Government's unilateral decision investing Soviet agents with powers of a Polish Government;
- b) approve before world public opinion the “faits accomplis” created by the Soviet Government with consultation with the Allies.
- c) ratify all activities of the Committee in Poland, including arrests and deportations.

3. By merging with the Committee of National Liberation the Polish Government would have to renounce its own legal basis of existence. Consequently, all possibilities of a return to the legal foundations of the Polish State would be wrecked. All ensuing acts would be imposed on the people of Poland in the presence of the Red Army and the N. K. V. D. Thus the Polish Government is expected voluntarily to destroy—after the ratification of the truncation of Poland and the legislation of the Committee—the legal foundations of the Republic and her supreme authorities.

4. Poland would thus lose her eastern lands and, in the remainder of her territory, Poland's independence would be effaced by the rule of agents of the Comintern in Poland.

No effective guarantees to show that the aforesaid course of events will not take place, have been put forward.

On the other hand it is expected from the Polish Government:

- a) to agree to the loss of Poland's eastern provinces;
- b) to legalize the status of the Polish Committee of National Liberation by its merging with the Polish Government and to approve the Committee's unlawful acts;
- c) after the legalization of the Committee to destroy the legal foundations of the Polish Republic;
- d) to express consent to the effacement of independence in the remainder of Poland.

In other words, the Polish Government is expected to commit suicide of its own volition.

The present Polish Government and its Premier will not be persuaded to do this and are inept to play such a role.

Moscow, *October 14th 1944.*

No. 73—Encl. 16

Conference with Marshal Stalin at the Kremlin on October 18, 1944, 6 to 7:07 p. m.

Only Prime Minister Mikolajczyk takes part in the conference.

Present as interpreters: Mr. Mniszek and Mr. Pawlow.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. Mr. Marshal. In this historic moment I wish to emphasize once again that your generosity and magnanimity, Mr. Marshal, in the matter of frontiers, may win the heart of the entire Polish nation. (Prime Minister Mikolajczyk discusses at length the necessity of not deciding at present the question of Polish frontiers as the only concessions proposes the fixing of the demarcation line.)

STALIN. A demarcation line is not a frontier. I firmly insist on immediate settlement of frontiers which as I said before shall follow the Curzon Line. And this Curzon Line was not invented by us but by the allies at that time. It was approved by the Americans, French and English who were our enemies at that time. We cannot depart from the Curzon Line. If we would make concessions from that line we would be ashamed of it. Therefore, we cannot do it. These territories were always the object of conflicts and struggles between Poles, White Russians and Ukrainians and this must end once and for all. Whoever wants peace must accept this. In addition, the Polish nation will not object to it. Messrs. Bierut and Osobka, representatives of the Lublin Committee, declared that this new frontier was just. Finally, the new frontier line will put an end to mistrust between Poles and Ukrainians. Emigrees in London oppose this frontier, but I do not consider them as the nation. In addition, these emigrees expect the conflict between Russia and England. We need a final frontier.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK again defended the integrity of the Polish frontier and discussed at length the question of Eastern Galizia, stressing that this part of the Polish Republic was not included in the Curzon Line, mentioning also that it was not a part of Russia before the 1914 War.

STALIN (interrupts). But Warsaw was within the boundaries of Czarist Russia.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK mentions the statement of Lenin that Poland should rise free and independent.

STALIN. We also share this view.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK once again defends Polish frontiers—

STALIN. I repeat once more that I cannot agree. And what would the Ukrainians say to it, who fought so valiantly against the Germans and suffered so many losses. In addition, as you know English and Americans support us in the matter of these frontiers.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. As you know, Mr. Marshal, Polish soldiers from eastern territories of Poland fought valiantly against the Germans and what would be my position should I come to them and tell that they have no home and no place to return to.

STALIN. We have already mobilized our citizens in Eastern Galizia and all of them very willingly fought the Germans. Those, however, from among the Ukrainians who cooperated with the Germans were executed as enemies of the United Nations.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. How do you, Mr. Marshal, imagine the future foreign policy of Poland? Poland besides friendly relations with Russia is in alliance agreements with Great Britain and France.

STALIN. Of course, besides friendly relations with Soviet Russia, Poland has to maintain friendly relations not only with Great Britain and France but also with the United States, the Czechs and the Hungarians. The states bordering upon Poland have to live in friendship together, so that if the Germans would provoke an aggression these states would strike at them.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. Will Poland take part in the occupation of Germany, together with the Soviet army?

STALIN. If Poland wishes, we will give part of the German territories for occupation.

I wish to emphasize once again that the Polish policy should be independent.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. As you know, Mr. Marshal, Communists are small in numbers in Poland. Then do you think, Mr. Marshal, that the form of government of Poland will not be Communist?

STALIN. Of course not. The form of government of Poland should be democratic. Private ownership system and free private economic enterprise should be preserved. Under the control of the State over capitalism, of course. There are no conditions for the Communist system in Poland.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. If it comes to an understanding in Poland, would it then be possible to count on the friendliness of Russia for the future Polish Government?

STALIN. I do not doubt it.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. After liberation from the Germans the people in Poland will want to live a free life, there will be various political parties, of course, and the views will conflict. There will be a free interchange of thought at last.

STALIN. It will be permitted only up to some limits: for the work over the reconstruction of the state and not for a revolt.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. Do you think, Mr. Marshal, that the members of the National Democratic Party of western Poland whose repre-

sentatives always wished friendly collaboration with Russia, will be able to work in Poland?

STALIN. We shall admit all who wish to work in the democratic spirit, both those from the left and those from the right. But we shall not admit those who want under these or those pretences to come for the purpose of making revolutions. It would be best to discuss the matter of returning people from London with the Committee. As you know, in the course of this war the composition of political parties has been completely changed; there are new people everywhere, people bound with the struggle against the Germans. It should be taken into account. To avoid misunderstanding, not even one man shall we admit who in this or another way is connected with reactionary elements of Sosnkowski. You should go to Poland, discuss with the Committee and then you will orientate yourself. One thing is sure. Political parties created now in Poland wish sincere and friendly collaboration with Russia and they must have their voice.

Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK underlines the share of Poland in the war against the Germans, great political significance in Poland of four political parties forming the Government in London, and assures Marshal Stalin that as soon as he returns to London he will endeavor to convince his colleagues in the Cabinet about the necessity of arriving at an understanding with Russia; however, he firmly insists upon postponement of the controversial matters relating to the frontiers to a future time.

(These minutes made from the notes of Mr. Mniszek.)

No. 73—Encl. 17

Report on the conversation of the Prime Minister Mikolajczyk with Prime Minister Churchill and Minister Eden at Mr. Churchill's urban residence at Moscow, on October 18, 1944, from 7:15 to 7:45 p. m.

After my conference with Stalin I held a conference with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden just before they went to the last banquet in the Narkomindiel.

I summarized briefly my conference with Stalin, which—except the Curzon Line Problem—I considered as satisfactory. I summarized by conference with Bierut also. I called the attention of the English to this part of my conversation with Bierut, in which the latter—stating that they are responsible for the democratization of Poland—argued that they also must have an absolute majority in the new government. I repeated also this part of my conversation, in which I said to Bierut that nobody could treat seriously their interpretation of the 1921 Constitution.

Then I mentioned that martial law was introduced in Lublin because the leaflets were posted: "We demand freedom and return of Mikolajczyk." This was the news that reached us today from Lublin. Mr. Churchill asked me whether I was attacked because of that as he said that he would do it. I answered not.

Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden promised that they would tell Stalin that the problem of the government with an absolute majority of Mikolajczyk's followers is the prerequisite for recognizing it by Great

Britain and the settlement of the Polish-Soviet controversy. Mr. Eden also said that he would tell Stalin that if the Soviet side agrees that Mikolajczyk takes the position of the Prime Minister it will be Mikolajczyk's responsibility to select other members of the government and to establish the proportional participation by political parties. In case the Soviet side will raise no objections as to personalities then everything must be left to the Prime Minister, as it is practiced in the West. The government formed only in this way will be recognized by the British Government. Great Britain does not and will not agree to the other solution. Mr. Eden and Mr. Churchill stated it in a determined form, stressing that they will present the problem in this way to Stalin today.

No. 74

Second note of Ambassador E. Raczynskiego of October 19, 1944, in the matter of conduct of the Soviet authorities on the territories of the Polish Republic

SIR: I beg to refer to my note of October 7th, 1944, No. 49/Sow/40, and acting on instructions received from my Government I have the honour to bring to the knowledge of His Majesty's Government a number of facts exposing the activities on Polish territory of the Soviet authorities and of the so-called Polish Committee of National Liberation, the administration of which is strictly subservient to these authorities.

The Polish Home Army, acting on orders of the Polish Government, has been fighting against the Germans for five years without regard to heavy losses, with the support both material and moral of the British and American Governments. As long as circumstances demanded it fought underground. When the front moved on to the territory of the Polish State it turned to open warfare, as a regular army lead by responsible officers and wearing proper military distinctions. This character of the Polish Home Army was recognised by the British and United States Governments in their declarations of August 30th, 1944.

In spite of the absence of diplomatic relations, the Home Army, acting upon orders of the Polish Government, co-operated with the Red Army wherever practicable. It came out in the open, established liaison with the Red Army and carried out concerted military action. In many cases it occupied places of enemy resistance before the arrival of Soviet forces. In the course of operations it gave the Red Army valuable information on the movements and strength of the enemy.

This effective and friendly cooperation of the Polish Home Army and the Red Army was not as a rule maintained beyond the period of military action in a given sector. The Polish Government are in possession of hundreds of telegrams from Commanders of various ranks and from different places in Poland already occupied or in the process of occupation by the Red Army, stating that once the operations have been accomplished the Soviet authorities disarm the units of the Home Army and disband them, in most cases arresting their Commanders and forcibly enrolling the soldiers into Polish units formed on Soviet territory. Out of the numerous cases known I quote the following by way of example: In March, 1944, units of the Polish Home Army which fought in the region of Korzec and Luck in Volhynia were dis-

armed once the operations were completed, their Commander executed, and the men deported to an unknown destination. In July 1944, the staffs of three divisions of the Polish Home Army which gave effective help in the conquest of Vilno, were summoned to the Soviet headquarters, arrested and deported to the interior of Russia. About September 20th, 1944, the 27th Division of the Home Army, which subordinated itself to the Soviet Command for operational purposes, received orders to march to the relief of Warsaw. It was later surrounded unaware by units of the Soviet forces and disarmed. Its officers were arrested, while the men were sent to depots of the Polish forces, set up on Soviet territory. In fact not one of the units of the Polish Home Army which took part in operations in conjunction with the Red Army between January and October 1944 appears to be in existence today, and all their Commanders and soldiers have either been arrested or deported to the interior of Russia, or else forcibly enrolled in the ranks of Polish military units formed by the Soviet Government.

Similar repressions take place against units of the Polish Home Army, which, having accomplished their local tasks—mostly of a diversionary nature, come out into the open and report to Commanders of the Red Army, either on their own initiative or because they have been called upon to do so. For example in Lwow on July 31st, 1944, all officers were arrested who reported for registration under orders from the Soviet authorities. At the same time organs of People's Commissariat for the Interior (NKVD), aided by flying squads of the militia of the Security Department of the so-called Committee of National Liberation, are organising manhunts and searches for soldiers of the Home Army and forcing the civilian population to report the names of officers and men of the Home Army.

Those among the arrested officers and men of the Polish Home Army who refuse to be enrolled in the Polish military units formed by the Soviet authorities are imprisoned in camps and placed under the guard of functionaries of the People's Commissariat of the Interior (NKVD), or else detained in ordinary prisons. According to information to hand a camp of this type has been set up in Majdanek, vojevodship of Lublin—a camp until recently known as the German death camp—where on August 20th, 1944, two hundred officers and N. C. O.'s and about 2,500 other ranks of the 8th Army and the 9th Infantry Division of the Home Army were interned. Other camps are said to have been established on Soviet territory. The last named camps are reported to contain also soldiers of Polish units formed in the USSR, detained for demonstrating their disagreement with the activities of the Polish Committee of National Liberation. The names of higher officers of the Home Army who have been arrested include the following: Gen. Halka, Gen. Bitner, Lt. Col. Roman and Major Miller.

These repressions directed against the Home Army cannot be regarded as accidental or as the un-coordinated activities of subordinate officers of the Red Army or officials of Soviet administration. In the manifesto issued by the Polish Committee of National Liberation on July 22nd, 1944, in Chelm, repressive measures against the Polish Home Army were envisaged. In order to justify these activities by giving them the appearance of legality the Committee issued a decree disbanding underground military organizations. In practice this decree is being applied by the executive organs of the Soviet Govern-

ment. In August 1944, a Soviet military commission was set up in Lublin to collect proof of alleged anti-Soviet activities by the Home Army and the Polish underground administration. The commission is composed of a considerable number of members and is under the chairmanship of General Gogdanov of the Red Army. The committee includes i.a the Soviet General Zhukov, representative of the Red Army with the Polish Committee of National Liberation, Colonel Melnikov, Colonel Strielov, Lit. Col. Ivanov and Captain Godlevski of Kiev, an NKVD interpreter. Members of the underground military and civilians organizations are placed at the disposal of this commission which collects material to prove alleged anti-Soviet and "Fascist" activities by the civilian and military organizations working under the Polish Government. Furthermore certain cases against members of Polish military and civilian underground organizations are investigated by organs of the People's Commissariat for the Interior (NKVD) and by Soviet military prosecutors.

In the light of the above facts there can be no doubt that the Soviet Government is responsible for organizing and carrying out repressions with regard to the Polish Home Army on the territory of the Polish State.

Similar repressions are also applied against officials of the Polish underground administration. In compliance with instructions from the Polish Government these officials disclosed to the Soviet authorities their identity as Polish civil servants appointed to carry out specified public duties. According to information in possession of the Polish Government the majority of these officials have been arrested, while the few who have retained their liberty have been forbidden to carry out their duties. It has been definitely ascertained that the delegates of the Polish Government in Lublin, Lwow, Tomaszow Lubelski and the mayor of Biala Podlaska have been placed under arrest.

The cases of the arrested officials of the Polish underground administration are investigated by Soviet military prosecutors and officials of the People's Commissariat for the Interior (NKVD), and the charges brought forward against them are as a rule of a very general nature like those of "fascism" and "collaboration with the Germans." These facts are a further proof that the real authority on Polish territory is that of the Soviet administration, whether the territory is recognized by the Soviet Government on the strength of their own decision as forming part of the USSR or whether they recognize it as belonging to the Polish State. The responsibility for the state of affairs described above rests in both cases entirely with the Government of the USSR.

Besides the action of the Soviet authority with regard to the soldiers of the Polish Home Army and officials of the Polish underground administration repressions are also applied to the general Polish public. An instance of these are the mass deportations of many thousands of men, women and children carried out with particular ruthlessness in Wilno, Lwow, Kolomyja and the regions of Zloczow, Rzeszow and Jaroslawa. It is not possible at the present moment to ascertain the category of persons affected nor the real purpose of these arrests and deportations. It appears, however, that they affect primarily members of the families of arrested soldiers of the Polish Home Army and of officials of the underground administration, a procedure entirely in accordance with the principles adopted by Soviet law of responsibility for the

deeds of others. Among those deported to Russia there are also technical experts, a fact which seems to indicate that one reason for these deportations is the desire to supplement Soviet cadres of experts. Nevertheless the mass character of the deportations seems, however, to indicate that their main purpose may be the elimination of the Polish population in the affected territories.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the deportations are being carried out just as those of 1939-1941, solely on the strength of an arbitrary decision of the Soviet administrative authorities, viz. that of the People's Commissariat for the Interior (NKVD).

The facts adduced above give only a partial illustration of the position of the Polish population on the territories occupied by the Red Army. They constitute undoubtedly a violation by the Government of the U. S. S. R. of international law and of universally recognized humanitarian principles,—a violation of particular gravity in view of the fact that it was committed by one state member of the United Nations and affected the citizens of another state member of the United Nations engaged in the struggle against the common enemy.

In bringing the above facts to the notice of the British Government I beg again to recall the note which I had the honour to address to you, Sir, on October 7th, and reiterate the Polish Government's confidence that His Majesty's Government will not fail to take all appropriate measures in order to bring about the release of arrested persons and their repatriation to their homes, and to prevent the recurrence of repressions against the members of the Home Army, the Polish underground administration and the Polish citizens in general.

Without such a radical change in the attitude and the action of the Soviet authorities and of those acting on their behest it would be vain to expect progress towards an understanding between the Polish Government and the Government of the U. S. S. R. however considerable such an understanding may be in the interest of the two countries and in that of all the state members of the United Nations.

I have the honour to be, Sir, with the highest consideration,

Your obedient Servant,

(—) EDWARD RACZYNSKI,
Polish Ambassador.

The Rt. Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, MC., MP.,
His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
The Foreign Office, S.W.1.

No. 75

Minutes of Minister T. Romer, concerning the conversation which took place November 2, 1944 between Premier Mikolajczyk, Minister T. Romer and Ambassador Raczynski, with Prime Minister Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan, regarding the Polish-Soviet frontiers

CHURCHILL. How long is it since you gentlemen returned from Moscow? About two weeks ago?

ROMER specifies October 22nd.

MIKOLAJCZYK. That is correct. Time is pressing and the problem before us is enormous.

CHURCHILL. Delay in deciding threatens that the friendly atmosphere created in Moscow will vanish.

MIKOLAJCZYK. My Cabinet has demanded, that in a matter so important to us, we consult the American Government. He reads the preliminary reply received today from President Roosevelt, who indicates that he will soon send a more factual reply.

CHURCHILL. What practical value has it at present? Will the Polish-Americans vote against President Roosevelt?

MIKOLAJCZYK. There is no fear of that.

CHURCHILL. That is good.

MIKOLAJCZYK. We are concerned, however, with the maintaining of Poland's independence, and unfortunately our concern is not without grounds.

CHURCHILL. It would be better if the negotiations broke down on this very point, in which you may count on our standing by you. In the matter of the eastern frontier we cannot support you.

MIKOLAJCZYK. If we were to agree to the territorial demands made, our Polish people would blame us that we had sold out our independence.

CHURCHILL. If you had followed our counsel in January and accepted the Curzon Line, today you would not have had in Lublin those horrible Lublin Poles!

MIKOLAJCZYK. The most recent examples of Soviet behaviour in Iran and Rumania are not encouraging.

CHURCHILL. You had better attend to your own affairs. In the case of Rumania, it is another matter, since it concerns recent satellites of Germany, who had provoked Russia. In Greece we have a good chance to take control of the situation. But what is our attitude to be towards the Polish Government, who cannot decide to say yes or no? It would be better therefore if you state clearly that you will never agree to a solution which will not give Lwow to Poland. I will then wash my hands of you! You have really reached the limit!

MIKOLAJCZYK. This is an misunderstanding. Together with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, we endeavour to influence the Government in this spirit to devote due attention to all arguments. I admit that we are meeting with very strong reservations when it comes to the solution proposed in Moscow. One can hardly be surprised. Why is Poland, alone among the United Nations, to bear territorial sacrifices, and so soon?

CHURCHILL (restraining his impatience). All right, then! Let the Lublin Poles continue to hold the leadership of Polish affairs in their hands, since you do not want to take it away from them. Dirty, filthy brutes, Quisling Poles will be at the head of your country! You may continue to sit here, but Russia will not want to talk with you any more. After all, it concerns the third world power! On my part, I did what I could, I explained to Stalin and convinced him of the need of an understanding with Poland. Today you could again be in Moscow close to success; instead, you sit here perplexed. I am very sorry.

MIKOLAJCZYK. The difficulty is that even despite our consent, the independence of Poland is not secured.

CHURCHILL. Surely you can say that you recognise the Curzon Line on condition that the independence of Poland shall be respected and guaranteed in the agreement. If this condition should not be possible of realization and the negotiations break down on that, you will not be bound in the matter of frontiers and us, as also, surely, the Americans, you will have behind you.

MIKOLAJCZYK. In the circles of Ambassador Lebedew, unfounded rumours are being spread among Poles that the Soviets await the arrival in Moscow this time, not members of the Polish Government, but a delegation sent by it for the purpose of further negotiation on basis of Soviet territorial concessions, which reach to the east of the Curzon Line. This is a maneuver calculated to obstruct an agreement being reached in Polish circles. In order to frustrate it, I instructed the reply that we are ready at any moment to dispatch such a delegation, should we receive the assurance that the subject of conversations with it in Moscow will be Polish territories to the east of the Curzon Line.

CHURCHILL. That is absurd, pure Utopia! Don't you remember my laborious attempt with Stalin to make it possible for the visit to Moscow for you gentlemen? At present your endeavours will evaporate into thin air; you will lose control over the further development of events. I shall have to tell Stalin that the Polish Government cannot make up its mind. You are returning to the old tradition of *Liberum Veto*. As far as I am concerned, I shall stop at that and will not follow you. What will be, under those conditions, Poland's prospects for the future? Think only of the terrible massacre which awaits your underground movement!

MIKOLAJCZYK. I have quoted to you in confidence the manoeuvre attributed to the Russians and my reaction to it, which goes to prove that I am not falling for rumours and which has as its purpose only the unmasking of a diversion.

CHURCHILL. You yourself know best what Stalin wants and thinks. Unless you give me an answer by to-day or to-morrow, I shall consider everything finished. Take into consideration what awaits you? I have done everything I could. I shall explain before Parliament. There is indeed no Polish Government, if it is unable to decide anything. I know the views of Mr. Mikolajczyk and Mr. Romer, but what of that, when they are unable to put them into effect. Meantime, the Lublin Poles are active and despite all, gain in their significance.

MIKOLAJCZYK. I cannot persuade my colleagues of the necessity to accept the heavy conditions made, without proper guarantees. The reply of the British Government to our inquiries which was transmitted to us in the letter from Cadogan, constitute in that respect not so much assistance as obstacle, because it constitutes a step backward in comparison with the stand formulated in Moscow.

CHURCHILL. You say that our letter is an obstacle? Please consider it, therefore, as cancelled of this moment. I withdraw our propositions.

RACZYNSKI attempts to explain the misunderstanding, but CHURCHILL does not let him finish and himself continues further: I have enough of it! On leaving Moscow, you had mentioned the possibility that your stay in London may not be for more than 48 hours before the negotiations are renewed. To-day, after two weeks have passed, you have made no progress whatsoever. You are all able to bargain only about one thing: the Curzon Line. Already in January you had rejected it and here now are the consequences of this step. Do you think perhaps that the Russian armies have once and for all stopped where they are now, and are unable to move on any further?

MIKOLAJCZYK. Not at all! On the contrary, we anticipate the further advance of the Soviet armies and this is taken into account in our instructions sent by us to Poland.

CHURCHILL. The result of your attitude, Gentlemen, shall be the unavoidable creation in Poland of a rival Government. I don't condemn you, but you are a confused man, who is incapable of saying either yes or no. To us, it will be a relief not to feel bound by anything. I have told Stalin in Moscow, that in the new Polish Government I don't allow the ratio of strength 75 percent to 25 percent in favour of the Committee and I demand at least 50 percent to 50 percent.

MIKOLAJCZYK. Enormous and extremely difficult things are demanded from us. After all, it concerns the transfer into the sphere of the new regions of Poland of five to six millions of Poles and to remove from them seven million Germans.

CHURCHILL. The main thing is that you find yourself in Lublin as soon as possible. Otherwise regrettable events will take place there, which are not to be mended.

CADOGAN. Was our reply of any use to you, Gentlemen?

MIKOLAJCZYK explains the difference which occurred in the formulation in Cadogan's letter to Romer of our first question and the effect thereof on the reply. He points out also the small value for us of a joint British-Soviet guarantee for the safeguard of the independence and territorial integrity of Poland.

CADOGAN. Perhaps I had not precisely formulated the question which Minister Romer has put to me verbally. This is my fault. As to the joint guarantee, I admit that in the event of aggression by Russia on Poland, the British guarantee does not come into play. But in that case a Soviet aggression would be however a clear violation of international obligations by Russia. That alone is already some security.

CHURCHILL. How can you wait helplessly, as if you were paralysed? You are playing delaying tactics, by posing to us still other new questions, we give ourselves a lot of trouble to reply to them—and I don't hide from you that it has not come to me easy to convince my colleagues on the necessity of giving you satisfaction—and as a result, you pose to us still further question, because it is all the same to you. I have enough of that and I withdraw my premises.

Here follows a discussion and mutual explanations concerning the particular points of questions and answers; it is conducted in a somewhat chaotic manner by all present, and does not lead to any goal. It only becomes clear from it, that Churchill does not have much of an idea of the legal intricacies of Cadogan's letter and apparently is not familiar with its exact formulation. He stresses only that all our questions were submitted for consideration by the British Cabinet, as a result of which to each of these questions he personally made a pencilled reply in the affirmative.

CHURCHILL. If you don't leave tomorrow evening for Moscow, I shall consider everything as finished and shall telegraph Stalin about it. I withdraw our letters containing guarantees. You have brought it about that the Committee of National Liberation exists.

MIKOLAJCZYK. I cannot agree with that. When Sikorski was at the Kremlin, the very same day the Union of Polish Patriots was constituted, out of which afterwards emerged the Committee of National Liberation. And during my trip to Moscow the Soviet Government hastened to sign an agreement with that Committee. Where is the good will here?

CHURCHILL. Only for you, only in the interest of Poland, I went personally to Moscow. But you care only about your "Liberum Veto," and your extraordinary habits, thanks to which one of the most valiant nations in Europe has in the past fallen into slavery. If you had really wanted to co-operate with Stalin, you could have by now been in Poland in the company of the British and American Ambassadors.

MIKOLAJCZYK. Only because I have not ceased to contemplate it, have we not yet said: No, although everything induces us to do so.

CHURCHILL repeats once again, the comparison so often used by him, of the losses which Poland would have to accept in the east with the much greater benefits, which the change of frontiers in the west would bring to her.

MIKOLAJCZYK. Among all the countries, not excluding Germany, Poland after this war is to suffer the greatest territorial sacrifices. How is that to be explained?

CHURCHILL. What did you Gentlemen accomplish in these two weeks? What did you return to London for? The Soviet Government intimates to us now that it will not sit at a joint table with the Polish Government at any international conferences and that it shall demand at them a place for the representatives of the Lublin Committee. Step after step you will be liquidated, this you will rightly not escape. Have the courage to say: No! I shall repeat it to Stalin.

MIKOLAJCZYK. You know well, that I did everything to bring about an understanding with Russia and have done so with no little risk.

CADOGAN. I am only a humble official and would not wish to exceed my competence by interfering in the discussion. Yet I am concerned to establish what we may communicate to Stalin, because since the Moscow Conference we did not make any remarks to him, even one word on Polish matters, despite their importance and urgency. If we are therefore to avoid a fundamental change of atmosphere, which would necessarily reflect also on the British-Soviet relations, then we must inform him without further delay of the situation. Are we to tell the Russians that the Polish Government cannot agree to the Curzon Line?

MIKOLAJCZYK. At the moment, no.

CHURCHILL. Are you prepared to leave tomorrow evening for Moscow?

MIKOLAJCZYK. No, I could not do it.

CHURCHILL. And the day after tomorrow?

MIKOLAJCZYK. I am not certain of receiving within that set time the Polish Government's decision. You will understand that we are concerned with the independence of Poland and this is no small matter in the present state of affairs.

CHURCHILL. This is a matter of your understanding with Bierut. I give you 48 hours' time. In the absence of your reply within that time, I shall telegraph to Stalin and let come what may.

MIKOLAJCZYK. The attitude of the British Government does not help to make a decision easier.

CHURCHILL. I shall be glad to withdraw our guarantees given to you.

CADOGAN. We gave in their connection more than we usually give. I shall not betray a secret by pointing out that Prime Minister Churchill had yesterday serious difficulties to force through the resolution in that matter at a meeting of the War Cabinet.

CHURCHILL. If your attitude is negative, then have the courage to say so. I shall not hesitate to stand up against you. Two whole weeks you fruitlessly wasted in continuous debates without any results! Where does it lead? Today I am telling you for the last time. After tonight I shall not speak to you any more!

MIKOLAJCZYK. Perhaps the same fate awaits me as Maniu, but never mind that!

CADOGAN. Can you give Stalin any indication, suggest anything, because in the event of our silence the last chance of agreement will vanish.

CHURCHILL. You have not moved one inch!

MIKOLAJCZYK refers to the position of President Roosevelt in the Polish question and to the basic divergence between his definition during his own conversations with the President which he had with him in June in Washington and the interpretation given by Molotov at the Moscow Conference. It is a matter of primary importance to us, which requires clearing up before we undertake a final decision.

CHURCHILL. I had already said I shall still wait 48 hours. A further delay would threaten with incalculable consequences. Again a new campaign of hate shall be set loose by Lublin.

MIKOLAJCZYK reads the last reports from Poland, which inform of the terrible conditions in which disarmed soldiers of the Home Army are held imprisoned near Siedlce.

CHURCHILL. Only your presence in Poland may bring an end to these horrors.

MIKOLAJCZYK. If you leave to me only 48 hours and if I am not to have the opportunity to await the American reply to our questions, then I warn you that the answer which you will receive shall be negative. I am quite certain that if you yourself were a Pole you would not act otherwise.

CHURCHILL. I never shirk before a decision nor before responsibility.

MIKOLAJCZYK. The attitude of America is the more important to us, for, in accordance with your own remarks which I heard in Moscow, on America will depend the material aid with which we are unable to dispense, having to deal with resettlements on such vast scale and the subsequent rebuilding of economies. For after the sacrifices suffered by Poland she will have to pay also for that herself? out of what?

CHURCHILL again reminds of the last demand of the Soviet Government, that at international Conferences in which it is to participate, not the Polish Government will be seated, but the Lublin Committee, on behalf of Poland. This is most embarrassing in connection with the London Conference on inland communications.

ROMER reminds that we find ourselves in that respect in company with Swiss and Portuguese "Fascists", as is evident from the absence of Russia at the International Conference of Civilian Airlines in the United States.

CADOGAN explains that with regard to the London Conference mentioned by Churchill, the Foreign Office had made reservations against the attitude taken by the Soviet Government, so that probably this matter shall not for the time being have any unpleasant repercussions.

CHURCHILL. Notwithstanding, the Poles continue to have a hostile attitude towards the Soviet. Was it not madness to appoint after

Sosnkowski, Bor, if one was concerned to improve the Polish-Soviet relations?

MIKOLAJCZYK. After Sosnkowski was removed, the Soviets attacked Bor; when he was taken prisoner by the Germans, President Raczkiewicz is being attacked. Tomorrow the attacks shall be directed against me or whoever replaces me.

CHURCHILL. I like Anders as a valiant soldier, but I remember what he told me: Today we fight the Germans, tomorrow we shall fight the Russians. But this is an aberration! Don't count on us to help you in that. Do you realize how very much your standing has deteriorated in the world since the beginning of this year?

MIKOLAJCZYK. In the moral sense, not!

CHURCHILL. I am withdrawing my guarantees contained in Cado-gan's letter, since you are unable to give me a reply.

CADOGAN. Perhaps Prime Minister Churchill shall agree not to do it yet, because we have learned from Premier Mikolajczyk that he unfortunately received my letter too late to be able to submit it to the Council of Ministers today, consequently the Polish Government had no opportunity whatsoever to become acquainted with this matter. Will it take place tomorrow?

MIKOLAJCZYK. Yes, I shall call for that purpose a special meeting.

In conclusion of the discussion it was mentioned also on the Polish side, as proof of the existing enormous difficulties the fact that Stalin deleted from the text of the British proposal the name of Premier Mikolajczyk as the chief of the future Polish Government in Poland; also the ration of strength in this Government, which under the present conditions even with a 50-50 proportion, to which the Lublin Committee does not agree, gives no possibility of governing. The British side explains in the first matter that Stalin gave to Churchill verbal assurance, that he accepts and will honor Mikolajczyk as candidate, and in the second matter that it shall remain a problem for negotiations in Moscow and Lublin, to guarantee a sufficient and permanent majority in the future Government, following Premier Mikolajczyk's idea. If this will not be possible to carry out, an understanding, and together with it, a Polish consent to the Curzon Line, shall not come about, and the whole thing will fall apart on a point on which the Polish Government will be able to count for a continuous support of the British Government, as opposed to the matter of the Polish frontiers in the east.

No. 76

Minute of Minister T. Romer dated November 28 1944 concerning the conversation which took place on that day between Premier Mikolajczyk and Minister Romer and Prime Minister Churchill, Minister Eden and Ambassador O'Malley regarding matters caused by the crisis of Mr. Mikolajczyk's Government

At 3 p. m. we were received in the ante-room by Minister Eden and Ambassador O'Malley.

EDEN enquires about the development of the crisis in the Polish Government. We inform him of the attempt undertaken by Minister Kwapiszewski yesterday to form under his leadership, for the short period of talks between the political parties, a provisional cabinet composed of the present members, without filling the posts at present left vacant

by representatives of the Peasant Party. In view of the refusal to take part in this cabinet of Romer and, later, Raczynski and others, the attempt gave no results and will probably be undertaken again in another form.

EDEN is of the opinion that in the present state of affairs the British side should not undertake any steps which could give the impression that an interference is made in internal Polish affairs. He is somewhat disturbed by the prospect of a lengthy debate on foreign affairs, which is to begin tomorrow in the House of Commons. He would consider it advisable to limit the statements of the British Government on Polish matters, so as not to cause an effect undesirable for Poland. For that reason he will endeavour to reassure the more prominent speakers and asks Minister Romer to act in the same spirit with the friendly Members of the House. He believes that the British press is showing a great restraint and sense in commenting upon the Polish crisis and asks if we have any observations or requests to make on this matter.

ROMER shares in principle Eden's views, suggests however that one should endeavour to correct the unduly critical speculations which occurred in connection with President Roosevelt's reply to Premier Mikolajczyk of the 17th instant. Eden agrees with that and quotes the "Manchester Guardian", which expresses similar views. Mikolajczyk believes that Roosevelt's letter was even more favorable in actual fact for Poland than we anticipated, particularly in view of verbal explanations given by Harriman.

EDEN, referring to his conversations with Harriman, completely confirms that. In particular he declares that the British Government not only encouraged Harriman to make representation to Stalin on behalf of Roosevelt, favoring Poland's retention of Lwow and the oil basin, but also expressed readiness on their part to support these endeavours, should Harriman consider that it will advance and not injure the cause, for the success of which the British Government is most concerned.

We enter the conference room, in which Churchill awaits us. Greeting him, Mikolajczyk tenders in advance his best wishes for his 70th birthday, which he will celebrate the day after tomorrow. Romer does the same. Churchill returns warm thanks. He looks wonderfully well and is evidently in a good disposition. He invites all present to the conference table, at which we sit as usual: the British and Poles facing each other.

CHURCHILL opens the conversation with a statement that we had acted most correctly and in his opinion the resignation under these circumstances was the only sensible way out.

MIKOLAJCZYK explains, that in view of the conditions created in Teheran, despite the best endeavours and intentions (here Churchill nods), he could not act otherwise, because he had the majority of the government against him, and had he accepted the views of the majority he could not count on the support of the Western powers. On departing, Mikolajczyk asks that the British Government, regardless of what men hold the power in Poland, should not cease to act in her interest and avoid acts which eventually may prove obstacles in returning to the present active policy of attempts towards an understanding with Russia.

CHURCHILL is not certain who will now take the helm of the Polish Government. He knows that the task to set it up was given to Mr.

Kwapinski and personally he is inclined to assume that despite apparent difficulties he may succeed. On the British side, Polish statehood will naturally not be questioned and the new government will receive the normal diplomatic privileges, which are enjoyed by foreign governments now in London. But this relationship shall not enjoy the personal confidence which was formerly bestowed on General Sikorski and later on Mr. Mikolajczyk. This will be clearly expressed to the representatives of the new Polish Government if they call on us—further continues Churchill—though they may not call at all, realizing that they do not stand on the same political grounds with us. In particular, the special privileges which were not available to the other governments, and which were the result of the personal confidence in General Sikorski and Mr. Mikolajczyk, as for instance the use of their own code in communications with Poland, could no longer be granted.

MIKOLAJCZYK asks that it be remembered that the main issue is Poland and her interests, and not these or other people who are temporarily entrusted with them. In particular, he is most concerned that the aid given to the underground movement in Poland is not discontinued, in accordance with the principle that whoever fights the Germans shall be assured of help.

EDEN intercalates that he has already issued the proper instructions as a result of the conversation he had with us yesterday, and asks whether we attach great importance to making it possible for Wincenty Witos and a few other persons to be flown from Poland, for whom a discreet escape from under the German occupation was planned.

MIKOLAJCZYK requests that this be carried out and explains that an early presence in London of Wincenty Witos could contribute greatly to the clearing up of the Polish political situation.

CHURCHILL inquires about the role of Witos in Poland and his personal relations with Mikolajczyk, to which the latter replies.

EDEN promises to issue at once the necessary instructions but adds that to have them carried out will take a few weeks. Referring to his conversation with us of yesterday, he asks Churchill whether, in his opinion, the British military mission to the Polish underground movement under German occupation, whose parachuting in Poland was recently suspended, may now be sent?

MIKOLAJCZYK presses that this be done, supporting our wishes with the argument that the British should have their own sources of information in Poland, where we have nothing to hide from them.

CHURCHILL is disposed in principle to comply with the wishes of Mikolajczyk, and formulates a directive for Eden, that in all current matters, which are not connected with the personal relationship of confidence in Mr. Mikolajczyk, actions are to be consistently carried out as heretofore. Besides—he adds—I do not doubt that, irrespective of the temporary stay of Mr. Mikolajczyk outside the government, he will continue to maintain the closest contact with us.

MIKOLAJCZYK replies that in his capacity as Chairman of the Peasant Party, he will naturally see to it.

ROMER reminds Eden of his promise to take care of the problem of aid for the civilian population evacuated from Warsaw and dispersed over Poland in terrible misery. We are mainly concerned to get some

blockade exemptions in respect of clothing and transfer of currency to Switzerland.

EDEN gives an assurance that he has already taken care of this matter and shall bear it in mind, fully aware of its importance.

CHURCHILL returns to the question of the change in the Polish Government and considers it under the existing conditions as an unavoidable occurrence, purely temporary and perhaps even desirable. He says—One should not hurry now. You gentlemen rest now for two or three weeks. Thereafter Premier Mikolajczyk shall return strengthened to power in a cleaned-up political atmosphere and I am convinced that you shall be able at a cheaper price to reach a better agreement with Russia. Meantime let these gentlemen from Lublin, Morawski and * * * (Romer prompts: Bierut)—yes, Bierut—really, I dislike these men very much—they will loosen their tongues. Then your own return, gentlemen, to the Government and to negotiations with Russia will constitute a valuable concession.

MIKOLAJCZYK gives the assurance that he will endeavour as far as possible to strive toward a further realisation of his policy of reconciliation with Russia, counting upon support of the Western powers, which is indispensable.

EDEN considers how representatives of His Majesty's Government should deal with the Polish problem during the debate on foreign affairs in the House of Commons. CHURCHILL believes that statements should be most guarded, pointing out that, despite difficulties, the door still remains open for a Polish-Soviet understanding, to the conclusion of which the British Government, in the interest of unity in the whole allied camp, lends its patronage. Asked about his opinion in this matter, MIKOLAJCZYK agrees with the need for restraint in making disclosures, asks, however, to stress the point of the recognition of the Polish Government in exile as opposed to the Committee of National Liberation, and to stress strongly the demand for an independent Poland, as one of the essential aims of this war. CHURCHILL agrees with this entirely.

There follows a warm leavetaking of each other, and at this opportunity MIKOLAJCZYK, reciprocating Churchill's earlier apologies for his rough remarks to us, expresses regret himself, that he had sometimes to appear too stubborn, but what is to be done—he adds—I am still first of all a Pole and you understand that.

EDEN follows us to the door and bidding us good-bye, assures us once more that he shall always be at our disposal whenever we wish.

The whole conversation had taken place in an extremely friendly and relaxed atmosphere.

No. 77

*Address of Mr. W. Raczkiewicz, President of the Republic of Poland, given on November 29, 1944 in connection with the taking of oaths of the members of the new Cabinet of Ministers*¹³

After having taken my office as President of the Republic and entrusting the late General W. Sikorski with the organization of the Government, I laid down, in agreement with him, as a foundation for the Government temporarily in exile, the widest as possible coalition of our country's political movements which should guarantee the

¹³ "Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Zolnierza", Nr. 285, of December 1, 1944.

Government a strong position in the public opinion of our occupied country as well as its authority in foreign relations.

Our country, although having such difficulties in carrying on social and political activities, has set an example of conformity in cooperation for our country's cause by constituting a coalition embracing all the main political groups regardless of the differences in their political programs. In such trying times which our country is presently experiencing, in times when our country is still under the yoke of occupation and is again the theatre of destructive war operation, when our country has suffered again heavy losses in the glorious, although tragic battle in Warsaw, in times when all our nation's vital forces must be united, not only to achieve final victory with our Allies, but also to rebuild Poland's existence as a state and her proper position in the world's family of nations, the main foundation should be kept unchanged. It must be my aim, as well as that of the Government's, to complete the foundations upon which it leans, so that it may evidently express the common aims of all basic political segments of the Polish national policy.

I do not doubt that your efforts will tend toward the same, but I regret that the presently resigning Prime Minister Mikolajczyk, an experienced statesman and active politician, did not consider himself able to take part in the Government.

The aims and efforts facing the Government are simple and clear.

Like the previous Government, it should endeavor to achieve the strengthening of the bonds uniting Poland with her Allies, not only to attain the aims of war, but also to settle after the war a durable peace so necessary for humanity, a peace based upon the principles of liberty of nations and man, common to the Allies.

During the present war, the bonds uniting Poland with Great Britain expressed in the Polish-British alliance have become even stronger by their joint struggle against the German invader carried on without any compromise since the beginning of the war, a struggle during which there was a period, in 1940, where Great Britain and Poland were almost isolated but did not for a moment give themselves up to despair. The Polish-British cooperation in all fields has become one of the chief elements of our policy and its further development should be your task.

The friendship between the United States and Poland, although not expressed in treaties, nonetheless strong and sincere, and based upon our common love of freedom, has been strengthened by the blood jointly shed on battlefields likewise continuing the struggle of the late 18th century ideals of liberty where our national heroes were found side by side with the great Washington.

This year France, our traditional and historical ally in Europe, freed from the chains of occupation, is reviving as a power and has already proven that her hardships through which she has survived and the current very difficult period which she is experiencing now, did not loosen the bonds of friendship or the treaties made with her. Also in this case, the blood of the Polish soldiers shed on the fields of France in 1940, as well as now in the great battles for her freedom and shed during the struggle of the "resistance", has become an uncrushable stamp of the written and unwritten documents of eternal friendship.

The Government should be gravely concerned with the reestablishment of lasting and friendly relations with our eastern neighbor, the

U. S. S. R. In the activities directed toward this goal the efforts of the Government cannot be lessened and its realization, although difficult, is however possible. The joint struggle against the German invaders, who with equal cruelty as in Poland, exterminated national groups and destroyed lands of the Soviet Union—has created a bridge by which this goal can be achieved.

Entrusting you today with the leadership of the Government, I know that the helmsman of the state-ship will be a man who is given the mandate of confidence by the entire country, one of the chief fighters who led the fight of Poland's underground—a man symbolizing the battle of Warsaw, the city now destroyed but unconquerable. You have sacrificed your entire life for the ideals of man's freedom, for the rights of the working man, and for the struggle for these ideals and rights, and I am completely confident that you will steer this Polish ship through stormy waves of the current war toward the harbor of peace based upon those principles for the realization of which you have been laboring during your entire life and which became the common principles of all the United Nations.

I am extending to you, Mr. Prime Minister, and to your colleagues my wishes that your work may add successfully to the achievement of this paramount aim to begin in our Fatherland, jointly with our people, the work of reconstructing the life destroyed by war and of healing the wounds inflicted to our Nation so gravely stricken.

No. 78

Reuter's Communiqué of January 5, 1945 concerning the English reaction to the recognition of P. K. W. N. by the Soviets as the so-called Temporary Government of the Republic of Poland

"The official reaction to the announcement of the recognition by the Soviet Government of the Lublin Committee as provisional Government of Poland is that this does not in any way affect the policy of the British Government which continues to recognise the Polish Government in London.

It was stated in official quarters that there has been correspondence with the Soviet Government on the question of the recognition of the Lublin Committee.

This failed to produce agreement.

Accordingly the announcement of the Russian decision caused no surprise in London".

No. 79

Two Aide Memoire presented on January 18, 1945 by the Charge d'Affaires of the United States at the Presidium of the Council of Ministers concerning the good offices of the Government of the United States with the aim to restore Polish-Soviet relations

The United States Government has instructed Ambassador Harri-man in Moscow to take up with the Government of the U. S. S. R. the request of the Polish Government for the good offices of the United States Government. He has been requested to ascertain whether the Soviet Government would find such action acceptable.

Mr. Harriman has been requested to say that, if agreeable to the Soviet Government, the United States Government would be glad to extend its good offices in the matter of arranging for the initiation of discussions between the Governments of Poland and the Soviet Union with a view to resumption of official relations between those two Governments.

The following statement was given to the Press by the Department of State in Washington at noon on January 17, 1944.

"Having received officially the request of the Polish Government contained in its public statement of January 14, this Government through its Ambassador in Moscow informed the Soviet Government of its willingness, if agreeable to the Soviet Government to extend its good offices with a view to arranging for the initiation of discussions between the two Governments looking to a resumption of official relations between them. Without going into the merits of the case, it is our hope that some satisfactory means may be found for the resumption of friendly relations between these two fellow members of the United Nations. No reply has been received from the Soviet Government."

No. 80

Memorandum of the Government of the Republic of Poland of January 22, 1945 concerning the settlement of the Polish-Russian disputes by arbitration

The Polish Government assume that questions concerning Poland will be discussed during the pending meeting of the highest Executives of the Great Allied Powers. With full confidence in the resolve of the Prime Minister of Great Britain to assure to the Allied Polish Republic genuine independence and to guarantee its rights, the Polish Government desire to take advantage of this occasion in order to state their views as follows:

1. The Polish Government are of the opinion that territorial questions should be settled after the termination of hostilities. In this matter, the opinion of the Polish Government coincides with the general principles announced by the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of America.

The Polish Government are prepared for a friendly settlement of the Polish-Soviet dispute, arising from the claims of the U. S. S. R. to the Eastern territories of the Polish Republic, and they will agree to any method provided for by international law for a just and equitable settlement of the dispute, with the participation of both sides.

Furthermore, the Polish Government are determined to conclude with the U. S. S. R. an alliance, guaranteeing the security of both States, and to collaborate closely with the Government of the U. S. S. R. within the framework of a universal international security organisation and within that of an economic organisation of the States of Central-Eastern Europe. However, remembering that Poland, as one of the United Nations in the common struggle for the freedom of the world, made immense sacrifices in material and spiritual values, and lost nearly one-fifth of her population killed in battles, massacred in penal camps and ghettos, perished in prisons, in banishment in forced-labour camps,—the Polish Government cannot be expected to recognise decisions unilaterally arrived at.

The Polish Government are convinced that the simultaneous establishment and guarantee of the entire territorial status of the Polish Republic, the settlement of the dispute with the USSR, the allocation to Poland of the territories situated North and West of her frontiers, embracing lands to which she is justly entitled, the assurance of her genuine independence and of full rights to organise her internal life in conformity with the will of the Polish Nation, untrammelled by any foreign intervention—are matters of vital importance not only to Poland, but also affecting the whole of Europe.

2. If, in spite of the constant endeavours of the Polish Government, the Soviet Government should not agree to an understanding, freely arrived at, the Polish Government, desirous of assuring to the country internal peace and liberty, suggest that a Military Inter-Allied Commission be set up, under the control of which the local Polish administration would discharge its functions until the resumption of authority by the legitimate Government. The Commission would have at their disposal military contingents supplied by the Powers represented on it. The status of the Commission and the principles on which the local administration would be based, should be elaborated in agreement with the Polish Government. The Polish Government desire to state here that the lawful Polish authorities, which were abolished by the German occupying power in violation of the stipulations of the IV. Hague Convention of 1907, continued to function underground, and should form the basis of the administration of the country.

After the return to Poland of the supreme States authorities and of those of her nationals, who—owing to military events—remain outside of the frontiers of the country, elections will be held on the basis of a universal, free, direct, secret and proportional ballot, which offers to all political parties full freedom of electoral activities and to all citizens the equal and free right to express their will. The Polish Government will retain their authority until the convocation of the Sejm, elected in accordance with the aforesaid principles, and the formation in Poland of a new, legitimate Government.

3. The Polish Government confident that the Government of Great Britain will not agree to be a party to decisions concerning the Allied Polish Republic, arrived at without the participation and consent of the Polish Government.

The Polish Government confidently trust that, at the Conference of the Great Allied Powers, the British Government will give expression to their resolve not to recognise accomplished facts in Poland, in particular not to recognise a puppet government. The recognition of such a "government" in Poland would be tantamount to the recognition of the abolition of the independence of Poland, in the defence of which the present war was begun.

No. 81

Full text of resolutions passed by the "Big Three" at the Yalta Conference on February 11, 1945

6) *Poland*

We came to the Crimes Conference resolved to settle our differences about Poland. We discussed fully all aspects of the question. We reaffirmed our common desire to see established a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland. As a result of our discussion we have agreed on the condition in which a new Polish Provisional Govern-

ment of National Unity may be formed in such a manner as to command recognition by three major Powers. The agreement reached is as follows:

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army.

This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland.

The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should, therefore, be reorganised on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a Commission to consult in first instance in Moscow with members of present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to reorganisation of the present Government along the above lines.

The Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors, by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line, with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognise that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitations of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace Conference.

No. 82

Declaration of the Government of the Republic of Poland of February 13, 1945 concerning the protest against the resolutions passed by the "Big Three" in matters pertaining to Poland

On February 12th, at 7:30 p. m. the British Foreign Office handed to the Polish Ambassador in London the text of the resolution concerning Poland adopted by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin at the Yalta Conference between February 4th-11th.

Before the Conference began the Polish Government handed to the Government of Great Britain and the United States a Memo-

random in which the hope was expressed that these Governments would not be a party to any decisions regarding the Allied Polish State without previous consultation and without the consent of the Polish Government. At the same time, the Polish Government declared themselves willing to seek the solution of the dispute initiated by Soviet Russia through normal international procedure and with due respect for the rights of the parties concerned.

In spite of this the decisions of the Three Powers Conference were prepared and taken not only without the participation and authorisation of the Polish Government but also without their knowledge.

The method adopted in the case of Poland is a contradiction of the elementary principles binding the Allies and constitutes a violation of the letter and spirit of the Atlantic Charter and of the right of every nation to defend its own interests.

The Polish Government declare that the decision of the Three Powers Conference concerning Poland cannot be recognised by the Polish Government and cannot bind the Polish Nation.

The Polish Government will consider the severance of the eastern half of the territory of Poland through the imposition of a Polish-Soviet frontier following along the so-called Curzon Line as a fifth partition of Poland, now accomplished by her Allies.

The intention of the Three Powers to create a "provisional Polish Government of National Unity" by enlarging the foreign appointed Lublin Committee with persons vaguely described as "democratic leaders from Poland itself and Poles abroad" can only legalise Soviet interference in Polish internal affairs. As long as the territory of Poland will remain under the sole occupation of Soviet troops, a Government of that kind will not safeguard to the Polish Nation even in the presence of the British and American diplomats the unfettered right of free expression.

The Polish Government who are the sole legal and generally recognised Government of Poland and who for five and a half years have directed the struggle of the Polish State and Nation against the Axis countries both through the underground movement in the Homeland and through the Polish Armed Forces in all the theatres of war have expressed their readiness—in a Memorandum presented to the Governments of Great Britain and the United States—to cooperate in the creation of a Government in Poland truly representative of the will of the Polish Nation. The Polish Government maintain this offer.

No. 83

Telegram from President Roosevelt dated February 16, 1945 to Prime Minister Arciszewski concerning the Yalta resolutions pertaining to Poland, and the telegraphic reply to this telegram sent by Prime Minister Arciszewski dated February 17, 1945

Prime Minister Arciszewski received in reply to his telegraphic appeal of February 3, 1945, the following telegram of February 16 from President Roosevelt, forwarded to him through the American Embassy with the Polish Government:

"Your telegram of February 3, 1945. You may be assured that Polish problems were considered with great care and friendliness at our last Crimean Conference. I hope that we all shall be able to work in harmony so as to find the proper solution at the proper time."

Prime Minister Arciszewski transmitted the following message, through the same channels, to President Roosevelt on February 17:

"I received your message yesterday, February 16, 1945. I welcome your assurance, Mr. President, that the Polish problems at the Crimean Conference were considered with the greatest care and friendliness, and that you hope to find the proper solution in due time.

"At this opportunity I consider it my duty to state that the resolutions of the Crimean Conference, as they were published, have been accepted by all Poles as a new partition of Poland and as placing her under the Soviet protectorate. Despite all, the Polish nation is deeply convinced that this is not the final settlement of the Polish problem and it continues to have an unshakeable hope both in your deep sympathies for Poland, Mr. President, and in that that you are a determined defender of the ideals of liberty and justice, in the defense of which American soldiers and Polish soldiers so willingly give their lives."

No. 84

Note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Tarnowski to the Ambassador of Great Britain Sir St. Clair O'Malley pertaining to the Yalta resolutions

MONSIEUR L'AMBASSADOR: On February 12th, 1945, His Majesty's Secretary of State, Mr. W. R. Law, communicated to Ambassador E. Raczyński, the Declaration concerning Liberated Europe and the text of the Agreement concerning Poland, accepted by the Prime Minister Mr. Churchill, President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin during the Conference held in Yalta from February 7th-11th, 1945. After a careful examination of the contents of these Resolutions, I have the honour, on behalf of the Polish Government to communicate to Your Excellency the following statement for His information and with the request to submit it to His Majesty's Government.

1. The Resolutions of the Conference concerning Poland have been made without the participation, knowledge and consent of the Polish Government, which is recognised by the British Government and the Government of the United States as also by all the United Nations except Soviet Russia, as the legal Government of the Polish Republic. From the very beginning of the war the British Government cooperated with the Polish Government, without ever questioning its authority, in all matters concerning the Polish State. Nevertheless, at a moment decisive for the independence of Poland, the British Government have not considered it necessary to consult with the Allied Polish Government on matters concerning Poland.

2. The Resolutions of the Crimean Conference entirely ignored the fact of the existence of the Polish State, represented by its lawful authorities: the President of the Republic and the Polish Government, under whose orders are fighting for five and a half years, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force of Poland, and until recently fought the Home Army and functioned the Administration of the Underground Polish State, and who have the support of the overwhelming majority of the Polish Nation.

3. The Resolutions of the Crimean Conference sanctioned the annexation of practically one half of the territory of the Polish Republic. In these circumstances the Polish Government desire to recall the following facts:

I. On August 25th, 1939, a Treaty of Alliance was concluded between Great Britain and the Polish Republic, the territorial status of which was established by the Treaty of Versailles and by the decisions of the Conference of Ambassadors of March 15th, 1923. The signature of Great Britain figure on both these documents. In resistance to Germany's claims to a part of her territory, Poland went to war against Germany and Great Britain declared war on Germany in defence of the just rights of Poland.

II. The United Nations, while acceding to the Atlantic Charter by the Declaration of January 1st, 1942, affirmed that: "their countries seek no aggrandisement territorial or other".

III. The British Government and the Soviet Government upheld the same principle in Article 5 of the British-Soviet Pact of May 26th, 1942, stating that:

"The high contracting parties * * * will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandisement for themselves and noninterference in the internal affairs of other States".

IV. The Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill declared in the House of Commons on September 5th, 1940, that:

"We have not at any time adopted since this war broke out, the line that nothing could be changed in the territorial structure of various countries. On the other hand, we do not propose to recognise any territorial changes which take place during the war unless they take place with the free consent and good will of the parties concerned".

The Foreign Secretary Mr. Eden, referred to this statement in the House of Commons on January 26th, 1944.

V. In the Note of July 31st, 1941, addressed to the late General Sikorski the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, renewed the assurance to the Polish Government, that:

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have entered into no undertaking towards the USSR which affects the relations between that country and Poland. I also desire to assure you that His Majesty's Government do not recognise any territorial changes which have been effected in Poland since August 1939."

VI. In the early part of 1942, the Polish Government drew the attention of the British Government that, should the rights of Poland not be safeguarded in the Soviet-British Pact, the British Government may find themselves unable to discharge their obligations towards Poland. In reply to the Memorandum of the late General Sikorski, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, in the Note of April 17th, 1942, renewed the assurance that:

"* * * I can assure you that any agreement which may now be concluded with the Soviet Government will not modify the intention of His Majesty's Government to regard their policy for the post-war settlement in Europe as based upon the principles of the Atlantic Charter, which have already been accepted by the Soviet Government. Secondly, until the war situation is clearer than it is at the present time, His Majesty's Government intend to abide by the principles set out in the Prime Minister's Statement of the 5th, September, 1940 * * *."

"* * * The policy of His Majesty's Government towards Poland is governed by the Anglo-Polish Agreement of the 25th, August, 1939. This policy has been confirmed and strengthened by the experiences of the last two and a half years, during which Poland and British

Forces have fought side by side, on land, on sea, and in the air, and the Polish people have steadfastly refused, in spite of manifold sufferings, to collaborate in any way with the forces of occupation. His Majesty's Government would not therefore, be likely to contemplate entering into an agreement with a third party which would injure the interests of so loyal an Ally * * *."

"* * * In any case His Majesty's Government do not propose to conclude any agreement affecting or compromising the territorial status of the Polish Republic".

After pointing out that the provisions of the Secret Protocol do not apply to Lithuania, the Note states:

"* * * The position is different in regard to Vilna and any other territory within the frontiers of Poland on the 25th, August, 1939. The Polish Government have already been assured that His Majesty's Government do not recognise any territorial changes effected in Poland since August 1939, and it is intended to safeguard this assurance in any agreement which may be concluded with the Soviet Government".

In view of the above it is obvious that the Resolution of the Crimean Conference concerning the Eastern boundaries of Poland constitute an infringement of both the Polish-British Alliance and the Atlantic Charter.

4. The Resolutions of the Crimean Conference stipulate for the formation of a so-called Provisional Polish Government of Mutual Unity. As its basis was adopted the so-called "Provisional Government" in Lublin, composed mainly of agents of the Comintern, while the reorganisation of this "government" has been entrusted to a Commission of the representatives of the three Powers, to whose discretion is reserved the selection of Poland's democratic leaders. This unusual procedure of forming the Government of an Allied State infringes the sovereign rights of the Polish Nation, the independence of which was guaranteed by the British Government in Art. 3 of the Polish-British Pact of Mutual Assistance of August 25th, 1939, which states that:

"Should a European Power attempt to undermine the independence of one of the Contracting Parties by processes of economic penetration, or in any other way, the Contracting Parties will support each other in resistance to such attempts."

Moreover, Article 6, Point 3, of the same Pact stipulates that:

"Any new undertaking which the contracting Parties may enter into in future shall neither limit their obligations under the present Agreement nor indirectly create new obligations between the Contracting Parties not participating in these undertakings and the third State concerned."

This obligation was more precisely defined in Article 3 of the Secret Protocol to the Pact of Mutual Assistance of August 25th, 1939, which states that:

"The undertakings mentioned in Article 6 of the Agreement should they be entered into by one of the Contracting Parties with a third State, would of necessity be so framed that their execution should at no time prejudice either the sovereignty or territorial inviolability of the other Contracting Party."

5. The Crimean Conference made a decision disposing of practically one-half of the territories of Poland contrary to Article 2 of the Atlantic Charter, which stipulates that the United Nations "desire to see

no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned." It is obvious from the text of the Resolutions of the Crimean Conference that there is no intention whatsoever of enabling the population inhabiting the Eastern territories of Poland to express freely their will with regard to their citizenship.

6. The Crimean Resolutions seemingly in conformity with the Atlantic Charter quoted in the "Declaration of Liberated Europe," charges the "Provisional Government" to be formed by the three Powers, with the duty to hold universal elections by secret ballot on the remaining territory of Poland, which, however, had not been defined in the North and West. The Resolutions, however, do not deal with the indispensable conditions of free and universal elections. These conditions should include inter alia: the freedom to return to their native land of all Poles, who, owing to the fortunes of war, remain outside Poland, i. e. of prisoners of war, deportees, political exiles and soldiers, sailors and airmen, fighting within the ranks of the Allied Armed Forces; the right of all political parties which were active in the Polish Underground Movement to take part in the elections. The Polish Government have reasons to fear that the future elections will be held under the same foreign pressure as the so-called plebiscite held in the Eastern provinces in October 1939, and that not all citizens, entitled to express their will, will be able to take part in the elections.

7. Throughout the whole period of their close and loyal collaboration with the British Government, the Polish Government took into consideration their counsels and adjusted accordingly their conduct in the difficult Polish-Soviet dispute. In conformity with these counsels, the Polish Government concluded on July 30th, 1941, an Agreement with the Soviet Government. This Agreement has not been kept by the Soviet Government. Nevertheless, desirous of giving further proof of their good will, the Polish Government, after consulting the British Government in January 1944, proposed the establishment of a provisional demarcation line between disputed (according to the view of the USSR) and undisputed territories of Poland. The Soviet Government rejected this compromise proposal. In their constant and sincere endeavour to reach an agreement with Russia, and disregarding past events, the Polish Government ordered the Home Army to co-operate with the Red Army in the war against Germany. This co-operation terminated in the arrest and deportation of many officers and men of the Home Army and in the tragic catastrophe of the armed rising in Warsaw. The Polish Government nevertheless, did not give up further attempts and acting on the advice of the British Government, undertook negotiations with the Soviet Government in August and October 1944, which unfortunately proved sterile. The Polish Government profoundly regret that all these efforts did not prevent the gradual recognition by the British Government of Soviet demands on Poland which finally led the British Government to agree to the Resolutions adopted by the Three Powers at the Yalta Conference, approving the annexation of practically one half of the territory of Poland and threatening her genuine independence.

8. In view of the above the Polish Government, as the only legal and genuine representative of the will of the Polish Nation, cannot recognise the Resolutions of the Crimean Conference concerning

Poland as legally valid and enters a solemn protest against these Resolutions.

9. During five and a half years of cordial, allied collaboration of our two nations, for the realisation of aims, based on a true appreciation of their vital interests, lasting bonds of friendship and mutual trust have been established between them.

The Polish Government cannot believe, therefore, that the Resolutions of the Crimean Conference could be regarded as the final expression of the attitude of the British Government with regard to Poland and consequently, they express their readiness to discuss with His Majesty's Government all questions contained in the Crimean Resolutions with regard to Poland.

Please accept, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

(—) A. TARNOWSKI.

His Excellency Sir OWEN ST. CLAIR O'MALLEY, K. C. M. G.,
His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador to Poland,
 London.

No. 85

Letter of Mr. C. F. A. Warner of the Foreign Office to Ambassador E. Raczyński of February 19, 1945 stimulating him to reveal names of Polish Underground activities

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR: M. Zaranski informed me a few days ago that you would be glad to receive a written reply to the memorandum which you sent me in your letter of the 29th January in response to the Secretary of State's suggestion conveyed to you by Sir Orme Sargent that your Government might care to furnish us with information about leading personalities connected with the underground movement in Poland in order that, if the opportunity arose, the Secretary of State might take some action in their favour.

The memorandum enclosed in your letter of the 29th January of course raised far wider issues than the Secretary of State had had in mind. But, as I explained to you orally, the Secretary of State made his suggestion because he was anxious that he should not, through lack of information, miss an opportunity of using his good offices in favour of important members of the underground movement during the Conference which has just closed. This in itself shows you that Mr. Eden had very much in mind the situation of the members of the underground movement in Poland. You may be assured that he and the Prime Minister are anxious to do everything possible to bring about a situation in which all democratic and anti-German sections in Poland could make their contribution in safety to the rebuilding of liberated Poland. His Majesty's Government consider that a settlement on the lines foreshadowed in the statement on Poland issued at the conclusion of the Crimea Conference offers in practice the most hopeful means of achieving this object.

Believe me, my dear Ambassador,

Yours sincerely

(—) C. F. A. WARNER.

His Excellency Count EDWARD RACZYŃSKI.

No. 86

Letter of Prime Minister Arciszewski to Prime Minister Churchill of March 8, 1945 containing an appendix with informations from the Homeland

In a cable addressed to you on February 3rd, I appealed to you to approach the Soviet Government with a view to stopping the criminal activities of the so-called Provisional Lublin Government aimed against the gallant soldiers of the Polish Home Army and the members of the Polish Underground Administration.

Since that date the persecutions in Poland far from being discontinued, have gathered in violence and are now assuming proportions threatening the very existence of the independent and most patriotic section of the Polish Nation. I therefore have the honour of enclosing a short survey of the information received from Poland and I would be grateful to you, Mr. Prime Minister, if you could inform me of the results of your intervention with the Soviet Government and in particular of the attitude of that Government with regard to this most tragic question.

Please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(—) T. ARCISZEWSKI.

Annex.

The Right Honourable WINSTON CHURCHILL, C. H., F. R. S., M. P.

Summary of the More Important Information Sent From Poland in the Period January 17th to March 1st*Date of message and contents*

January 17, 1945, Kielce Province: The Lublin Committee has assumed civil authority. Arrests of members of the Home Army and the Underground administration have begun. Enforced registration of all males in the age groups (?) 19-59.

January 22, 1945, Cracow Province: On 18th January, groups of the Home Army were fighting the Germans in the western suburbs. Public utility buildings were preserved, thanks to the action of Home Army units. The population greets the Red Army and units of Berling's army now marching in coldly. The Command of Berling's army is strictly controlled by the N. K. V. D. According to a statement made by one of Berling's officers, about 70 per cent of the soldiers are in favour of the Government in London.

January 24, 1945, Cracow Province: Two orders of Marshal Koniev have been posted upon the walls: one regarding right of mobilisation, which empowers the Lublin Committee or the Red Army, when so authorised by the Committee, to effect mobilisation, and a second regarding the surrender of weapons and radio sets, and the registration of typewriters, printing presses and duplicators. Registration of males in the age groups (?) 16-65.

The N. K. V. D. has been functioning in Cracow since January 21st. At present they are reading denunciations and observing. Delegates from Lublin speak against the London Government at meetings, and make sharp attacks on the Home Army. The same is evident in the Lublin press, which is already being issued in Cracow, and in the soldiers' papers.

January 24, 1945, Miechow District: A number of members of the Home Army have been shot in Miechow and Slomniki. Radziwill was arrested in Balice, and 40 landowners and farmers in Miechow district for belonging to the Home Army or approving it. The Polish Workers' Party is undertaking the work of denunciation.

January 27, 1945, Piotrkow District: On the river Pilica in Opoczno district, strong units of the Home Army took part in fighting the Germans. They captured weapons, and destroyed and captured cars. After completing their tasks, these units of the Home Army had to disperse. The Soviet authorities only managed to catch one of the company leaders, and he succeeded in escaping.

The population is treating the new authorities with great reserve. Soviet paratroops are hunting for leaders of the Home Army. Two have already been shot. Soviet officers have announced that the Home Army is to be exterminated as fascist. Orders have been issued for the surrender of arms, radio, sets, typewriters, and duplicators.

January 30, 1945, Piotrkow, Miechow, Czestochowa District: In Miechow district, 16 officers of the Home Army have been arrested; in Piotrkow, a number of agents of the Underground Movement. The food and fuel situation is desperate. The withdrawal of Cracow zloties has produced a complete lack of currency.

Soviet and Lublin agitation against Great Britain is noted. At Czestochowa during a manifestation on January 25th, a banner was carried with the slogan: "Down with England".

February 1, 1945, Cracow Province: The Soviet military authorities take no account of the Lublin Committee and act independently. The Lublin Committee slavishly comply with all their demands. A visa from the Soviet ambassador and the permission of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs is necessary in order to travel to Lwow. The Soviet Armies rely on the food stocks of the Polish population for their food supplies. The shops are shut, and there is no bread, water, gas or electricity.

As President of Cracow, an agent of the Committee with the pseudonym of Michalski has been sent from Lublin. So-called socialists, members of the Peasant Party and democrats, unknown to anyone, have appeared on the Town and Province Councils.

In towns, judges and advocates are the first to be arrested in the country, landowners.

February 6, 1945, Lodz Province: The situation is similar to that prevailing in other parts: chaos in administration, and the villages have to give up their last remaining food supplies. The N. K. V. D. has already begun arresting former members of the Home Army. In Lodz, two officers have been arrested. Zymierski's army is coldly received by the population.

February 7, 1945, Warsaw Province: Meetings at which demands for the transformation of the Lublin Committee into a temporary government were adopted here have been organized in villages and small towns by the Soviet Military Commandants on a pattern laid down in advance. People were compelled by force to attend. Members of the N. K. V. D. were mingled with the audience in uniform and in civilian clothes, and they took careful note of the audience's behaviour. Members of the Polish Workers' Party,

also mixed with the audience, cheered and clapped at the appropriate moments, so as to give an appearance of unanimity and enthusiasm.

February 9, 1945, Warsaw Province: Dearth everywhere in this area. Shoes cost 2,500 zlotys, a suit 50,000 zlotys, butter 500 zlotys a pound. Private people are not allowed to use the postal services. It is not allowed to travel even in your own district without a permit.

Steps are being taken to effect the complete extermination of the Home Army.

February 14, 1945, Warsaw Province: Public security is under the direction of Radkiewicz, who is dependent on the N. K. V. D. and not on the Lublin Committee. The militia in the villages is similarly situated. The Polish Workers' Party is controlled by the N. K. V. D. and used for political investigations. The population is required to give personal data on every possible occasion.

February 16, 1945, Warsaw Province: The Sovietisation of Poland is proceeding apace. Agrarian reform is being carried out in great haste in the territories taken by the Soviet Armies. The land allotted is usually much less than 4 hectares, and may not be built on. The nationalisation of industry and trade is being prepared by the annulling of the stocks of ready cash, which may only be changed for Lubin zlotys by individuals in person. The Lublin Committee is granting short-term credits, and in case of non-payment, the businesses are taken over by the Committee.

A totalitarian organisation of society is gradually being introduced, and is based on enforced one-party organisations. Such an organisation for the villages is the Peasants' Mutual Aid Association, and for workers of the appropriate Trade Union. The Supreme Councils of the Trade Unions and the "Mutual Aid" are dominated by the Polish Workers' Party.

The cooperative movement is in the hands of the one-party central cooperative "Spolem". Cinemas and films are in the hands of a cooperative for the exploitation of films taken over by the Lublin Committee from the Germans. The publication and sale of papers, journals and books is concentrated in the hands of one institution, organised to have the appearance of a readers' cooperative.

February 20, 1945, Random District: The N. K. V. D. is taking systematic steps to discover the whole organisation of the Home Army and to arrest its members. In Kielce province, about 20 percent of the former members of the Home Army have been arrested. In Sandomierz, more Poles have been arrested during the few months of Soviet occupation than during the whole five years of German occupation. The local and State authorities are constantly changing, as they cannot cope with the situation: in Kielce, the Wojewoda is the fourth and the Mayor the sixth in succession. The attitude of the population to the new authorities is indifferent or hostile. Even the enthusiasts change their views in a short time.

Members of the Home Army are grieved that, after so many years of fighting and difficulties, they still have to hide like criminals.

February 22, 1945, Lwow Province: In January, mass arrests took place, in which 60 percent of those arrested were Poles, among them 21 University professors, priests and all classes of society. The prisons are full to overflowing. In August, 1944, and January, 1945, two train loads of arrested persons, each containing about 2,000 people, were sent to forced labour camps in Russia. In connection with these arrests, the possession of an old envelope bearing a postage stamp with Hitler's image, or of an old German newspaper is considered sufficient proof of collaboration with the Germans. From February 5th, Poles in important positions (professors, doctors and so on) have been forced to sign a Memorandum condemning the Polish Government in London and the Home Army and praising the Lublin Committee.

February 22, 1945, Bialystok-Lomza Province: Between 8th and 15th November, 1944, 143 cattle trucks packed full of arrested Poles left Bialystok and Grodno in an easterly direction towards Russia. Up to January 1st, 1945, the total number of Poles arrested and deported to Russia was about 5,000 in Grodno and about 10,000 in Bialystok.

Levies for Berling's army, carried out by means of man-hunts, continue. Up to February 1st, there were arrested 6 district chiefs of staff, 5 inspectors, 3 local commandants, about 1,000 officers, 400 noncommissioned officers and some hundreds of soldiers of the Home Army together with their families. The people are unwaveringly behind the Government in London.

East of the Curzon Line, the N. K. V. D. are organising hunts for Poles, and are deporting them to forced labour in Russia. Sometimes they are forcibly expelled on the Lublin side. The Byelorussian population expresses sympathy for the Polish Government in London and wishes these territories to be Polish.

The situation is similar in Vilno and Novogrodek provinces
February 24, 1945, Radom Province: A former inspector has been arrested. The N. K. V. D. demanded that he should reveal the whole organization of the Home Army and Underground administration.

February 25, 1945, Lublin Province: In Lubartow, there is a camp for officers of the Home Army and for those officers of Zymierski's Army who have been convicted of belonging to the Home Army or of other "political" crimes. This camp is under the control of the N. K. V. D. and contains about 6,000 officers and soldiers. Every few days groups are deported to Russia to an unknown destination.

During the first days of February, the vice-Wojewoda of Kielce and some officials of the Government Delegation were arrested.

There is great anxiety at the Crimea decisions. The hostile attitude towards the Lublin Committee is increasing. Nevertheless, belief in another more favourable solution of Polish affairs has not been shaken.

February 26, 1945, Warsaw Province: The wife of Premier Arciszewski was arrested on February 20th. She was working in the Polish Red Cross. Further arrests of members of the Polish Red Cross are taking place. Please inform the British. Allied intervention necessary.

March 1, 1945, Bialystok Province: The population in Bialystok strongly supports the legal Polish Government in London. Byelorussians also support the Polish Government in London and wish to be Polish citizens. The minority question simply does not exist in these areas, as there is complete agreement. The population faithfully believes that a better solution of Polish affairs will be found. They have not become hardened, changed from what they were before the war, they are suffering, but they are fighting on and show no weakness.

In the province of Bialystok, the N. K. V. D. are carrying out arrests of former soldiers of the Home Army and of loyal-minded Poles without pause.

In February, 1945, 125 cattle trucks from Grodno Province and 242 from Bialystok Province, containing arrested Poles, were sent off to Russia.

The N. K. V. D. are keeping those arrested in cellars, air raid shelters and in every possible place. Those arrested sit in darkness, without any bedding or warm clothes. In the course of interrogations, the N. K. V. D. beat prisoners, torture them morally, keep them in the cold without clothes. They accuse those arrested of espionage on behalf of the British and of the Polish Government in London, and of collaboration with the Germans. There is a high rate of mortality among the prisoners.

Leaders of the Home Army are carried off into the heart of Russia or perish without any trace.

The N. K. V. D. often "work" in the uniforms of Polish officers. Spies and collaborators with the Gestapo were at first arrested by the N. K. V. D.—later, however, they were set free and the N. K. V. D. employed them as their own spies.

In towns and bigger villages, special posts have been set up to help in the hunt for former soldiers of the Home Army.

March 1, 1945, Lodz Province: During the last days of February, the N. K. V. D. arrested 23 officers of the Home Army, who formerly worked in the district staff.

The attitude of the population towards the Lublin authorities is unfavourable. Most people in Poland consider the present state of affairs as Soviet occupation.

No. 87

Prime Minister Churchill's Reply of March 17, 1945, to letter from Prime Minister Arciszewski, dated March 8, 1945

MY DEAR EXCELLENCY: I thank you for your letter of March 8, in which you sent me a summary of information received by your Government from Poland concerning the situation of the Polish Underground Administration and the members of the former Home Army.

This letter and its enclosed summary have been carefully read by me, and I have also transmitted them by telegram to the President of the United States.

Yours sincerely,

(—) WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.

His Excellency Monsieur T. ARCISZEWSKI.

No. 88

Message from President W. Raczkiewicz dated April 20, 1945, to President Truman, requesting that the principles of justice be defended

MR. PRESIDENT: The hour is clearly approaching when the thunder of battle will die down in Europe and the peals of victory will announce the defeat of the Teutonic oppressor at the hands of the United Nations.

On the eve of this hour so momentous to Europe and the whole world I cannot refrain from expressing my fears that the day of the long awaited peace may not be a day of joy for Poland and for many other countries, or worse still, it may not be a day of the triumph of justice. For millions of men that day will not be a day of liberation and independence.

In your speech, Mr. President, made on April 16th to both Houses of Congress, whilst voicing your unshakable will to continue this war until final victory over the aggressors, you declared that “* * * during the darkest hours of this horrible war entire nations were kept going by something intangible—hope * * *. Hope has become the secret weapon of the forces of liberation.” On the strength of my position as President of the Polish Republic and speaking on behalf of the Polish Nation, I am fully entitled to state that the Polish Nation was and continues to be inspired by a deep faith in the justice of its struggle for the integrity and independence of the Polish State. The Polish Nation also shares without any reservations your conviction, Mr. President, that “* * * thoughtful people have always had faith that ultimately justice must triumph,” because “* * * past experience surely indicates that without justice enduring peace becomes impossible.”

I am convinced that in no country will this statement of yours, Mr. President, meet with such deep response as in Poland, the country which in spite of appalling sufferings, tremendous sacrifices and bitter disappointments experienced in this war, asks for no more than the application in her case of the justice of which you, Mr. President, are so fervent an advocate.

The liberation of Europe from the aggressors, very largely due to the magnificent efforts of the American nation must not at the same time deprive of real freedom and independence a nation of 30 million people with a thousand year old history and proud of their contribution to world culture and civilisation. Poland and other small and medium nations have also contributed to a considerable extent to the general victory of the United Nations, and their natural rights to an independent existence cannot be infringed by other great powers, because as you so rightly pointed out, Mr. President, “* * * the responsibility of the Great States is to serve and not dominate the peoples of the world.”

At this vital juncture of the world war, I wish to appeal to you, Mr. President, as to an advocate of moral principles and at the same time the leader of the greatest Christian and democratic Power of our time,—to defend the freedom of all states and nations.

May I be permitted to express the conviction that the triumph of these principles in the case of Poland may only be assured when the problems on which her future is dependent will be considered regardless of the pressure of war exigencies within the framework of a better Europe in which Poland is an organic part.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to you, Mr. President, my highest consideration.

(Signed) WŁADYSLAW RACZKIEWICZ.



